



Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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CONTENTS

19 May 1995

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INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

CIS Official Previews 26 May Minsk Talks [INTERFAX]	1
ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 19 May	1

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

'No Commitment' on Joining NATO's PFP Program [INTERFAX]	3
U.S. Statement Said 'Premature' [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 19 May]	3
Article Argues Case Against NATO Expansion [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 19 May]	3
Moscow To Fulfill USSR Arms Commitments to Iran [INTERFAX]	6
Diplomat on Factory Contract With Iran [INTERFAX]	6
Tehran-Moscow Nuclear Cooperation Viewed [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 4 May]	7
Further on Visit by Turkmenistan President	9
'Text' of Yeltsin Dinner Speech [ITAR-TASS]	9
Yeltsin, Niyazov Sign Treaties [INTERFAX]	10
Accords Signed on Drug Trafficking [ITAR-TASS]	11
Farewell Ceremony Held for Niyazov [Moscow RTV]	11
Further on Defense Minister's Visit to PRC, ROK	11
Grachev Cited on Results of Visit [ITAR-TASS]	11
PRC Rejects Overtures for Alliance [IZVESTIYA 20 May]	12
Grachev Departs PRC for South Korea [ITAR-TASS]	12
Grachev Arrives in Seoul, Begins Talks [ITAR-TASS]	12
Grachev Signs Military Memorandum [ITAR-TASS]	13
Chernomyrdin Meets With Bulgarian Counterpart [ITAR-TASS]	13
Energy, Economic Cooperation With Sofia Sought [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 21 May]	13
Kozyrev's Stance on Polish Chechen Radio Viewed [SEGODNYA 19 May]	14
Poland 'Not Interested' in Dispute [INTERFAX]	15
Krakow 'Free Caucasus' Radio Protested [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 16 May]	15
Minister: Moscow on U.S. 'Blacklist' Over IPR [INTERFAX]	17
Ministry Protests Actions of U.S. Reporters [INTERFAX]	17
Foreign Ministry Cited on Bosnia 'Deadlock' [INTERFAX]	17
Foreign Ministry Criticized Over Croatia Offensive [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 May]	18
Ministry Statement on Israel, Palestinian Land [ITAR-TASS]	18

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Yeltsin Rejects Law on Settling Chechen Conflict [ITAR-TASS]	19
Yeltsin Again Nominates Paramonova To Head Central Bank [ITAR-TASS]	19
Yeltsin Weighs 'Pros,' 'Cons' of Duma Election Law [ITAR-TASS]	19
Kremlin Could Delay Duma Elections To Foil Chernomyrdin [IZVESTIYA 19 May]	20
Gaydar on Prospects for Democracy in Russia [ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 17 May]	20
Prospects for Democratic Forces' Unity Eyed [IZVESTIYA 17 May]	23
Duma-96 Announces New Election Alliance [INTERFAX]	24
Election Bloc 'People' To Protect Interests of Poor [INTERFAX]	24
Yavlinskiy Leads Among Possible Presidential Candidates [INTERFAX]	24
Yavlinskiy, Lebed Rated Highest in Poll [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 17 May]	25

Media Issues

Presidential Press Service Becomes Independent Branch [ITAR-TASS]	26
Kolesnikov To Head Government Information Department [INTERFAX]	26

Military Issues

ABM Treaty, Strategic Stability Weighed [SEGODNYA 6 May]	26
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Federal Assembly

State Duma Praises Results of Belarus Referendum [INTERFAX]	30
Calls For Russian Referendum on Integration [INTERFAX]	31
Duma Seeks To Enhance Powers of Security Services [MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 18 May]	31
Duma Asks Grachev To Allow Lebed To Attend Hearings [INTERFAX]	31
Duma Asks For Ruling on Legality of Local Party 'Cells' [INTERFAX]	31
'Fundamental Agreement' Reached on Forming Upper Chamber [KOMMERSANT-DAILY 19 May]	32

Regional Affairs

Cuny Search Team Fails To Reach Shatoy [ITAR-TASS]	32
Hope for Cuny 'Decreasing Each Day' [IZVESTIYA 19 May]	32
Grachev Insists on Preconditions for Chechen Talks [ITAR-TASS]	33
Maskhadov Ready To Meet With Grachev [INTERFAX]	33
Dudayev Critical of Chernomyrdin's Peace Proposal [INTERFAX]	33

Update on Battlefield Situation in Chechnya	34
Four Soldiers Killed in Attacks [<i>Moscow 2x2 TV</i>]	34
AP Correspondents Attacked in Grozny [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	34
Chechens, Marines Clash South of Grozny [<i>INTERFAX</i>]	34
Russian Aircraft Reportedly Attack Villages [<i>INFORMATSIONNOYE AGENTSTVO EKHO MOSKVY</i>]	34
Russians Resume Strikes at Dudayev Positions [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	35
Moscow Vows Not To Bomb Mountain Villages [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	35
Chechens Thwart Russian Advances [<i>INTERFAX</i>]	35
Federal Forces Rocket Opposition [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	35
Continued Fighting Near Bamut [<i>INTERFAX</i>]	36
Moscow Allocates R410 Billion To Restore Chechen Economy [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	36
Finance Ministry Opposes Special Tax Zones for Regions [<i>SEGODNYA 18 May</i>]	36
Moscow Mayor Luzhkov Denies Presidential Ambitions [<i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 May</i>]	36
Luzhkov Could Lose Job as Moscow Mayor [<i>ARGUMENTY I FAKTY May</i>]	37
Kazan Conference Says Tatarstan Statehood Premature [<i>SEGODNYA 19 May</i>]	37
Fertilizer Shortage Bedevils Spring Sowing in Altay [<i>SELSKAYA ZHIZN 18 May</i>]	38
Fire Flares Up at Site of Komi Oil Spill [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	39
Maritime Representative Criticizes Central Government [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	39

Economic Issues

Yeltsin Orders Issue of Gold Certificates [<i>INTERFAX</i>]	40
Petrov Presents 1996 Fiscal Policy Guidelines [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	40
Cabinet Session on Budget Reported [<i>SEGODNYA 19 May</i>]	40
\$8.5 Billion Allocated for Foreign Debt [<i>ITAR-TASS</i>]	41
\$8.7 Billion Included for Imports [<i>INTERFAX</i>]	41
Ruble's Rise Seen as Artificial, Unhealthy [<i>KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 26 May</i>]	42
Livshits Denies Rumored Central Bank Decentralization [<i>KOMMERSANT-DAILY 19 May</i>]	43
Aviation Industry Reports Substantial Losses [<i>INTERFAX</i>]	43
Energy Crisis Prompts Ministry To Seek New Powers [<i>ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 19 May</i>]	43
Finance Ministry Criticizes Coal Company Chiefs [<i>SEGODNYA 19 May</i>]	44
Ways To Stop Concealment of Oil Export Money Considered [<i>SEGODNYA 18 May</i>]	45

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Clinton Visit Seen Giving 'Impetus' to Ties [<i>HOLOS UKRAYINY 16 May</i>]	46
Results of Clinton's Visit to Kiev Viewed [<i>VSEUKRAINSKIYE VEDOMOSTI 16 May</i>]	46
Hungary's Horn Arrives, Talks With Kuchma [<i>Kiev TV</i>]	48
Romanian Foreign Ministry on Gorbulin Statement [<i>INTERFAX</i>]	48
Influence of 'Extreme Right' Examined [<i>LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 9 May</i>]	49
Official on Not Joining CIS Customs Union [<i>UNIAN</i>]	54

National Affairs

Kuchma Sees Moroz Speech as 'Open Political Move' [INTERFAX]	54
Kuchma Unable To Attend Closed Parliament Session [INTERFAX]	55
Decree Answers Crimea Referendum Protest [KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA 12 May]	56
Decree Creates Referendum Commission [KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA 13 May]	57
ITAR-TASS Referendum Report Denounced [KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA 16 May]	58
Council Appeals For Support for Referendum [KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA 16 May]	58
Demidenko on Ending Crimea Presidency [KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA 13 May]	58
Crimea's Tsekov Airs Views on Elections, Referendum [INTERFAX]	59
Delegation Head on Results of Kiev Talks [KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA 13 May]	60
Article Views NPT Issues Based on Russian Data [UKRAYINSKA HAZETA 11 May]	61
Foreign Ministry on CIS Economic Union [UNIAN]	64
Supreme Assembly Passes Law on State Power [UNIAN]	65

Economic Issues

Government Requests Larger SDR From IMF [UNIAN]	65
Bank Official Sees Easing of Hard Currency Rules [INTELNEWS]	65
Officials in Lvov on Potential Gas Cutoff [MOLODA HALYCHYNA 6 May]	65
Efforts Made To Increase Gas Supplies [KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA 12 May]	66
Gas Supply Shut-Off Resisted by Local Authorities [UNIAN]	67

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

U.S. To Fund Dismantling of Missile Launch Sites [INTERFAX]	68
Lukashenka Ruling on Arms Elimination Praised [VO SLAVU RODINY 17 May]	68
Commentary Views Results of 14 May Referendum [ZVYAZDA 17 May]	69
Communists, 'Nostalgia' Prevail in Elections [NARODNAYA GAZETA 17 May]	70
Party Leaders on Election, Referendum Results [MMC]	71
Winners in First-Round of Elections Listed [MMC]	72

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Returns From, Comments on ROK Economic Talks [Almaty TV]	73
Radio Views Results of ROK-Kazakhstan Summit [Moscow International]	73
Talks Resume With Uzbeks on Gas Deliveries [SEGODNYA 11 May]	73
Slovak Delegation Continues Cooperation Talks [Almaty TV]	74
Trade, Scientific Agreements Signed [INTERFAX]	74
Alleged Parliamentary Election Irregularities Examined [MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI 30 Apr-7 May]	75
Physicist on Nuclear-Powered Engine for Spacecraft [PANORAMA 13 May]	76

Kyrgyzstan

Government Presidium Approved; Premier Named [Bishkek Radio]	77
Article Criticizes Local Bias Against Muslims [RES PUBLICA 16 May]	78

Tajikistan

Rakhmonov Hopes For Progress in Talks With Opposition [INTERFAX]	78
Opposition Leader: Field Commanders Under Control [INTERFAX]	79
Opposition Leader on Possible Pressuring of Dushanbe Regime [INTERFAX]	79
Tajik Conflict Players Viewed [IZVESTIYA 18 May]	80

CAUCASUS

Armenia

President Speaks on Death of ARFD's Manukyan [SNARK]	83
ARFD Faction Seeks Review of Prisoner's Death [ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN]	83
National Security Acting Chief Resigns [ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN]	83

Azerbaijan

Nuclear Parts Said Shipped to Iran via Armenia [TURAN]	84
Baku To 'Strictly Observe' Karabakh Truce [INTERFAX]	84

Georgia

Shevardnadze, IMF Mission Chief Hold Talks [Tbilisi Radio]	84
Opposition Groups Form Consultative Board [AKHALI TAOBA 5 May]	85
Tbilisi Counts on Russian Help in Abkhazia [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 18 May]	86

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Further on President Meri's Visit to Finland	88
'Fleased' With Yeltsin's Remarks [INTERFAX]	88
Interviewed on Economic Issues [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET 17 May]	88
Ends Three-Day Visit 18 May [Tallinn Radio]	89
Trade, Sea Transport Agreements With Ukraine [Tallinn Radio]	89

Latvia

Finance Minister Resigns Over 'Mistakes' [BNS]	90
Transport, Communications Agreement With Belarus [Riga Radio]	90

Lithuania

Foreign Minister Departs for Gdansk Meeting [BNS]	90
Cabinet Forms Department for European Integration [BNS]	90
Opening of Chechen Center Elicits Inquiry [BNS]	91

CIS Official Previews 26 May Minsk Talks

LD1805190795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1519 GMT 18 May 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The memorandum on closer economic cooperation between Russia and Belarus which President Boris Yeltsin and President Alyaksandr Lukashenka are to sign during the CIS summit in Minsk on May 26 and which can be later joined by other countries forms a qualitatively new foundation for the Commonwealth.

The statement was made by the CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya at a Moscow news conference.

Korotchenya announced that CIS foreign ministers and possibly members of the Inter-State Economic Council will meet in Minsk before the meeting of the heads of states and governments. The Council of the Heads of State is expected to discuss eight questions and the prime-ministers 17. Some of the subjects will be discussed jointly.

Among the most important matters Korotchenya named the CIS covenant on human rights and liberties which is directly related to the position of the Russian-speaking population outside Russia, a treaty on the protection of borders with non-CIS members, the extension of the mandates of peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan and Abkhazia.

Korotchenya told Interfax that Commonwealth countries have signed over 500 documents of various levels since the formation of the CIS. He called groundless the complaints of some politicians that the agreements do not work.

He admitted that some of the decisions do not come into effect immediately or in full but this requires primarily the political will of the countries in question. Meanwhile, according to the executive secretary, Ukraine is opposed to the formation of an economic union, Turkmenistan prefers to abstain when other matters are raised.

Korotchenya voiced the belief that at the upcoming summit the Russian deputy Prime-Minister Sergey Shakhrai will be elected the head of the CIS Council for Information.

He stressed that the question of a common information space of the Commonwealth has not been dropped from the agenda because the CIS feels a shortage of information.

In Korotchenya's opinion many politicians deliberately conceal key decisions of the Council of the Heads

of State and other Commonwealth bodies or give an unrealistic picture of the implementation of the resolutions of summit meetings.

Korotchenya thanked Interfax for congratulating him on his election to the Belarusian parliament adding that elections are very difficult. "It was difficult talking to people when it came to the subject of the collapse of the USSR. But my compatriots had faith in me and entrusted me once again with representing their interests in parliament", he said.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 19 May

LD1905061895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
0600 GMT 19 May 95

["Press Review" — ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW May 19 (Itar-Tass) — ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA writes that the formation of an electoral bloc headed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin signifies, firstly, the authorities' intention to consolidate their positions inside the Parliament and, as far as possible, do without extraordinary measures and, secondly, dismisses speculations about the Premier's striving to substitute himself for the President without the latter's consent.

Many media in recent months tried to suggest the idea of the hopeless position of the present "party of power" and the need to give a wide berth to it. However, such an idea hardly conforms to political reality, the writer of the article believes.

Particularly non-sensical are attempts to convince Yeltsin that his concern for the territorial integrity of the country and doing away with the criminal-separatist hotbed in Chechnya did a great damage to him. The number of people who wish to live in a strong state is always greater than that of those who would like to break it up. Therefore, there were no protests — only few "democrats" had a fit of hysterics, the article says.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA draws attention to the problem of strengthening Sea-Based Strategic Nuclear Forces (SBSNF).

In the United States, the strategic submarine fleet is the object of national pride, for it is believed that it is precisely this fleet that is the core of deterrent to any potential threat to the U.S.

In Russia, the newspaper observes, opinions on that score are not so unambiguous. Moreover, a number of experts maintain that the State cannot afford to maintain SBSNF in present-day conditions.

Experts are of the opinion that with high effectiveness of the weapons the SBSNF do not bring threat upon

Russia's own territory, since they operate mainly outside the country and a foe cannot plan a preemptive nuclear strike against our territory. The SBSNF are the smallest from the viewpoint of attending personnel — one person per medium-yield warhead. The cost of the delivery of one warhead to target by a sea-launched missile is 33.4 percent lower than that by a land-based one.

Besides, historically things took such a turn that the land-based missiles production facilities were scattered all over the Soviet Union. Therefore, nowadays, many of the enterprises turned out to be abroad while the production facilities of the SBSNF are practically all (up to 95 per cent) on the territory of the Russian Federation.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writes that Russia leads the field by the number of attempts to seize aircraft. But, according to the Department for Supervision of the Enforcement of Laws by Transportation and Customs Agencies, general crime in transport services has somewhat decreased over the past two years. This applies primarily to wilful murders, aggravated assaults, and robberies — 223 last year as against 282 in 1993.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an article about General Aleksandr Lebed.

"Despite efforts by Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev to make Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed leave Tiraspol, the Commander of the 14th all-arms army continues pointedly to ignore incoming suggestions for him to choose a new place of service, and at the same time he makes derogatory remarks about members of Russia's political and military leadership.

"Grachev, urged by the Kremlin to take resolute actions, once again got into an unpleasant situation by issuing a directive to disband the Control Department of the 14th army. Lebed made it clear that he did not intend to obey the directive. Since Grachev left for Beijing and Seoul for planned visits, there is a brief time-out for the time being. Nevertheless, the Lebed-associated problem exists and it is yet to be resolved. However, no one knows how".

ROSSIYSKIE VESTI believes that depositors are worried at the forthcoming privatisation of the Savings Bank. The Russian Federation's Savings Bank is now an open-type joint-stock company, in which the controlling interest (51 per cent) belongs to the Central Bank of Russia.

A new law banning the Central Bank from acting as co-founder in any commercial banks, entered into force recently. This means that the Central Bank is to part with the controlling interest before January 1, 1996.

Mikhail Delyagin, a prominent analyst in the Presidential team, believes that the State is unlikely to give away such a coveted piece of the pie, for this is a sure source of revenue and the basis of social stability.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes that following the uncertain balancing at the 5,125-5,130-rouble mark, the U.S. dollar is continuously falling. By May 10, it went below the 5,100-rouble mark and ten days later closely approached the 5,000-rouble mark. It must be recalled that way back in April, prescient Economics Minister Yevgheny Yasin predicted such a turn of events.

The accuracy of the Ministerial forecast suggests the idea that this decline is a thoroughly planned move by the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank, the writer of the article believes.

The government has secured the decline in the foreign-exchange currency rate by stopping the money-printing machines and suspending the granting of credits to factories and collective farms, the article points out.

Within the first quarter of the year, 6,000 million roubles were withdrawn from circulation and no new banknotes were printed. Delays in the payment of wages, a refusal to pay for the already filled State-placed order in the defence industry, and the replacement of money for springtime sowing campaign by petrol on credit are all things from the same category, the newspaper explains.

'No Commitment' on Joining NATO's PFP Program

LD1805150195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1323 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — Moscow views as premature the statement by the US Department of State spokesman Nicholas Burns to the effect that Russia will join NATO's Partnership for Peace [PFP] program on May 31, a senior member of Russia's Foreign Ministry told Interfax on Thursday.

According to Burns, an agreement on when Russian will join the program was reached in Moscow at the latest meeting between Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin.

"As far as I know, no commitment on this score was made at the summit in Moscow," the source said.

Nevertheless he did not rule out the possibility that Russia will join NATO's program in late May. "On May 30 the NATO Council will hold a session in Nordveik outside the Hague, and on May 31 the North-Atlantic Council for Cooperation will convene for a session there. The head of Russian diplomacy Andrey Kozyrev is expected to attend both events," the diplomat said.

Last December, at the similar events which took place in Brussels Russia was willing to join the Partnership for Peace program. "That did not happen, however, since previously the NATO Council took decisions which forced us to think twice," the diplomat noted.

At that time the NATO Council decided to consider the possibility of expanding the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization eastwards.

As the diplomat said, "Moscow would not like the Brussels version to be repeated in Nordveik." "Suppose we declare that we shall join the Partnership for Peace program, and the NATO Council springs another surprise on us. So it's better to be in no haste," the diplomat said.

The joining of the Partnership for Peace program does not include the signing of any documents, he explained. "Russia and NATO will simply make a corresponding statement, that's all," he added.

The diplomat stressed that the second document on bilateral cooperation known as the Russia-NATO program will come into force along with Moscow's joining the Partnership for Peace program. "We believe that it is inexpedient to have them go into effect at different times," he pointed out.

U.S. Statement Said 'Premature'

MK1905102095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 May 95 p 2

[Unattributed report in the "In Brief" column: "Russia's Participation in the 'Partnership for Peace' Is Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A high-ranking staffer of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry said yesterday that Moscow considers the statement made by Nicholas Burns, official representative of the U.S. State Department, on Russia's joining NATO's Partnership for Peace program on 31 May, premature. According to Mr. Burns, the presidents of the United States and Russia have agreed on the time when the Russian Federation will join this program during their meeting in May in Moscow. At the same time, the Russian diplomat does not exclude the possibility that Russia could join NATO's program in late May.

Article Argues Case Against NATO Expansion

MM1905115995 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 May 95 p 2

[Article by Major General Pavel Semenovitch Zolotarev, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry information analysis center: "NATO Expansion: Objective Inevitability or Artificial Impasse?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Victory and the connected addressing of the history of World War II has shed light on the acuteness of the problems of consolidating European security and expanding NATO. The West has undertaken its latest demarche with a view to influencing Russia's principled stance on this issue. So it will be worth returning yet again to the thrust of the problem.

At the NATO Council session U.S. Vice President Mr. Gore stated that the expansion of the North Atlantic alliance is an inevitable process which accords with the political and strategic interests of this organization itself.

But for such an assertion, especially as it describes this as an inevitable process, one should add and reveal the political and strategic interests with which the alliance's expansion actually accords. Because the thrust of the activity of any organization is determined primarily not by the number of members but by the policy pursued by that organization in the interests both of the organization and of its individual members.

So the assertion that NATO's expansion is an inevitable process is a ruse. The West is making the maximum efforts to persuade Russia in such a way that this ruse is not that obvious. But meetings with the military-political leadership of the West European countries and

the United States and analysts' discussions have shown the unsoundness of arguments in favor of expanding NATO. The West is aware of the weakness of its position but is not abandoning its intentions.

What is the reason for a number of states and primarily the United States and the FRG continuing to insist on the expansion of NATO?

The thrust is evidently in the fact that the bloc's expansion accords with the interests of the following:

- the United States, which is seeking with the aid of this instrument to retain its influence on the continent;
- several European states anxious to gain a firm hold in the new Europe through membership of the alliances;
- the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries which through joining NATO hope to gain access to unrestricted Western aid and facilitate economic integration into "greater Europe."

It is the coincidence of these interests which has led to the point where the trend toward the preferential expansion of NATO has prevailed over the process of the alliance's real transformation from a Western military-political bloc into a peacekeeping organization.

How does the desire to achieve these interests conform with the interests of European security?

The answer is obvious enough — it does not conform in any way! The resumption of the cold war under the new geopolitical conditions is virtually impossible. The era of global confrontation between two incompatible socioeconomic systems has receded irreversibly into the past. But, as the Russian president rightly noted at the Budapest OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] forum, NATO's expansion will lead to the expansion of a "cold peace" in Europe.

It is simple enough to convince ourselves that these are not emotions but an entirely logical position: You have to think about what really must be done to ensure security under modern geopolitical conditions.

The end of the cold war period can be characterized by a whole series of positive factors and primarily by the fact that the likelihood of a wide-scale war has become infinitesimally small. The need has gone for military blocs designed for wide-scale warfare. The conservation of such military blocs has become politically and economically pointless.

At the same time the new era has given rise to new challenges to security. Now it may be said with complete conviction that in the world today the likelihood of armed conflicts and local wars has not only remained but has been increased.

There has been a change in the system of bloc coordinates in which the interests of a whole series of states were maintained. Now national interests of individual states which have found themselves outside the existing alliance have come to the fore.

At the same time a review of spheres of influence between countries seeking to raise their role at the regional level has begun. As a rule these processes are accompanied by the threat of the outbreak of armed conflicts which could grow into local wars.

In this connection the process of the establishment of new security systems which has begun in a number of regions of the world and primarily in Europe reflects an objective need which is being dictated by the real geopolitical situation. It is entirely natural that the key issue of the formation of collective security of a new type is the determination of the structure and its functions, which should primarily be determined by the tasks facing the security system.

In the cold war period the political prerequisites for the emergence of a military threat were conditioned by the struggle between two different socioeconomic formations and so did not have a nature that was in any way dynamic. Under the new geopolitical conditions the political prerequisites for the outbreak of armed conflicts and local conflicts are quite diverse and dynamic. A characteristic feature of the moment is the possibility of collective efforts to neutralize them at an early stage before armed conflicts emerge. It follows that under present conditions preventive diplomacy acquires a special role.

The timely and skilled use of political and diplomatic measures to regulate the contradictions which arise could make it possible to prevent the actual possibility of the emergence of military conflicts. So any regional security system should include organs which should be capable on the basis of an analysis of the interstate contradictions which arise to elaborate recommendations for resolving them by political means but, most importantly, they should have an instrument for implementing the recommendations. Any fire is easier to prevent than to put out later.

At the same time we must consider that political diplomatic methods cannot always be effective. In that case, if we have not managed to prevent the outbreak of a military conflict, we must provide for the possibility of using force to localize an armed conflict and exclude the possibility of its escalation. From this it follows that security systems should have mechanisms, an organization, and groupings of troops (forces) designed for and able to carry out peace-keeping and peace restoration operations. But the decisive say must remain

with politicians, for military measures in principle cannot eliminate the political causes for the emergence of armed conflicts and can only create the necessary conditions for their elimination.

Thus the structure and tasks of the security system are obvious enough. But in real life it is not all that simple.

The formation of regional security systems is not taking place in a vacuum. And if we compare the processes of the formation of the security systems of the CIS states and the European states then for Europe the security system's formation is taking place under more complex initial conditions. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the USSR, the CIS countries have not been burdened with the military-political structures created previously.

A different situation has taken shape in Europe. It has inherited the structures formed in the cold war period — the OSCE, NATO, the Western European union, the EC. Without any doubt nearly all of them have positive experience which could be used in forming a new European security system. The desire to use these structures is entirely logical and cannot give rise to objections. The OSCE is best adapted to resolving the main task — implementing preventive diplomacy.

The OSCE is the organization of the future. It should develop and the first positive steps have been taken in this direction at the Budapest forum. NATO and the Western European Union are the organizations which have a military force at their disposal and on whose basis there could be formed the structure of a European security system which should be able to fulfill the functions of maintaining and restoring peace.

The Western European Union is a developing organization while NATO is a defense structure formed a long time ago. The idea of the "partnership for peace" program aimed at countering modern threats to security deserves support but this partnership should not supplement NATO's previously existing defense potential but replace it. In that case NATO could become an organic part of a new European security system. But what is actually happening?

It follows from all recent NATO documents that it is planned to retain all the organization's defensive functions with a certain reduction in the peace-time grouping of the bloc's allied armed forces. All groups of armies created in the cold war era (the central group of armies, the northern group of armies, and so forth) are retained to repel "aggression from the East," as are the NATO military planning organs, which elaborate the relevant operational plans.

Moreover, it is a case of expanding NATO. That means that the groupings of armed forces of new members of the alliance will join the bloc's allied armed forces, that is their combat potential will really increase. It is characteristic that the real contenders for NATO membership include those states which see Russia as the main threat to their security, citing its "internal instability" or "imperial aspirations." With this logic the result is that a weak Russia is dangerous because it is weak and a strong Russia is dangerous because it is strong.

Thus the real transformation of NATO, about which so much is being said, is not taking place. Moreover, you form the impression that there are no such intentions. If NATO is truly seeking to transform itself then why talk of some measures to compensate Russia or of a nonaggression agreement? That is topical for antagonistic military blocs but pointless for a collective security system.

When people speak of the consequences of NATO's expansion then as a rule there is talk of Russia's reaction although it would be more correct to speak of the interests of European security.

The expansion of NATO not only puts back the date for creating a truly bloc-free system of European security but also could with even greater likelihood transform the alliance into an ineffective organization. It will be extremely difficult to elaborate a collective decision with an expanded composition. The nature of present challenges to security and their diversity and the growth of internal contradictions among the European states presents a complex enough tasks for the alliance's existing composition. Europe could be deprived prematurely, before the formation of an effective system of general security, of an important structure essential for this transitional period.

NATO's expansion also influences the processes of the formation of a CIS regional security system. Instead of a system of collective security the formation of a defensive alliance will inevitably begin.

NATO's expansion will undermine the entire disarmament treaty and law base which has been elaborated as of now. And it is a case not only of the OSCE but also of the strategic arms limitation treaty. At first glance no direct logical connection can be seen here but in the State Duma even now there is a far from unequivocal attitude toward the START II treaty and after the alliance's expansion its ratification will in practice become unfeasible.

It is not only NATO's expansion but also the rhetoric around this problem which will be used actively during

the election campaign in Russia. On the one hand this will influence the disposition of political forces and on the other it could give rise to responsive steps from Russia that are far from appropriate to the real threat. If you also consider that in the same period there will be presidential elections in the United States then it is not hard to predict the possible consequences.

What conclusion can be drawn from the existing situation? Is a compromise solution possible, satisfying the interests of the countries which want NATO's expansion and the interests of European security and Russia's interests?

Such a decision is possible! But not through bartering with Russia over some compensation measures. No trading can compensate for the above-mentioned adverse consequences of NATO's expansion. On the basis of mutual respect for interests different, compromise solutions can be found.

The conservation of U.S. influence in Europe accords with the interests of European security. That is understood in the West European countries and in Russia. The United States only has to make efforts to find new forms of cooperation and mechanisms for influencing European processes through the structures of a new European security system. Of course that is more complicated than using the old, tuned mechanism. But displaying inertia in adapting to the new political conditions will cause great damage, including to the interests of the United States itself.

A similar situation exists for the countries which are asserting their status in the new Europe. They can acquire prestige and a fitting role by resolving topical problems of ensuring universal security.

Excessive and in fact unfounded concern for their own security on the part of the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic countries can be removed not by expanding NATO but by different means — for instance by a system of multilateral guarantees.

It is possible that there is some point in creating a joint consultative mechanism to elaborate the criteria for transforming NATO and the temporary framework for their implementation, to elaborate specific measures excluding the resurrection of confrontation between blocs. That is a more urgent task than the elaboration of criteria and the procedure for NATO's expansion. Its solution could be a component of wide-scale cooperation between Russia and NATO.

All-around cooperation between Russia and NATO both within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" program and outside it, is essential but not in parallel with but instead of NATO's expansion.

It is essential to make full use of the opportunities envisaged by the "stability in Europe Pace" signed 21 March this year to maintain the status quo on the continent.

It is essential also to breathe new life into and to make full use of all potential but as yet unrealized opportunities of the "Partnership for Peace" program.

Only mutual compromise (and not bartering), respect, and priority for collective security interests over the interests of individual states or organizations from the cold war time can help find the optimum solution rather than a deadlock one.

Moscow To Fulfill USSR Arms Commitments to Iran

*LD1905111595 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1016 GMT 19 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — The Iranian arms market will be sated for a certain time after Russia fulfils the commitments of the former USSR, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official believes.

At the same time, he stressed in an interview with Interfax Friday that "Russia has no intentions of going beyond the agreements concluded with Tehran in the military sphere."

Meeting the press after talks with U.S. President Bill Clinton in Moscow on Wednesday last week, his Russian counterpart Boris Yeltsin reiterated Moscow's pledge to fulfil the available arms delivery contracts with Tehran, but said that Russia would not sign new ones.

The diplomat reported that the Americans are in "a rather fault-finding" mood toward all aspects of Russian-Iranian military cooperation, "the terms of its completion included."

"Frankly speaking, we do not set such terms for ourselves," he noted, adding that Moscow "is not afraid to lose the arms market in Iran or be forced out of it."

The source confessed that "in recent time Russia has not received from Iran any special requests for expanding cooperation in the field."

Diplomat on Factory Contract With Iran

*LD1805190895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1835 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — If the Russian Nuclear Power Ministry signed the contract for constructing in Iran a factory, using gas

centrifuges supplied by Russia, for enriching uranium the contract would be wrecked sooner or later even without the assistance of the U.S., a high-ranking Russian diplomat told Interfax today.

He said that the investigation of the issue of possible delivery of gas centrifuges to Tehran had begun on the initiative of the Russian Foreign Ministry proposed by the U.S. in about a week before the Russian-U.S. summit in Moscow on May 10-11.

The diplomat said that a report of Russian Nuclear Power Minister Viktor Mikhaylov on the issue had been submitted for consideration by the government and letters had been sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The diplomat denied media reports that Mikhaylov had secretly signed some documents with Iran without the consent of the Russian president and government.

The diplomat said that there were no contracts for building a factory for enriching uranium which would utilize centrifuges. Mikhaylov just signed the record of the talks during his visit to Tehran in January 1995 saying that contracts for preparing Iranian nuclear specialists and construction of the factory will be worked out.

The diplomat said he believed that from the legal point of view the minister had the right to sign such a protocol. He said this was a working document not involving any obligations but just fixing the basis of the talks. The diplomat said the U.S. had just failed to find anything other compromising the Russian-Iranian deal.

According to the diplomat, Mikhaylov, however, "displayed some autonomous actions because the issue of delivery of gas centrifuges, contrary to the issue of preparing specialists, goes beyond the scope of the basic agreements signed with Iran in 1992." The diplomat said Mikhaylov was unlikely to have an approval of the Russian Government for making such a move.

The diplomat repeated that Russia and Iran had concluded two agreements in August 1992, the first one on helping Iran to build the nuclear power station and the second one on cooperation for peaceful use of nuclear power. According to the diplomat, the documents decided on the scope for bilateral cooperation, in particular the construction of the nuclear power station in Iran, delivery of a reactor for research and preparation of personnel for the nuclear power station.

The diplomat admitted that the Russian Foreign Ministry had not until recently known about the record signed by Mikhaylov in Tehran. At the same time, he added that the nuclear power minister "did not have to show us these records." The diplomat said that if the

Nuclear Power Ministry had decided to think the issue over seriously it should have addressed the government and proposed that a corresponding separate agreement be concluded.

The diplomat said Moscow "hopes that the settlement of the issue of centrifuges will calm down the U.S."

For more details please see the IF Diplomatic Panorama of May 18.

Tehran-Moscow Nuclear Cooperation Viewed

954E0944A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 4 May 95 pp 1, 4

[Article by Natalya Kalashnikova and Georgiy Bovt:
"Always a Place for Bargaining in Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The story concerning the contract on deliveries to Iran of Russian light-water reactors is gaining notoriety as we approach the meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton scheduled for 9-10 May in Moscow. Certain contradictory announcements resounded yesterday on this theme, giving cause to reflect in particular on the correlation between politics and economics.

The first announcement. Yesterday, U.S. representative to the United Nations Madeleine Albright stated that a unilateral U.S. embargo had gone into effect with respect to Iran, and called upon allies to cease their dealing with "the sponsor of world terrorism." One automatically thinks back to 1979, to the seizure of American diplomats by Islamists and subsequent U.S. sanctions. So we are talking about pure politics here, for terrorism is evil. The second announcement—from Saudi Arabia—supports this. According to information from Riyadh, Iran intends to allow the Islamic resistance movement Hamas—considered by many to be the main obstacle in the path towards achieving a Near East peace—to open up an official representation in Tehran. Moreover, according to the Saudis, Iran just recently apportioned about \$20 million to Hamas and is now studying the possibility of sending weapons and ammunition, including rounds for the Grad salvo-fire system, to the occupied Arab territories.

The third announcement, coming from Dubai but citing a source in Riyadh, prompts us to reflect somewhat on other matters. The substance of this is as follows. The oil companies of Saudi Arabia, the largest oil exporter in the world, are entirely capable of replacing Iranian oil companies as far as the Americans are concerned. In other words, U.S. firms such as Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Texaco, and Conoco, now prohibited by presidential decision from doing business with the Iranians, need only effect a small spatial maneuver to

prevent any losses. A REUTER news report, citing a Saudi source, states specifically that Riyadh's oil industry presently finds itself in an unenviable position—it has had to lower production, since competition in the region is great and there are few buyers. The Iranian embargo comes at precisely the right time. Just as did Riyadh's "malicious gossip" aimed at Tehran, shielding Hamas. True, it was also reported that although the victimized American companies attentively considered the initiative of Saudi Arabia's Aramco, they were casting their gaze on other sources as well—in the Near East, West Africa, and even in Russia. And here the notion of pure politics automatically becomes interwoven with equally pure commercial considerations.

Then we have the fourth announcement—from Ankara, where in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding a meeting took place of the oil ministers of Turkey and Iran. The word "embargo" was not in high regard. The parties confirmed that the volume of Iranian oil shipments to Turkey would be maintained on the 1994 level. Moreover, a quite promising plan for deliveries of Iranian gas to Ankara was discussed (up to 10 billion cubic meters in all, the first 2 billion to be delivered in 1998). How against this background must the fifth announcement look—issued yesterday from the lips of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Albert Chernyshev and confirming numerous preceding ones issued from highly placed Russian political figures? Chernyshev stated that Russia will continue its cooperation with Iran and will not repudiate its contract for completion of construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. To answer this question we might find a small historical excursion useful.

The Iranian theme has already resounded in Russian-American dialogue, and fairly powerfully so. In the fall of 1992, Washington was beset with alarm—Moscow intended to ship submarines to Tehran. At that time the first rumors were being heard that instability in the former USSR would create conditions favorable for Tehran's acquisition of access to nuclear secrets, and that someone in the CIS in general, and in Russia in particular, could succumb to the temptation of commercial gain and supply Iran with what would essentially be nuclear warheads.

In short, everyone was scared. True, in November 1992, the U.S. State Department hastened to dispel fears somewhat, as if to say—there is instability, but not to the extent that such materials might escape from the CIS, although we suspect that certain technologies are leaking to Iran through Argentina and China. But as far as the Iranian nuclear program is concerned, it is in the "embryonic" state. At the same time, Washington did not diminish its focus on the submarines, which were

old diesel models. On 4 August 1993, the REUTER agency reported from Dubai that a submarine made in Russia had moored in the port of Bandar-Abbas—and not the first, but the second such submarine. According to the contract, Moscow had promised to deliver three submarines to Tehran.

By that time the Iranian theme had become an everyday topic in talks between Moscow and Washington. In what tenor did political figures discuss the subject? Was this a matter of pure policy? On the struggle against terrorism, for example? Or were these emotions the domain of the press? But first let us consider one additional detail. At the end of March 1993, Andrey Kozyrev visited Tehran. Following this the Iranian Mejlis ratified an agreement with Moscow, dated back in 1989—on cooperation in the nuclear energy sphere, according to which Russia (the legal successor to the USSR) was obliged to provide Iran assistance in building a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. The contract was concluded for \$2.7 billion, according to preliminary data, and would run over a period of 84 months. The shipment of reactors was also envisioned. Russian experts asserted then that these were of the variety already sold to Finland and operating at the nuclear power plants Voronezh-2 and Kola.

Washington's reaction was an angry one. But not as hysterical as the one we see today. In mid-May 1993, Andrew Pierre and Jeffrey Kemp, experts from the Carnegie Foundation—an organization close to United States structures of power, held a briefing at the Russian-American Information Center in Moscow. At that time in particular, the thought was being expressed that Moscow, with the aim of resolving friction with the United States, had advanced a proposal "to divide up spheres of influence in the arms trade." In the opinion of Pierre and Kemp, Russia was fated to obtain mainly the old markets—Iran, India, China, the DPRK, Syria, and Libya. The logic of this assertion is also supported by the well-known contract for shipment to India of cryogenic missile motors and corresponding technologies, which was not in harmony with norms of the control system for missile technologies. It is the Iranian and Indian contracts, inherited from the USSR, that were exceedingly vexing to Washington, according to the Carnegie Foundation experts.

Then came the summit meeting in Vancouver, where both stories came up in the dialogue of Yeltsin and Clinton. Neither man, incidentally, was about to weary the other with maxims on terrorism and the like. The conversation proceeded ever increasingly around mercenary matters. Russia was threatened with sanctions and the cessation of aid (just as the Capitol is presently threatening to cut off aid). But Yeltsin steered the question into the sphere of compensation, as if to say—look, we

take a loss in severing the contracts; what do we get in return? In other words, instead of ideological quarreling, purely commercial aspects came to the fore, according to people who were involved. No sale of submarines to Iran? Fine. If you are so afraid of Iran, then let us share arms markets, in the Persian Gulf, for example. Finally, tell us—who will it be who compensates us for the lost submarine contract valued at up to half a billion dollars? Suspend the contract with India? All right. But who will support the Russian space firms? Who, for example, will allocate quotas for the commercial launch of satellites? As a result, without going into all the details, we see that everything was reduced one way or another to compromise, the traces of which are visible today. It should also be noted, by the way, that the story concerning submarines for Iran somehow fizzled out unnoticed. And not only because of the commitment Boris Yeltsin made last fall in Washington not to conclude new contracts for arms shipments to Iran. It was simply that Russia, seemingly by accident (but this is not in fact true), experienced great success in the export of its fighters to Malaysia.

Today Moscow and Washington are again demonstrating an enviable stubbornness in the Iranian issue. Clinton—who cannot help but understand that he is driving his "friend Boris" into a corner—apparently needs this primarily for domestic consumption. President Clinton simply cannot win political points on anything else these days. And following the explosion in Oklahoma, the terrorism card is simply a joker in his deck. Why is Moscow being so stubborn? It too cannot help but understand that it would be better to have the Iranian regime near its borders—ideologically alien to it, to put it mildly (financing not only Hamas, but the Afghanistan mujahidin as well)—weak and not in possession of nuclear weapons, rather than strong and in possession of these weapons. This too is being done in part for domestic consumption—it is considered good form nowadays to say "no" to America.

But the external toughness of the two capitals implies that compromise will once again most likely be reached at the Moscow summit on 10 May. Whether this will mean the possibility of redirecting the light-water reactors from Iran to the DPRK (at Washington's prompting) or something else—is not all that important.

**Further on Visit by Turkmenistan President
'Text' of Yeltsin Dinner Speech**

*LD1805141695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1406 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin today hosted a state dinner in the Kremlin in honour of President

of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov. The text of Yeltsin's speech at the state dinner follows:

"Esteemed Saparmurad Atayevich,

Esteemed Turkmen guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

"Here on Russian soil, I cordially greet the President of Turkmenistan and all the Turkmen guests who are present in this hall.

"Saparmurad Atayevich and myself, we have opportunities for meeting often. Primarily at conferences within the framework of the Commonwealth. The leader of Turkmenistan did us the honour of attending the recent celebrations of a jubilee which the peoples of our countries have in common, the 50th anniversary of Great Victory.

"Our meeting today is a special occasion. The President of Turkmenistan has for the first time arrived in Russia for an official friendly visit, which testifies to a high level of Russian-Turkmen relations.

"They say in Turkmenistan: 'An unsewn seed will never sprout'. We have sown good seeds in the field of cooperation and interaction, and they have already sprouted well. There are no differences between our countries. And we are firmly determined to comprehensively develop and deepen our bilateral cooperation and our ties.

"Russia and Turkmenistan regard each other as privileged partners, and this is the main principle of our relationship. Evidence of this can be seen in the results of today's Russian-Turkmen talks.

"I want to point in particular to The Treaty of Cooperation for Purposes of Securing the Rights of Ethnic Minorities and The Agreement on the Legal Status of the Citizens of Russia and Turkmenistan who have Permanent Domicile on the Territory of either Party. These two documents are of principled importance.

"I will stress that the on-going work to improve the legal framework of our relations in the humanitarian sphere is a distinguishing characteristic of the Russian-Turkmen relationship.

"In December 1993, we with Saparmurad Atayevich signed the truly innovative Agreement on Dual Citizenship. It has taken full legal effect since. The documents signed today will set yet another good example for other Commonwealth states to follow.

"Of course, there are snags in our relations. But they do not frighten us. The main thing is that both ourselves and our Turkmen friends have the will and desire to overcome difficulties. And we are doing so with success.

"Many problems, including economic, can be resolved through interaction with Commonwealth member states. I think that a policy of integration in the Commonwealth at an individual pace and with the possibility of choosing from among a number of options provides an opportunity for Turkmenistan as well to join, and actively participate in the integrational processes.

"Our countries have a vital interest in international stability in the world. Unfortunately, real threats to security continue to loom over the southern frontiers of the Commonwealth.

"Russia is making and will continue to make all efforts to ensure regional security. We are prepared for closest possible cooperation with all countries concerned, including Turkmenistan, and with the international community as a whole.

"We are for strengthening our political contacts with the Turkmen side in close interaction on the international arena, within the framework of the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States, and at European and Asian forums.

"We attach special significance to constructive cooperation with Turkmenistan in handling problems of the Caspian Sea.

"Russian people know Turkmenistan as a country of oases and deserts, natural gas and oil, cotton and karakul pelts, silk and fruit. Turkmens weave beautiful tapestry and rear splendid fast horses. But what's most important, Turkmenistan for Russians is a country of friends".

Yeltsin, Niyazov Sign Treaties

*LD1805184695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1519 GMT 18 May 95*

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Presidents Boris Yeltsin of Russia and Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan signed a treaty on the legal status of Russian citizens permanently residing in Turkmenistan and Turkmenistan citizens permanently residing in Russia.

The two men also signed a treaty on cooperation in protecting the rights of the Russian ethnic minority in Turkmenistan and the Turkoman ethnic minority in Russia and a joint statement on Niyazov's official visit to Moscow.

Yeltsin said in the course of the talks in the Kremlin that the two countries had agreed on strategic partnership until the year 2000. Turkmenistan is the first CIS member nation with which Russia has established this kind of relations, Yeltsin continued. In his view, this is

a very important step, beneficial for the interests of the two countries and peoples.

Yeltsin said that his meeting with Niyazov without any aides present was marked with a high degree of mutual understanding. In his words, Niyazov is his friend and they kept nothing secret from each other.

According to Yeltsin, the use of Russian installations in Turkmenistan, in particular joint use of gas pipelines, dominated the meeting. Another priority issue was the Caspian Sea. "We want the status of that body of water to be defined jointly in the interests of all the Caspian countries," he said.

The two men also discussed the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border.

Yeltsin emphasized that a common ground was found on all these issues.

He added that they also exchanged views on political counterbalance to the Islamization of the Central Asian region. Yeltsin emphasized that the Islamization could have dire consequences.

"We have difficult relations with Afghanistan. The Tajik-Afghan border which we help to protect has been violated on numerous occasions. The good relations Turkmenistan and President Saparmurat Niyazov have (with Afghanistan) could be used in political solution of these problems," Yeltsin said.

In his words, Russia has no claims, territorial or others, on Afghanistan and wants friendly mutually beneficial relations based on confidence with that country.

Yeltsin expressed the hope that Turkmenistan will provide political assistance in moving towards that goal.

When the talks ended, Yeltsin told journalists that Niyazov will use his influence in Iran and Afghanistan to help establish good relations with Afghanistan, resolve the border situation and improve the Tajik situation. He noted that Russia has normal relations with Iran.

Niyazov said that Turkmenistan is interested to work for stability on the Tajik-Afghan border and work for better Russian-Afghani relations.

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Niyazov signed an inter-governmental agreement in Moscow Wednesday on cooperation in the fuel industry.

Under the document, a joint company will be set up to develop oil and gas fields in Turkmenistan. The cooperation in this field will include the setting up of joint ventures, notably with third countries involved in them, for prospecting, drilling, refining and construction of transit pipelines.

Chernomyrdin told journalists that Russia intends to step up the economic and trade cooperation with Turkmenistan. He emphasized that Turkmenistan used to be the USSR's second largest source of oil and gas.

In the course of Niyazov's visit a total of 23 documents were signed. In particular, First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets and his Turkoman counterpart signed an inter-governmental agreement on the guidelines for economic cooperation between the two countries until the year 2000 and an agreement on cooperation in the setting up of a North-South transport corridor across the two countries.

Other inter-governmental agreements signed during the visit include those on cooperation in air defense, guarding air force installations and organization of military transport.

The foreign ministers of the two countries signed a consular convention, an agreement on the status of media reporters and an inter-governmental agreement on cooperation in culture, education and science.

An agreement on the setting up of a Russian trade mission in Turkmenistan and a Turkoman one in Russia was also signed.

Accords Signed on Drug Trafficking

*LD1805194095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1719 GMT 18 May 95*

[By Olga Semenova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 18 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian Interior Minister Viktor Yerin and his Turkmen counterpart Colonel-General Kurban Kasymov met in Moscow today to discuss cooperation between the two countries in fighting drug trafficking.

Yerin noted the importance of such cooperation, taking into account Turkmenistan's geographical position: in most countries bordering Turkmenistan the cultivation and production of narcotic substances was widely practiced.

The two ministers voiced their satisfaction with the cooperation between the two countries in this field. During joint operations against drug dealers the law enforcement bodies confiscated 90 kilograms of substances which might have been used for the production of "especially dangerous drugs".

One of the agreements signed during today's meeting calls for more active contacts between the two countries in fighting drug business, including the prevention of transit transportation of drugs from foreign countries to Russia via Turkmenistan.

The meeting between the two Interior ministers was attended by the chief of the Russian Interior department for fighting drug trafficking, Major-General Aleksandr Sergeev.

Farewell Ceremony Held for Niyazov

*LD1905142295 Moscow Russian Television Network
in Russian 1000 GMT 19 May 95*

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Video shows Yeltsin and Niyazov shaking hands, and greeting various officials at a Kremlin hall] The official farewell ceremony for President of Turkmenistan Saparmurad Niyazov was held today in Kremlin. Yesterday both sides expressed deep satisfaction with the negotiations, which resulted in the signing of a total of 23 documents. Among them is the agreement on trade and economic partnership until year 2000. It has been noted that this is the first such agreement signed by Russia with another CIS country for such a long period of time.

Further on Defense Minister's Visit to PRC, ROK

Grachev Cited on Results of Visit

*LD1805175195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1637 GMT 18 May 95*

[By Grigoriy Arslanov and Vyacheslav Tomilin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BEIJING, May 18 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev described his five-day visit to China as quite successful. After he had completed his tour of the country and returned to Beijing Grachev said that during the talks with the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin and defence minister Chi Haotian the sides primarily discussed bilateral cooperation in the military sphere. Grachev noted that during meetings with the Chinese political leadership the Chinese side showed its willingness to deepen Russo-Chinese friendly relations in all spheres.

"Both the Chinese leaders and the Chinese people seek to restore as soon as possible close, warm and fraternal relations which existed between the people of the two countries several decades ago," Grachev said. However, he pointed out that during the meetings and talks the question of an alliance was not raised. The Chinese leadership intends to look into his proposals on the creation of a subregional structure of collective security in Northeast Asia. Grachev denied allegations that the sale of Russian weapons to China poses any threat to Russia's security, saying that "neither at present, nor in the near future China poses any threat to Russia."

Grachev expressed his regret, commenting on another nuclear explosion made in China several days ago. Grachev quoted the Chinese defence minister as saying that "other world powers possessing nuclear weapons had tested them much more often and therefore, they surpass the Chinese weapons in quality. China seeks to reach the level of other nuclear powers, including Russia, but as soon as a treaty on a comprehensive ban on tests of nuc weapons is signed, China will immediately sign it and cease nuclear explosions, including for peaceful purposes."

Grachev declared that he was prepared to meet the Chechen field commander Aslan Maskhadov to discuss the problem of ending the bloodshed, provided the Chechen side fulfills initial demands for a full ceasefire, ultimate capitulation and weapons' surrender.

"If Maskhadov is willing to do so and if he believes that I can settle some problems, after consulting the president, provided Boris Yeltsin authorizes it, I might meet Maskhadov if this is really useful and the bloodshed ends," Grachev said. As a political condition, Grachev stipulated the recognition of the fact that Chechnya is the subject of the Russian Federation. "It is only after Chechnya complies with this demand that we might discuss who shall or who shall not be punished and what should be done to restore the Chechen economy together," he said.

On Friday morning Grachev is going on an official visit to Seoul.

PRC Rejects Overtures for Alliance

*MM1905150095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 May 95 p 1*

[Report by correspondent Vladimir Skosyrev: "Beijing Rejects Grachev's 'Alliance' Proposals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has completed his visit to the PRC. Summing up the results of his trip during a conversation with Russian journalists, the head of the military department said that he proposed, in particular, to Beijing that they should tackle security issues together. He raised this topic with virtually every leader he was able to see. The Chinese replied: We do not intend to join any alliance or bloc, and won't create such an alliance. It remained unclear from the interview whether Grachev put forward these epoch-making proposals with the Kremlin's sanction or did so off his own bat. South Korea has become the next stage in the minister's foreign tour.

Grachev Departs PRC for South Korea

*LD1905051895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0240 GMT 19 May 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Tomilin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing, 19 May, (ITAR-TASS) — Pavel Grachev, the minister of defense of the Russian Federation, this morning left China for Seoul upon completing his five-day official visit.

For the first time in the history of bilateral relations, the head of the Russia's military department was received by the China's top leader, PRC President Jiang Zemin. In Beijing and during his tour of the country, Pavel Grachev held talks with PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian and other Chinese military commanders on the strengthening of cooperation in the military sphere. The sides have signed a protocol on extending the framework of exchanges between the two military departments and armies.

According to Pavel Grachev, the talks centered mainly on the questions of arms and armed forces reduction as well as the strengthening of measures of trust on the Russian-Chinese border. Beijing and Moscow intend to work out an agreement on the measures of trust in preparation for Boris Yeltsin's visit to China in the second half of the year. In conversation with the Russian minister of defense, Chairman Jiang Zemin stressed that he is impatiently looking forward to the arrival of the Russian head of state.

Grachev Arrives in Seoul, Begins Talks

*LD1905101895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0926 GMT 19 May 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Seoul, 19 May — Talks have begun in Seoul between Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev — who arrived here today — and Yi Yang-ho, head of the Defense Ministry of the Republic of Korea.

Welcoming Pavel Grachev, his South Korean colleague said that since diplomatic relations were established, links between the two countries have been developing successfully in all fields, including the military. At the current talks, Yi Yang-ho said, we might give our assessments of the state of bilateral relations in the military sphere and think about how we might best build such relations in the future, in the interests of friendship and relieving tension on the Korean peninsula.

Once the talks, which are taking place in the Defense Ministry building of the Republic of Korea, have ended the defense ministers of the two countries are to sign joint documents.

A welcoming ceremony for the Russian military delegation headed by Pavel Grachev had earlier taken place. Army General Grachev inspected a guard of honor comprising of the three categories of the South Korean Armed Forces. Infantry in white trousers and green jackets, seamen in snow white uniforms, and pilots in blue jackets and white trousers lined up on the green lawn.

During the morning, the Russian military delegation laid wreaths at the monument to those who fell in battle at the national cemetery in Seoul.

Grachev Signs Military Memorandum

LD1905104595 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1013 GMT 19 May 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Nikolay Geronin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Seoul, 19 May (*ITAR-TASS*) — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and his South Korean counterpart Yi Yang-ho today signed a memorandum on mutual understanding with regard to military contacts between the defense ministries of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea.

The memorandum was signed after talks between Grachev and Yi Yang-ho at the South Korean Ministry for National Defense. Grachev arrived in Seoul today on a three-day official visit.

Chernomyrdin Meets With Bulgarian Counterpart

LD1805193495 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1631 GMT 18 May 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Vladimir Abrosimov and special correspondent Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia, 18 May — Talks have begun here between the official Russian and Bulgarian delegations, led by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and his Bulgarian colleague Zhan Videnov. Chernomyrdin arrived in Sofia today on an official visit. Chernomyrdin told journalists that there was a period in the relations between Russia and Bulgaria, "when everyone was concerned with their own interests". "This has to be changed now," he said. Therefore, the talks are held in a businesslike atmosphere.

Prior to the summit, consultations were held by experts from both countries for the final drafting of documents prepared for the signing. They cover such areas of cooperation as the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the fuel and power complex, transport, the timber industry, and others, an *ITAR-TASS* correspondent was told by Russian Finance Minister Vladimir Pantsov, who is a member of the delegation. It is expected that at least 11 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements will be signed during the visit.

Energy, Economic Cooperation With Sofia Sought

MK1905093095 Moscow *KOMMERSANT-DAILY*
in Russian 21 May 95 pp 1, 4

[Report by Svetlana Sukhova under "Chernomyrdin's Visit to Bulgaria" rubric: "It Is Still Easier To Sell Gas Than Nuclear Technology"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Bulgaria, which began yesterday, could become a starting point for a new round of economic cooperation: It may be possible to overcome three stumbling blocks which in recent years have prevented the restoration of Russian-Bulgarian cooperation to its late-eighties level. In particular it is planned to address the problem of arrears to Russia and the participation by the Gazprom joint-stock company in the building and privatization of Bulgarian gas pipelines. Yet one of the key questions — cooperation in nuclear engineering — has come up against considerable obstacles. [passage omitted]

It should be noted that in the recent period Moscow has experienced serious difficulties over the expansion of its nuclear technology market in Eastern Europe. The situation with the Bulgarian nuclear power station in Kozloduy (built with the assistance of the USSR, and analogous to the Balakovskaya and Novovoronezhskaya nuclear power stations) has taken a difficult turn. Moscow was expected to modernize the Kozloduy nuclear power station, supply fuel to it, and evacuate waste. Soon, however, the situation changed: Bulgaria began to favor Western reactor models for nuclear power stations. Or rather, it was swayed to favor them. The United States, the International Energy Agency, and the IAEA published a series of "show-up" materials about Russian nuclear technology. [passage omitted]

Modernization will require millions [of dollars]. So far, money has been provided only to Bulgaria: In 1993 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development allocated \$28 million to modernize the VVER-440 reactor in Kozloduy. But now the Bulgarians have decided to put modernization on hold, citing the outstanding issue of waste evacuation. In particular, Deputy Prime Minister Kiril Tsochev said 17 May: "Russia should come to terms with Ukraine on this count, and Bulgaria with Moldova." According to Valentine Kunev, Tsochev's Moldovan counterpart, who recently visited Sofia, "basic agreement has been reached on this matter but it is necessary rigidly to regulate the security of transportation." It is not known whether Moscow has settled this question with Kiev. [passage omitted]

The contract on creating a Russian-Bulgarian joint-stock company envisions Gazprom's participation in

modernizing Bulgaria's gas infrastructure and also the export of gas to third countries. The plans by the Russian gas producers to turn Bulgaria into a "gas distributor" in the Balkans can come true. Work is nearing completion on the building of a Bulgarian gas distribution station from where Russian gas will flow to Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, and eventually (after UN sanctions are lifted) to Serbia. The construction of a Bulgarian-Macedonian section of the gas pipeline is in the final stage. During the meeting in Sofia the building of the Burgas-Alexandropulos oil pipeline will apparently also be discussed (a corresponding decision was made in April at a meeting by heads of Foreign Ministries of Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria in Athens). According to a feasibility report produced by the Nizhny Novgorod joint-stock company Giprogazsentr, which is affiliated with Gazprom, the pipeline will go from the port of Burgas (Bulgaria's Black Sea coast) to the city of Alexandropulos (Aegean Sea). The pipeline's design capacity is 32 million tonnes of oil a year; its length is 317 km, and the projected cost is \$650-700 million. Russian oil will be delivered to Burgas by tankers from Novorossiysk, and from Alexandropulos it will be shipped in the same way to European ports. The oil pipeline will allow Russia to export oil bypassing the narrow Bosphorus, where Turkey has imposed limitations on the passage of large tankers. According to the Russian Transport Ministry, the capacity of the Novorossiysk bulk oil base (35 million tonnes a year) and of the Russian tanker fleet will allow the transport of such a volume of oil by sea. [passage omitted]

Kozyrev's Stance on Polish Chechen Radio Viewed
MK1905101095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
 19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Abarinov: "A Demarche That Never Occurred"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Reports that Andrey Kozyrev is going to raise with the Polish authorities the question of the activity of the Chechen information enter in Krakow in connection with its intention to start broadcasting onto Russian territory have plunged Russian journalists into confusion. Nonetheless, the minister confirmed to your SEGODNYA correspondent the other day that the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry is carrying out a legal appraisal of the problem. In an attempt to clarify what acts of international law Moscow will invoke in its exchange with Warsaw, your correspondent has found out that the legal department has not received any assignment on the matter from the minister and is not conducting any appraisal.

Yesterday, your correspondent had an opportunity to make inquiries with First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. The latter explained that the expert appraisal has so far been limited to tasking the Russian Embassy in Warsaw with investigating the circumstances of registering the Chechen center in Krakow and that decisions on further action will be made depending on the results. Mr. Ivanov refrained from making premature judgments as to what actions might be taken. To all appearances, however, he is skeptical about the possibility of a diplomatic demarche.

Moreover, Igor Sergeyevich cited a number of examples proving that such a move would be ineffective and may even backfire. In particular, he cited the protests Hanoi used to lodge with Moscow in connection with a private Vietnamese-language radio station broadcasting from Moscow, protests Moscow never satisfied. According to sources Igor Ivanov would not specify, Zviad Gamsakhurdia loyalists are broadcasting from Russia to Georgia. And so on, up to members of a Japanese sect who, as is well known, used to broadcast from Vladivostok. Evidently, precedents to the contrary can only be found in a different historical era.

Systematic encroachments on the freedom of information are commonplace in Russian political life. The Foreign Ministry, however, has always been extremely careful in taking up this dubious activity. Let me recall, for instance, Andrey Kozyrev's remarks at his news conference last December. He said at the time that "in conditions of an acute (Chechen — V.A.) crisis" the mass media retain "their critical approach and polyphony," which is "a sign of society's health and maturity." The minister characterized this approach as "a normal reaction of a normal society." He only asked journalists to brief the public also on the government's official view, "even if with comments" — this was Kozyrev's most serious complaint about the Russian press in connection with the way it was covering the Chechen campaign.

In all likelihood, the idea of a demarche never went outside the Foreign Ministry's walls, and the authorized leak about "contemplating the possibility" was intended to show someone's service zeal to his superiors. It was none other than President Walesa who dotted the i's in this bizarre episode yesterday. According to INTERFAX, speaking with a group of Russian journalists in Warsaw, he said that Poland "is not interested in an argument or a row" with Russia over the Krakow radio station and that "Poland has laws that do not leave such a radio station the slightest chances of operating."

As we see, the incident had been defused even before it occurred. Moscow has found the strength to suppress its

imperial reflex. Warsaw thought it advisable not to start a quarrel. It should be noted that no one has lost face. Opponents are bound to criticize Walesa, and rightly so. But there are priorities in politics. The Polish president has made his choice.

Poland 'Not Interested' in Dispute

LD1805184995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1835 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] WARSAW, May 18 (Interfax) — Poland "is not interested in having a dispute or a quarrel with Russia because of the plans to create in Krakow the Free Caucasus radio station," Polish President Lech Walesa said.

He told Russian journalists in Warsaw today that "Poland has laws which does not give a single chance for such a radio station to function." Walesa said he was not going to violate the laws and would guard law and order.

A group of Chechen intelligentsia in opposition to Dzhokhar Dudayev is now in Poland's second important town. They are going to create the Free Caucasus radio broadcasting station with the assistance of some Polish dissidents. Chechen activists are going to broadcast not only in the languages of the North Caucasian peoples but also in the languages of other Caucasian peoples.

Speaking about his position towards the situation in Chechnya, Walesa said he understood the aspiration of the Russian authorities to preserve the country's territorial integrity but could not agree with the methods for reaching this goal. He said the world community was partially to blame for the present situation in Chechnya.

"Russia needed help and the world performed badly here," Walesa added.

In regard to Russian-Polish relations Walesa admitted the existence of some difficulties, including the "burden of the past" and the problems on Warsaw integration with NATO. Walesa confirmed Poland's intention to join the North Atlantic Alliance. However, he rejected ideas that such an intention was caused by fear of Russia.

Walesa said Poland wanted to integrate with NATO for guaranteeing the country's security. "We are pragmatists. Earlier, there were two military camps: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. One of them (the Warsaw Pact) dismissed itself and to fill the security vacuum we are in favor of evolutionist enlargement of another bloc (NATO)," he said.

Krakow 'Free Caucasus' Radio Protested

954E0967A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
16 May 95 pp 1, 3

[Correspondent Vladimir Kiryanov report: "Should the Caucasus Be 'Liberated' From Krakow?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—Another fracas connected with the unbidden concern of certain figures of municipal stature for the "liberation of Chechnya" and, perhaps (everyone can dream), the entire Russian Caucasus also is brewing, unfortunately, in Polish-Russian relations. The pretext for the sharp rhetoric at the parliamentary and diplomatic levels of the two countries on this occasion are the preparations for the opening in Krakow of a radio station portentously named "Free Caucasus." This, we would recall, is far from the first fly dropped in the ointment of the very painful and delicate Chechen conflict affecting all of Russia.

Remaining dispassionate, let us familiarize ourselves with the entire heap of messages of the Russian Embassy in Poland sent on this matter in the past two or three months to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The purpose is a noble one: to prevent the playing of the Chechen card in some people's unscrupulous political game and to prevent the creation of one further pretext that could cause a deterioration in the good relations between our neighbor countries: "A group of citizens of the Russian Federation, specifically, a certain A.R. Ampukayev and Ch. Zubarayev, representing themselves as 'authorized representatives' of General Dudayev's illegal regime, has for a certain time been operating on the territory of the Polish Republic," we read in one diplomatic note. "According to an announcement of the General Consulate of the Russian Federation in Krakow, the city's official authorities recently opened a so-called Chechen Information Office, whose intention is to engage in anti-Russian propaganda activity in Poland and, subsequently, to spread it to other countries of Europe....

"The said action of the Krakow authorities does not, in the embassy's opinion, correspond to the spirit of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Poland on Friendly and Neighborly Cooperation of 22 May 1992...."

In short, in bringing the above to the notice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the embassy expressed the hope that measures to close the said "office" in Krakow would be adopted and that the assistance to its "representatives," citizens of Russia, would be terminated. The response was terse and clear: "None of the personalities mentioned in the note has been in contact with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland. They are regarded as private

individuals, Russian citizens, on the territory of Poland." This might have been the end of the matter.... But the work of the Chechen "office" is merely gathering pace. And a new message, once again beginning, in accordance with protocol, with an expression of respect and esteem, was sent. The Embassy of Russia announced that it had the text of a statement signed by...."the president of the Chechen Information Office." Dudayev's emissaries call themselves here "Chechen diplomats in Poland." One wonders: Are these persons truly considered diplomats in Poland, and if so, what state do they represent, and are they really accredited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland? A repeat request—for the embassy to be told of the legal status of the operation of the "Chechen office" in Krakow....

Having in turn presented its respects to the embassy, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that it has all the requisite information obtained from the Krakow authorities. The point is as follows: The Chechen Information Office emerged with the consent of the Krakow City Council, not on its initiative. The main task is to adopt measures to spare casualties of the war in Chechnya and initiate humanitarian actions. And this is not "anti-Russian propaganda activity in Poland," as the Russian Embassy mistakenly believes. Nor is there anything to add apropos the status of the "Chechen diplomats," who represent only themselves and are not accredited anywhere, of course....

But our diplomats displayed rare obstinacy and little perspicacity. They simply cannot understand what "private persons of Russian citizenship" are doing in Krakow and with what status and for what bread, so to speak, they are cranking up information activity here. Once again a message flies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accept, dear colleagues, our gratitude for the valuable information on the so-called Chechen Office and for the interview which you conducted with our representative of minister-counselor rank. We would request that the same be explained to the authorities of Krakow—what the real status of Messrs Ampukayev and Zubarayev, who are passing themselves off as diplomats, is. And in respect to humanitarian actions, clarify how they may be tied in with the "office's" widely announced intention to create in Poland a Radio "Free Caucasus" broadcasting in languages of the peoples of Russia. Will it be registered in accordance with international rules governing radio broadcasting and will it obtain radio frequencies available in Poland? Could the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not confirm or deny the information that "Free Caucasus" intends to mount an anti-Russian propaganda campaign?

I am sure that this correspondence will ultimately take up many volumes inasmuch as an aspiration to an auspi-

cious resolution of the conflict simply cannot be sensed from the first letters. Fuel is being added to the fire, what is more, by the local news media also. Analyzing a feature shown on NTV in Moscow, the newspaper RZECZSPOLITA inadvertently recalled that it had already written of the plans for the creation of the "Free Caucasus" radio and of the impending application of its founders to Poland's Council for Radio and Television. The newspaper CZAS KRAKOWSKI announces the aspiration of the "Chechen Office" to shortly acquire legal status as an association. It is echoed by GAZETA KRAKOWSKA. It consoles the readers in the article "Radio Chechnya Speaks," quoting the words of the chairman of the Krakow City Council in connection with the creation of the radio station: "...I can assure you that there are no impediments of a technical nature for the realization of your undertaking in full." This is easy to believe, seeing how swiftly and easily the municipal authorities are providing the "office" with office premises. As the newspaper GAZETA KRAKOWSKA candidly reveals, the new station would be performing the same functions as Free Europe or Voice of America...before the disintegration of the Eastern bloc.

Russia is overjoyed at such a prospect! Once again some people cannot manage without the functions of the period of the cold war, which, as we had all hoped, long since passed into oblivion. Against the background, what is more, of official statements concerning the virtually insuperable difficulties over the registration in Poland of such radio stations and the thorns allegedly awaiting anyone who pokes his nose into the Council for Radio and Television, other information is filtering out also. Much is being written and spoken about several influential Polish members of the "Chechen Office," about the absence of problems with financing and the purchase of the necessary equipment, and even about the possibilities of its transfer free of charge by the Solidarity trade union. These transmitters also were formerly presented for a good cause, it is said. They will render further service.... Only whom is it intended to "pull down" this time?

It remains for Russians to depend on the assurances of representatives of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who believe that the fears expressed by Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, other politicians, and the press are premature. Because the right to register a radio station belongs to the state, not the Krakow authorities. Will the city's authorities pay heed, finally, to the opinion of the government department? Judging by the reaction to the diplomatic requests of recent months coming from the capital, an alluring separatist syndrome has, perhaps, been manifested in ancient Krakow also....

Minister: Moscow on U.S. 'Blacklist' Over IPR

LD1805213795 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1756 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — The United States included Russia on their blacklist of the countries violating intellectual property rights [IPR], Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Georgiy Gabuniya told a press conference today.

He said the United States had explained their move by their concern over the scale of video piracy in Russia. Gabuniya said the annual U.S. loss from the illegal sale of U.S. cinema and video production in Russia stood at \$800 million. According to the United States, Russia accounts for 10% of the United States's total losses in the sale of video films and cinema production.

Gabuniya said that the United States had raised the issue of preventing and stopping the illegal sale of U.S. films in Russia during the last few months. He said that Russia might face economic sanctions after its inclusion on the blacklist. Washington may impose sanctions if Moscow fails to launch a decisive struggle against video piracy.

Gabuniya said the sanctions could include the lifting of several privileges now enjoyed by Russian exporters within the scope of the General System of Preferences. In particular, the right to duty-free export of Russian goods costing hundreds of millions of dollars might be annulled. Gabuniya said the United States might also raise the issue of Russia's unpreparedness for joining GATT/WTO and other international economic organizations.

Gabuniya said the situation "requires that a decisive struggle be launched against video piracy and other forms of violation of intellectual property rights in Russia."

Gabuniya said the Russian Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, in close cooperation with the law enforcement, was working on a system of measures for preventing the illegal sale of video and cinema production. He stressed that the struggle against video piracy would be nationwide.

Ministry Protests Actions of U.S. Reporters

LD1805144995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1323 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — On Thursday advisor-envoy of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow Robert McCarthy was called to the Russian Foreign Ministry which made oral representations to him due to the lawless actions of American journalists on Poklonnaya Gora during the festivities devoted to the

50th anniversary of Victory Day, a spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who had a conversation with the American diplomat, reported to Interfax Thursday.

In his words, the matter concerns the photographer of the ASSOCIATED PRESS agency John Applewhite and correspondent of the ABC TV company Catherine Bayers who used forged pool cards to attend the gathering and were detained by employees of the Russian Security Service.

"We expressed a tough negative estimate of this event to the American diplomat," Karasin said.

He pointed out that "from the political point of view the actions of the American journalists have thrown a shadow on the events celebrating Victory Day."

"The American journalists rudely violated the procedure for guests' security established for those who participated in the festivities. Their actions can only be viewed as disrespect for the norms of professional ethics," Karasin said.

He reported that "the American party presented its apologies and reassured that this would not be repeated."

Foreign Ministry Cited on Bosnia 'Deadlock'

LD1805190995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1836 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be driven out of the deadlock. "The present situation favors those forces which stake on a military solution to the issue," Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told Interfax in an exclusive interview in Moscow Thursday [18 May].

Ivanov emphasized that "resolute steps were required under the circumstances which have emerged."

"Russia intends to make intensive efforts, particularly within the Contact Group, to develop such a formula which would ensure a breakthrough to the conflict's political settlement," he added.

Ivanov did not rule out the possibility that the foreign ministers of the Contact Group countries, including Russia, the U.S., U.K., France and Germany, could meet in session again.

According to Ivanov, "Moscow proceeds from the assumption that the sooner the ministers' meeting is held, the better." Nevertheless, it is too early to speak about its time and venue, he added.

Ivanov said the meeting will touch upon lifting the sanctions against Yugoslavia. "A complex decision is

needed, involving lifting sanctions against Belgrade and the mutual recognition — under certain conditions — of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina," he emphasized.

Commenting on the situation in Croatia, Ivanov pointed out the importance of today's resolution of the U.N. Security Council condemning the Croatian offensive on the Serb positions in Krajina.

According to Ivanov, "the resolution was achieved none too easily." "Not everyone in the U.N. security Council was inclined to condemn the aggressor in an unbiased way," he added.

"The aggressor, regardless of who and what he is, must be condemned. Unfortunately, earlier there were cases when only one side was subject to condemnation, while Russia's partners sometimes closed their eyes to other sides' unlawful actions," Ivanov said.

Foreign Ministry Criticized Over Croatia Offensive
MM1805142695 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 May 95 p 3

[Report by Colonel Aleksandr Oliynik: "Croatian 'Blitzkrieg' and Our Policy in the Balkans"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Jasenovac-Okucani-Moscow — Our special correspondent Aleksandr Oliynik, who has returned from an assignment in the Balkans, gives details of Zagreb's military-political operation to "re-unite occupied territories" in self-proclaimed Serbian Krajina, during which thousands of Krajina Serbs have been killed in massive artillery bombardments. [passage omitted]

The Croatian "blitzkrieg" has seriously undermined the authority of Russia's policy in this region. Its weakness is associated with the fact that a truce and an economic agreement were concluded between Knin and Zagreb last summer on the Russian Foreign Ministry's initiative. Russian Ambassador to Croatia Leonid Kerestedszhiyants, who initiated the Serbian-Croatian talks, was at the time quick to describe them as "historic," making it practically "impossible to foresee a resumption of hostilities." The point is that at the time Russia acted as guarantor of the implementation of these accords. It was not so much the Croats as the Serbs who took this as gospel.

What "guarantee of peace" can there be if Zagreb has cynically torn up the peace agreements, while at the same time Moscow has failed to respond to this with the appropriate measures. Smolenskaya Ploshchad [location of Russian Foreign Ministry] is keeping silent, but one would like to believe that Croatia's aggression will give those who are elaborating and implementing our foreign policy in the Balkans pause for thought. Maybe in the

future Russian interests will not be sacrificed to new, rash "peacekeeping initiatives."

...In the center of Jasenovac, at the memorial to those who fought fascism, I read words which are imprinted on my mind: "Mrtvi zivima oci otvaraju" — "The dead open the eyes of the living." Will the thousands of innocent people killed in the days of the May Day holiday finally not open the eyes of UN peacekeepers and of our and Western politicians as to who exactly the aggressor is and who the victim is here? Or does it suit the peacekeepers to turn a blind eye?...

Ministry Statement on Israel, Palestinian Land

LD1805174195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1648 GMT 18 May 95

[By Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 18 (ITAR-TASS) — Russia's principle stand on the act of confiscating a part of Palestinian land in East Jerusalem remains unchanged and reflects the Russian community's view which is quite close to approaches of an overwhelming majority of members of the U.N. Security Council, said a statement circulated today by the Russian Foreign Ministry in context of Wednesday's voting held on a draft resolution on recognising the Israeli Government's decision as invalid.

Out of 15 members of the Security Council 14 voted in favour of the resolution, but it could not be approved due to a veto imposed by the United States.

Working in close contact with the Israeli and Arab sides, as well as the U.S., the Russian Foreign Ministry brought to their notice the Russian point of view on this problem, the document noted. Its essence is that the Israeli Government's act runs counter to the framework of the peace process and obligations which it undertook, including the spirit of the Palestinian-Israeli declaration on principles, which was signed by Russia as a co-sponsor. The Russian side tried to persuade Tel Aviv to reconsider its decision and thereby save the Arab-Israeli peace talk process from another blow.

At the same time, Moscow does not see any superfluous grounds to dramatize the situation. The Middle East peace process has more than once experienced periods of losing the step and even recoiling, however, the potential of cooperation and mutual understanding accumulated in it has helped improve the situation through joint efforts. Russia now intends to work in this very direction in close cooperation with the Arab and Israeli sides and American co-sponsor, the Russian Foreign Ministry statement emphasized.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Rejects Law on Settling Chechen Conflict

LD1905111095 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 1047 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 May — Russian President Boris Yeltsin today rejected the federal law "On Temporary Measures To Achieve a Political Settlement of the Crisis in the Chechen Republic," which was passed by the State Duma on 12 April, the Presidential Press Service reported today.

In his message to State Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin, the president said that instead of achieving a political settlement in Chechnya, the law could backfire and become yet another destabilizing factor, a report by the press service says. Moreover, the president thinks that certain norms of the federal law are at variance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Russia's international commitments.

Yeltsin Again Nominates Paramonova To Head Central Bank

LD1905103295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1002 GMT 19 May 95

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — President Yeltsin sent today a letter to Ivan Rybkin, Chairman of the State Duma, in which he again nominated Tatyana Paramonova as candidate to the post of chairperson of the Central Bank of Russia. The voting at the lower chamber of the Russian parliament will be held within a week, Aleksandr Livshits, the President's aide for economic issues, told Itar-Tass.

The law "On the Central Bank of Russia", which came into force recently, rules out a possibility of the supreme financial institution of the country to be headed by an acting chairman. This is exactly what Paramonova is doing now. If the State Duma turns her down, then, according to Livshits, "someone else will have to be found," and alternative candidates are already being chosen.

Yeltsin Weighs 'Pros,' 'Cons' of Duma Election Law

LD1805213295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
2037 GMT 18 May 95

[By Itar-Tass writer Tamara Zamyatina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian Federation Council is making attempts to put pressure on the Russian president to prevent him from signing the law on elections of

deputies to the State Duma adopted by the lower house of the Russian parliament. A document circulated by the press centre of the Federation Council Thursday contains excerpts from letters and oral appeals to the upper chamber of the parliament, whose authors categorically object to holding elections on the principal of party lists, regarding such elections anti-democratic. One can hardly recall any precedent when adopting laws unpopular among fellow-citizens parliamentarians referred to the letters and oral appeals of the voters. Now that the law on elections might affect the fate of the lawmakers themselves, they begin to study the public opinion.

The law on elections to the State Duma in its present form stipulates that 225 candidates might be elected by party lists, whereas the other half of the deputies' corps (225) shall be elected from one-mandate constituencies. Russia's regional heads — the now senators — shall have to contest for mandates to the Federation Council on their own, without being included in party lists. Therefore, they consider unjust an "easy" variant of being elected to the Federal Assembly, merely by being included in lists of candidates from political parties and election blocs.

Among those opposing the law on elections to the lower house of the Russian parliament adopted by the State Duma are the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the speaker of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeyko, whereas the presidential chief of staff Sergey Filatov and presidential aides are urging the president to sign the law on elections to the State Duma.

The controversy around the contentious law being approved by the president has arisen because the recognition of the right to be elected by party lists would set Yeltsin at loggerheads with regional heads who are expected to back the "Russia-is our home" election bloc led by V. Chernomyrdin in regions. A favourable attitude of the "regional elite" will be necessary for the president at the forthcoming presidential elections due in 1996.

As a compromise, presidential aides recommend that Boris Yeltsin sign the law, making critical remarks to it and submitting them to the State Duma for consideration. While the president is considering all "pros" and "cons" politicians are looking for ways of influencing the president, which is the reason why the start of the election campaign is being delayed.

Kremlin Could Delay Duma Elections To Foil Chernomyrdin*MM1805142495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
19 May 95 p 1*

[Article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "The Kremlin Is Drawing Up Its Own Scenarios for the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday Boris Yeltsin signed the federal law "On the Election of the Russian President." Here the number of signatures necessary for a candidate to be nominated is reduced from 1.5 million to 1 million. A little earlier, presidential aide Georgiy Satarov had announced that, contrary to the declared intention not to sign the law "On Elections to the State Duma," the president will sign it after all. Satarov noted that after the law is signed, a series of amendments reflecting the president's disagreement with individual clauses of the law will be submitted to the lower chamber of parliament in the form of separate draft laws.

The Kremlin's vigorous attempts to insert the stage directions it requires into the election play whose denouement will determine whose political benefit performance the parliamentary and presidential elections will be, are prompted by the appearance on the scene of the large election bloc "Russia Is Our Home," headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin. The bloc includes the entire political elite, captains of industry, bankers, and governors. It has at its disposal the vast administrative apparatus with its all-pervasive influence, skills, and training. And this is in a situation where no counterweight to the right center, as conceived by the president himself, has yet materialized. None of the left-centrists has, as yet, expressed the desire to play along with the authorities, preferring to pursue an independent election struggle.

In these circumstances Viktor Chernomyrdin is transformed into a figure who is objectively becoming a real rival to Boris Yeltsin. The dust of the Chechen war has not left its mark on the premier's political face, thanks to his highly developed ability to shun risky or dubious enterprises. He does not take responsibility for "shock therapy," but he does take the credit for a balanced, predictable policy that has achieved comparative economic stabilization. Thanks to "Our Home," a vast arsenal of electoral tools is henceforth at his disposal.

In short, Viktor Chernomyrdin can stake a serious claim to the presidency. But only if he wins the parliamentary elections. According to our information, this turn of events is causing increasing alarm in the president's entourage. A way out of the situation that has arisen is being sought. In particular, an attempt to postpone

the State Duma elections is not ruled out. More than enough grounds for this could be found. If, as has already been announced, Boris Yeltsin is to send the law on parliamentary elections to the Constitutional Court, the examination of this case there is hardly likely to be speedy. Incidentally, the correlation between deputies elected on party lists and those elected for districts on a majority basis is a political question, not a legal one, and does not come within the Constitutional Court's remit. But while the case drags on, the time allowed for the official start of the election campaign will pass. And then the parliamentary elections could be timed to coincide with the presidential elections, from which Viktor Chernomyrdin will automatically be excluded, since he has already associated himself with an electoral bloc fighting for seats in the State Duma.

The fact that this scenario is a very real possibility is indicated by a remark let slip by Vladimir Shumeiko the other day in conversation with British Prime Minister John Major: It will be no great problem, he said, if the presidential and parliamentary elections take place at the same time — in June 1996.

Yet only recently, at the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of Victory, Boris Yeltsin promised his honored guests, the heads of the great powers (including, incidentally, the British prime minister) that the elections will be held at the date stipulated by law. And that, he said, will be the proof that democracy really exists in Russia.

Boris Yeltsin has not yet gone back on his word, once given.

Gaydar on Prospects for Democracy in Russia*MM1805112895 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 17 May 95 p 2*

[Interview with Yegor Gaydar, leader of "Russia's Democratic Choice," by Lyubov Tsukanova, date and place not given, under the rubric "Democracy in Russia: Reality and Prediction": "Yegor Gaydar: In Politics You Have To Uphold Your Convictions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Tsukanova] Yegor Timurovich, a great many people have recently been expressing doubts that democracy in Russia has a future....

[Gaydar] The people who are quickest to bury Russian democracy now are those who for reasons I do not understand believed that, despite several centuries of authoritarianism in Russian history, despite 75 years of a totalitarian regime, and notwithstanding the range of very grave socioeconomic problems that we inherited, a democracy born amidst such labors would rise Aphrodite-like and resplendent from the foaming sea.

And now they say that this democracy is a rather ugly infant with a meager inheritance and a poor upbringing and that it will require a good deal more effort to make it work, at which point they throw up their hands in despair. And they say: What is actually being created here?... Is this really democracy? Who thought that it would be like this? If this is what it is like, let us do without democracy. Give us generals who will build us a totalitarian capitalism and a beautiful democracy after that....

I am profoundly convinced that this is an "infantile disorder" of Russian democracy. It stems from helplessness.... If all our present-day problems are compared with the reasonable expectations of a decade ago — the downfall of the communist regime — it has to be acknowledged that the fact that democracy in Russia exists and has existed longer than at any other time in our history means that it has a chance of survival. That is why I totally disagree with those who pretend to mourn for democracy and want to write this question off for another 10 years.

[Tsukanova] But the threats are great....

[Gaydar] The threats are real. There is one fundamental problem — the relationship between democracy and capitalism. There is no stable democracy without capitalism. This has not been worked out anywhere yet nor is it likely to be. Capitalism and the market are the infrastructure of democracy. I think it was Lenin who once wrote that it is impossible to move forward today without moving toward socialism. In Russia today it is impossible to move forward without moving toward capitalism. Of course, I would like this to be a socialized capitalism, one which has experienced the metamorphoses of the 20th century and which guarantees an adequate level of social guarantees for its citizens. All this is possible in Russia.

There are people who believe that you can build capitalism in Russia without democracy. Yes, there are such examples, capitalism without democracy does exist and has "existed" many times. Hence the vast number of ideas and all sorts of authoritarian solutions — on the postponement of the elections and so forth. This is probably not the best time for holding elections. The main burdens of the transitional period are over now but people do not feel that because the vast bulk of the advantages of a functioning market have yet to manifest themselves. However, if we do not make any mistakes now and hold fast to the course set, then it is possible that there will be economic growth as early as 1996 and that in 1997 the Russian economy will be in a state of dynamic growth and there will be money to resolve the most acute social problems and reform the tax system

on a healthy basis — in short, capitalism will begin to yield tangible positive results. But that is in the future, whereas the elections are right now and it is a most difficult and inauspicious time. And of course there is a real risk that destructive forces will come to power, forces for whom neither private property, the market, nor democratic institutions have any value. This is the truth which has to be confronted.

But the solutions which are being offered on this basis are pseudosolutions. They will not bring stability. On the contrary, they could mobilize serious opposition forces operating outside the system. Thus by hoping to save the nascent system, create a market that works, and then build democracy on that basis, you could simply destabilize the whole system of state institutions and place power in the hands of those very forces which are threatening democracy.

So yes, it is a difficult task, but there is no alternative: It is necessary to participate in the elections and to try not to lose them so that people do not lose what they have already gained despite all the present problems.

[Tsukanova] But what to be done so as not to lose the elections? This is surely the main question, is it not?..

[Gaydar] "Russia's Choice" has always supported the coordination of the efforts of reasonable, moderate, democratic forces. This was our position on the eve of the 1993 elections. We talked about that many times on that occasion; and we did not simply talk, we held intensive negotiations. And ultimately we managed to form an agreement on the principles of collaboration and the creation of an electoral coalition involving several democratic blocs. However, when it came to signing a document it emerged that one bloc — "Russia's Choice" — was ready to sign it but the others were not. They had decided that they could win on their own. The astonishing enigma of Russian history is that people never learn from it. Those same newspapers which explained back then why the democrats ought to fight the elections separately and which then bemoaned the fact that the democrats were unable to unite are now repeating the same argument as though nothing had happened.

We put forward the cooperation initiative a long time ago. Our proposals are still on the table. Our position is well known. But to be honest, we are conducting fairly intensive work in the regions without harboring any great hopes for the moment that light will dawn on our potential partners in Moscow.

[Tsukanova] How do you assess your social base, your electorate?

[Gaydar] Our base is quite broad. Polls show that, despite the dissatisfaction at much of what is going on and despite the vacillations of various politicians, on the whole the level of support for what might conventionally be called democracy remains quite high. We understand how unstable the situation is, how changeable it is, and how much will depend on how events develop this year and on the state of the economy. Our party is unwaveringly committed to ensuring that the state of the economy is good. Whatever else, we have never wanted things to get worse so that we can capitalize on that. We do not favor the slogan: The worse things are the better. We are firmly convinced that the more the government does the things that we defended and proposed a long time ago and the more reasonable the government's policy is, the greater the likelihood will be that events in Russia will develop along the path of stabilization and the creation of a base for real democracy, albeit somewhat late, perhaps two-three years later than might have been the case.... I believe that when this becomes reality there will be a very significant change in the public consciousness as a whole. After all, people have grown really tired of catastrophe, of total collapse, of the fact that things are difficult, that production is falling, that there is no hope in prospect, and so forth. Signs that the country has taken the right road and that Russia has begun to recover from its lengthy ailment could change the social and political climate in society. That is my fervent hope.

We must reach agreement and we are prepared for a serious discussion with all who firmly advocate guarantees for private property, the market, a stable national currency, a peaceful foreign policy, the continuation of the military reform, and an agrarian reform. In short, a discussion with all who share our ideological principles. This does not mean that we have no differences of opinion with our potential partners. There are differences of opinion, some of them serious differences of an ideological character. But they are not the most important thing today, they are not dominant, they do not determine the nature of the threats facing the country. That is why agreement must be reached wherever agreement is possible.

[Tsukanova] Among democrats there is a debate over whether they ought to try to seize the slogans of patriotism, strong statehood, and so forth from the opposition in an attempt to win votes from the Communists and nationalists, or whether they ought consistently to defend their own values. What is your view?

[Gaydar] I believe that people should uphold their own convictions in politics. I have my convictions and I am not going to change them just to please someone else. I consider myself a Russian patriot. I am convinced that

it is we who are defending Russia's future today. I am convinced that there could be nothing more terrible for Russia than to try to bring back the past now. I am absolutely convinced that Russia is not the chronic sick man of the world community. It is a country which could grow and prosper quickly. And I am pleased that more and more people in the world share my belief on that. But I categorically state that under no circumstances will I join a party whose banners display the slogans of radical nationalism, xenophobia, and national exclusivity, which divides people and sets them against one another on ethnic grounds, and goes in for imperial saber rattling. I categorically reject that. I hope that those who think like me will do the same.

[Tsukanova] Yegor Timurovich, there is a belief that the democratic parties received insufficient support in the 1993 elections not because they had fewer supporters but because their voters are less active in elections. What do you think about that?

[Gaydar] This is a problem and it is a very serious one. As polls show, our electorate is in fact younger and better educated than the average voter. It contains a high proportion of inhabitants of the big cities. But unfortunately they are precisely the categories of the population where the turnout is lowest. And in my view they are making a terrible mistake in so doing. Potentially this is very dangerous. Here is one simple example. Recently we voted on amendments to the law on military obligation. Our faction has been and still is categorically opposed. We do not believe that this law benefits Russia or its science and education, nor does it benefit Russian security or the Russian Army. It could have adverse social consequences. So the question is: What do you have to do to prevent such questions being resolved in this way? You have to turn out and vote! The only way to prevent the authorities from making decisions which are dangerous for you and your family is to turn out and vote. People must understand how important it is to elect deputies who are at least reasonably intelligent and responsible and who will not spring some very nasty surprises on them.

Consequently for us the most important task is to persuade people to go and vote. For whom? You must vote according to your conscience. But you must vote.

[Tsukanova] Do you intend to alter your election tactics in the light of the lessons of the previous election campaign?

[Gaydar] I see no reason to abandon any element of our tactics. Of course, we can see clearly the imminent tasks of stage two of the Russian reforms. This does not mean reforms of a surgical type. Generally speaking, it means simply completing the construction of those

mechanisms necessary for laying the foundations for growth in Russia. Moreover, this means a socially more just form of growth. We are working right now on a broad range of documents which one way or another will prepare the basis for this next stage of the reforms. We will enter the elections with a large set of specific laws which are vitally necessary to everyone. We are well aware of the program we would like to implement in Russia after the next elections. We will enter the elections appealing as always to our population's best sentiments, to reason, to a sense of reality and readiness to speak the truth. The truth today is not some kind of "terrible" or "grim" truth. Essentially the truth is that, despite the enormous costs, the worst is over now. The important thing now is not to do anything stupid, so that the Russian economy can then be made to grow quickly.

Prospects for Democratic Forces' Unity Eyed

MM1805133095 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 May 95 p 2

[Article by Otto Latsis: "Election Race Becomes Increasingly Intense, Prospects for Law on Elections Become Increasingly Vague"]

[FBIS Translated Text] News of the election campaign in Russia has been cascading as from a cornucopia, although there is still no decision on the parliamentary elections. Moreover, the prospect of this decision being made has suddenly become very vague. The public were still trying to comprehend the report that the Duma had overturned the Federation Council's veto of its version of the law on elections when it was announced that the president would seek the abolition of that version.

IZVESTIYA has already written about the possibility of a situation whereby "in the struggle for a better law on elections" we will be left without such a law at all. Speaking abstractly, it is easy to prove that the president's version, which gives preference to first-past-the-post districts, is far more democratic than the Duma's, which leaves half the seats in the hands of party bureaucrats who often do not have real parties behind them. But, speaking concretely, there is almost no time left to struggle for a better version, and there is a risk that the Duma will break up for the vacations through September without waiting for the law's fate to be finally decided.

While shouting about the president's alleged intention to wreck the elections, the Duma itself is threatening to violate the constitutional provision relating to the notice required for elections — at least six months — by means of its litigation with the upper chamber. That will be enough to justify taking a well-trodden path: an emergency edict in place of the missing law.

The edict might not even have the weak restraints on the possibility of the elections' manipulation by local administrations that the law has. The fact that it is precisely the governors' power that has been perceived as the chief means of support for the president was reconfirmed in the course of Boris Yeltsin's 15 May meeting with leaders of the Governors' Union.

Special confirmation of this was not in fact required following the creation of the "Chernomyrdin bloc." And yet certain details of the last few days — such as, for example, Moscow's scandalous support for Maritime Kray Governor Nazdratenko — make us ponder over and over again just what the plan of election preparations adopted by the authorities promises for Russian democracy. It would seem to be not a bad thing to secure additional guarantees against the accession to power of those who are vaguely called extremists — to put it more simply, against Zhirinovskiyites and Zyuganovites. But if, for this, the authorities themselves have to give short shrift to democracy in just the same way as their opponents would do if they won, then what does the country gain?

Under these conditions a question which has long been on the agenda of politicians on the democratic-reform wing becomes still more urgent: the question of the democratic forces' unity and, ideally, the creation of a third bloc operating independently of the authorities' will and bidding. The unexpected agreement in the Yavlinskiy-Gaydar "duet" on television's "Itogi" program over the need for talks on this question created only a fleeting possibility of real action in the right direction. But the decision which followed without delay from the political council of "Russia's Democratic Choice," which gave Gaydar a mandate to hold talks, made the possibility almost a reality. We now have to see to what degree the leaders of the reform wing will be concerned with the interests of the cause and to what degree they will be concerned with personal ambition.

The well-known points of possible accord between "Democratic Choice" and "Yabloko" are extremely weighty: It is sufficient to note the proximity of their positions on the war in Chechnya, the struggle against corruption in the government apparatus, and the more consistent implementation of the policy of reforms. The points of possible discord are also known in general and promise quite a few difficulties, although these do not seem fundamental. Will it be possible to overcome them? If not, this means that modern Russian democracy does not deserve a better fate than that of passively watching the "Chernomyrdin bloc" and the "Rybkin bloc" — which has not yet been created but is awaited impatiently in certain circles — kick a ball about on the political field. At the same time the government

is already acting increasingly openly as a really all-powerful government, not fearing serious opposition either to the continuation of the war in Chechnya, or to the overt wrecking of the military reform, or to the shifting of more and more new burdens onto the shoulders of the socially most vulnerable sections of the population.

Duma-96 Announces New Election Alliance

*LD1805202995 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1838 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — The public movement Duma-96 announced in Moscow Thursday [18 May] the formation of an election alliance for the coming parliamentary and presidential elections, the chairman of the movement Anatoliy Gordeyev told a congress of Duma-96.

He said his movement is holding consultations on pooling efforts with 12 parties and public groups, among them the People's Democratic Party, the Union of Afghan War Veterans and the Union of Veterans of the Armed Forces.

In an interview with Interfax Gordeyev stressed that it will not be an opposition alliance.

The congress was attended by representatives of 54 regions.

Election Bloc 'People' To Protect Interests of Poor

*LD1805213895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1942 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — The new social-liberal bloc "People" will protect the interests of the poor, its leader, chairman of the Russian Union movement, Vladimir Fillin, told a news conference in Moscow Thursday.

"We will do everything for our electors. We will return depositors their money and grant lawful privileges to invalids," he emphasized.

According to Fillin, his bloc will fight "for equal rights for Russians abroad as well as those for all regions of the Russian Federation."

Fillin said the new bloc will participate in both parliamentary and presidential elections.

Fillin was confident that the bloc's candidates will canvass about 10% of the votes.

Fillin said small and medium-sized businesses financed the bloc. At the same time, he declined to name specific companies or businessmen.

The new bloc was founded on the basis of the Depositors, Shareholders and Creditors' Association (leader Yuri Palchikov), the Afghan War Veterans Fund (leader Sergey Trokhov) and the Russian Union movement (leader Vladimir Fillin).

Yavlinskiy Leads Among Possible Presidential Candidates

*LD1805114695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1024 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — Leader of the YABLOko faction in the State Duma Grigoriy Yavlinskiy enjoys the greatest support as a possible candidate to the post of the country's president according to an opinion poll.

As many as 8% named him when responding to the following question: "If the presidential elections in Russia took place today for whom would you vote?"

The opinion poll was organized on April 22 by sociologists of the Public Opinion Fund. As many as 1,362 residents of Moscow, St. Petersburg and several regional centers and cities and rural residents were questioned in the course of the opinion poll.

According to the poll's results, made public in the State Duma Thursday, 6% of the electors would vote for Gennadiy Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Aleksandr Rutskoy, and Svyatoslav Fedorov (a physician-ophthalmologist).

The other votes were distributed as follows: Fedorov - 5%, General Lebed - 4%, Yeltsin and Gaydar - 3% each, Luzhkov - 2%, Chernomyrdin, Shakhrai, Shumeyko, Rybkin, and Gorbachev - 1% each.

A total of 28% failed to give any precise answer and 16% more declared that they will not vote in presidential elections.

Asked "For representatives of which political parties and associations would you vote for if the elections to the State Duma took place today" respondents answered the following: YABLOko - 8%, the Communist Party and Russia's Women - 7% each, LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] and Russia, Forward movement (Fedorov) - 5% each.

The rest failed to garner the 5% needed to receive seats in the parliament on federal lists. The Russia's Democratic Choice party (Gaydar), the Derzhava movement (Rutskoy), the Self-Rule of Working People party (Fedorov) received 4% of votes each. The Agrarian party (Lapshin), the Democratic Party of Russia, the Congress of Russian Communities (Skokov, Lebedev), the Party of Russian Unity and Concord received 2% each.

Yavlinskiy, Lebed Rated Highest in Poll

MM1805130295 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 17 May 95 pp 1-2

[Report by Dmitriy Babich and Margarita Kechkina: "They Are Known Not Only by Their Faces, But Also by Their Expressions. If It Was Up to Our Readers, Yavlinskiy the Economist or General Lebed Would Be Running for President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tired of talking to politicians, we decided to turn to the "millions of ordinary Russians" whom, as we know, politicians are supposed to serve, although they do not always find the time to do so. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's "Status" Sociological Research Center recently conducted a sociological poll among 7,000 of our readers from 15 regions of Russia. One of the objects of the poll was to try to determine who could really lay claim to the post of president of Russia at the moment.

Of all the Moscow newspapers, ours has the widest range of readers. We are read by pensioners, policemen, workers, entrepreneurs, politicians, and housewives. So we are looking at a fairly objective "cross section" of our society, making it possible fairly accurately to determine who is most worthy.

And our readers name as the most worthy, by a long stretch, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (15 percent of those polled "voted" for him) and General Aleksandr Lebed, who polled 10 percent. Far behind them are Boris Yeltsin 4 percent), the fierce Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (3 percent), and the ever-devoted Communist Gennadiy Zyuganov (2 percent).

What was it about two such different people as Yavlinskiy and Lebed that made our readers take them to their hearts? First, the fact that neither of them has ever stood at the helm in Russia, and that they are both in opposition to the government now. The majority of Russians are so dissatisfied with everything that is going on that any contact with the present authorities is like being infected with leprosy, for a politician. That may explain the very low rating of Yegor Gaydar (only 5 percent of potential voters) or Viktor Chernomyrdin (2 percent).

More than half our readers are dissatisfied with the changes taking place in the country: 36 percent believe their life has become "worse rather than better," and 17 percent say it is quite simply worse. The eternal Russian question "who is to blame?" gets the usual answer — the authorities. Some 25 percent blame the president for everything, and 36 percent blame the government and parliament. Gorbachev also gets it in the neck (15 percent of those polled are prepared to stand in the celebrated line of people wishing to "thrash" the first

and last Soviet president). It is not surprising that the disaffected give their sympathies to Lebed, who has long since acquired the image of the "persecuted general" sent off to the Dniester region some time ago and now being "oppressed" by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, on whom no love is lost among the people. If Boris Yeltsin and his entourage really are planning to bring the general down, what they should do is, on the contrary, promote him and shower him with government dachas and limos. Yeltsin's own experience confirms that there is no better trump card in Russian politics than the image of the doomed exile.

Yavlinskiy has another version of "exile status." He claims that they are constantly stopping him from working, refusing to listen to his comments, and not fulfilling his programs, and in 1993 they even disconnected (just imagine it!) his government telephone because of his "free-thinking." This is rather an unusual kind of exile. But Yavlinskiy also has another trump card — he presents himself as the all-knowing intellectual-economist. The disaffected see the dire state of our economy, ravaged by the reforms, as the root of the evil. That is the explanation for the hopes pinned on Yavlinskiy the economist. All the indications are that many people have faith in the success of the "Nizhniy Novgorod scenario" for reforms at Russia-wide level (incidentally, Nizhniy Novgorod Governor Boris Nemtsov confidently holds third place in the presidential race, having collected 8 percent in the form of a "sympathy prize." [no closing parenthesis as published])

It would, however, be wrong to explain the people's dissatisfaction solely in terms of economic disorders. Otherwise how are we to explain the fact that 48 percent of those of our readers who describe themselves as "well provided-for" also do not approve of everything that is happening in the country? In the past few years it is not only material life that has changed beyond recognition in our country, but also the cultural "environment" — television, pop music, the book market, the style of clothing and relationships. And even among the rich there are many people who are very conservative in cultural terms, preferring "The Cranes Are Flying" to "Terminator" and Lyudmila Zykina's modest dress to Masha Rasputina's very revealing attire.

These were the people who may have been impressed by Lebed's remark in a KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA interview that, as a true Russian general, he does not like Russian television, because of the presence of a large number of "pallid butts" on the screen. And people obviously have more faith in the general than in Zhirinovskiy, although the latter also likes talking about "firm order" and promises to put an end to prostitution. The LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] leader

embodies, rather, the divided mind of the ordinary Russian who hates the depraved "new Russians" with their "worldly life" (12 percent) and at the same time envies them (6 percent). As a result we get the present LDPR leader, who talks about Russia's national humiliation while visiting all the Russian-staffed strip clubs in Europe, or promises to take money from the heartless rich and give it to the pensioners, while putting on Belshazzar's feasts in the Praga Restaurant.

Yet the people are tired of deception and scandals. They hunger for an "integral nature," and find it in figures like Lebed and Yavlinskiy who are opposites in every respect. Many people hope that these two really do mean what they say. Lebed admits honestly that he does not believe in the existence of the human soul. And people like him better than Konstantin Borovoy, who makes donations to Orthodox churches and has his picture taken, in the intervals between donation scenes, with girls from "Penthouse" (Konstantin Natanovich had only 3 percent of readers' sympathies).

But one word can be pronounced in different ways. And when it comes to eloquence Lebed clearly surpasses Yavlinskiy. Take, for instance, that painful topic, the war in Chechnya. Both the people's favorites were against sending in the troops. But Yavlinskiy simply mumbled something about "our children being killed there," while Lebed put forward the voluntary initiative of heading a whole regiment made up of the children of members of the Duma and the government, and, with that regiment, taking Grozny. The thought is the same, but Lebed's words will, of course, make much more of an impression on the mass consciousness. So if Yavlinskiy really wants to become president he still has a lot to learn from Lebed and Zhirinovskiy about populism — the ability to talk to ordinary people in their own language. And if Lebed wants to be president, he should surround himself with economic experts who can convince the ordinary person that in addition to a stern face and huge fists the general also has a brain. The possessor of an equally stern outward appearance — Yeltsin — did that once before, and won.

Media Issues

Presidential Press Service Becomes Independent Branch

LD1805115395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1145 GMT 18 May 95

[By Andrey Serov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Itar-Tass) — President Yeltsin signed a decree today, which deals with the status of the press service of the Russian President. According to the decree, it becomes an

independent branch of the President's Administration with the status of a department. It will be managed by the press secretary of the President, an official report says.

Kolesnikov To Head Government Information Department

LD1805204895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1837 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — An aide to the prime minister, Sergey Kolesnikov, has been appointed as head of the Government Information Department, a source in the Russian cabinet told Interfax Thursday.

Well-informed government sources told Interfax that Kolesnikov is a professional journalist and "has vast experience of work in the leading editions of the former Soviet Union."

Over the recent years, he was Chernomyrdin's chief speech-writer as he prepared his reports and speeches.

According to the sources, Kolesnikov enjoys "much authority and influence" in the government staff.

Military Issues

ABM Treaty, Strategic Stability Weighed

95WC0044A Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
6 May 95 p 9

[Article by Sergey Konstantinovich Oznobishchev, director of the Center for the Problems of International Security, Institute of the United States and Canada, and Anton Viktorovich Surikov, senior academic associate of the Center for Military-Strategic and Technological Studies, Institute of the United States and Canada, under the rubric "Pro and Con": "The 'New' ABM Defense: A Panacea Against Threats or a Threat to Strategic Stability?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The anniversary of an event that, if it did not "shake the whole world," left a deep mark in the development of the military-political relations of the USSR and the United States passed almost unnoticed. March marked twelve years since the famous speech of Ronald Reagan that launched the many years of preparations for what was christened by journalists "Star Wars," and by specialists "efforts to create a broad-scale ABM defense with space-based elements." That time long remained in the memory of policymakers and experts as a time of heated skirmishes against technical and military-political nonsense whose appearance was provoked by the American president. The appearance of a well-ordered system of reasoning

against the opportunistic plans in the realm of ABM defense that remains fundamentally sound to this day was one positive result of this debate of the recent past. Only a few years, containing an entire era, have passed since the end of the 1980s, from the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and break-up of the USSR to the complete disappearance of the bipolar world with the obligatory confrontation of the superpowers. The political barometer has swung from one extreme to the other in recent years, from Cold War to friendship and partnership, finally sticking at the reading of "variable," which in contemporary politics now conforms to a declared "Cold War."

All of these extreme spurts have proved to be really purely "climatic," and have not affected the profound essence of relations between Russia and the United States or their conceptual and military-material foundation: notions of security as mandatory mutual nuclear restraint, traditionally requiring the preservation of "parity" in the realm of strategic nuclear weapons. The calls to enter a peace without nuclear weapons thus remain empty phrases; military analysts have not stopped their cold calculations for an instant of how much nuclear weaponry it is necessary to have under various scenarios for an exchange of nuclear strikes. It has been impossible to create over the last ten years, since the start of the "restructuring" that seemingly opened up the possibility for changes in the system of relations in the realm of security, to create the most important thing—a mechanism for partnership able, in particular, to bring our notions of each other and the surrounding world into a unified system of coordinates, making it possible to perceive and eliminate in good time mutual apprehensions in the military-political sphere.

The far from vanished military-technical foundation of the so-called "balance of terror" continues to reproduce constantly, as an essential component of it, the pathological suspicion characteristic of the nuclear age regarding the thrust of the actions and intentions of the opposing side. In this indestructible logic of "through the looking glass" that was engendered by the nuclear age, each side has always seen its role as the noble knight forced to defend himself—i.e. proceeding from the version of one's own answering actions to a massive enemy attack, accusing and suspecting the other side of concealed preparations for attack. Nothing has intrinsically changed in these calculations of the concealed hostility of the other side. The winds of partnership have thus only lightly touched the upper, demonstrative layer of our relations, without altering their essence of mutual nuclear restraint.

The achievements that we have made today are actually a continuation of the negotiating process inherited from

the Cold War era within the framework of traditional arms control. This process has moreover proved to be absolutely out of sync in Russia—the executive authorities have become so fond of virtually complete rule that they do not consider it necessary to coordinate their actions with the legislative branch. B.N. Yeltsin, speaking at the UN Security Council in September of last year, did not simply once again come out in favor of relations of partnership with the United States, but even promised that Russia would begin fulfillment of the START-2 Treaty as soon as it is ratified.

Debates in parliament are a normal phenomenon of the ratification process in any country, and the sooner they start the sooner it is possible to reach some resolution. The executive branch, however, is publicly assuming further obligations without any concern whatsoever for the ratification process, and not initiating it. It is not superfluous to recall that the first and last readings devoted to the START-2 Treaty took place in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in March of 1993.

The "managers" of our policy, evidently not wishing to demonstrate the serious existing internal differences and confuse our Western partners, are committing a much greater evil—they are threatening the entire process of arms reduction and elimination, and the reputation of Russia as a partner. Concerns on this score have already reached the "red line" in U.S. nuclear strategy, where the idea of the likelihood of a "collapse of the system of arms control" on the territory of the former USSR is being used to substantiate the existence of effective American nuclear forces.

The now-traditional "concern" regarding the development of the anti-missile programs of the other side—in this case the status and prospects of this work in the United States—has always been expressed in connection with the process of reducing and eliminating strategic nuclear arms. The interconnection between offensive and defensive weapons lies at the heart of this concern. It became clear, after a brief "rosy" period of relations with the West, that unfortunately none of the objective military-political trends in reality testified in favor of a devaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in the world. That means that we must continue to "co-exist" with them, without trying to destabilize the situation through a failure to observe the accepted rules of the "game" that had been developed over decades. President Reagan tried to break those rules in naivete and with the faith of the amateur, rather than the confidence of the professional.

The situation is largely similar in American politics today. More than enough such "amateurs," who were

never in the forefront of great international policy and the arms control process, have come to Capitol Hill since the last elections. These neophyte Republicans are the authors of the latest naively dangerous initiative, the essence of which remains as before—to breathe new life into the old ideas of creating, at least, a "refined" ABM defense on the country's territory and trying, with the aid of technical means, to resolve the military-political issue of ensuring the security of the United States into the future. And one need not be an uncommon futurologist to foresee that this idea will be one of the central ones in the arsenal of the critics of START-2 during its debate in the Russian parliament. One distinction of the impending discussion from the one that took place two years ago is precisely the fact that the defenders of the treaty at that time had the moral right to speak convincingly of the curtailment of ABM programs in the United States.

Another direction in the undermining of strategic stability, also initiated by the American representatives in the sphere of the long-term development of anti-missile systems, is also evoking concern. The United States is not ceasing its attempts at the negotiations in Geneva to coordinate certain technical parameters with Russia that would make it possible to delimit the characteristics of anti-missile systems being created to fight tactical or strategic ballistic missiles. They advance as one of the motives for this decision the necessity of decisive opposition to the growing nuclear-missile threat from so-called third countries, and also, perhaps, Russia. In order for this work not to contravene the ABM Treaty, which contains the obligation "not to create, test or deploy systems or components of sea-, air-, space- or mobile land-based ABM defense" to "fight strategic nuclear missiles" and which does not discuss tactical systems, the institution of special limiting technical parameters is being proposed for the latter.

ABM systems being tested for the defeat of targets flying at speeds of five km/sec or less are proposed to be considered "tactical" at the negotiations. That target speed corresponds to the maximum flight range of missile warheads—3,500 km—and the considerably lesser (by two km/sec) top speeds developed on the transatmospheric phase of the flight of the warheads of contemporary ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). This proposal was later adjusted somewhat. A kind of compromise was noted as a result at the negotiations, as expressed in the following limits for the top speed of intercept: 4.5 km/sec for land-based theater ABM systems, and 5.5 km/sec for sea-based theater ABM systems and air-based theater ABM systems. The rough agreement on seemingly strictly technical parameters, however, conceals a whole

series of dangers. First, if these proposals are fixed as corrections to the ABM Treaty of 1972, then the United States will "legalize" the possibility of testing, creating and deploying mobile anti-missile systems for the interception of missiles in the final stage of their boost phase of flight, including ICBMs and SLBMs, the greater portion of the boost phase of which takes place at speeds of less than 5.5 km/sec. This ABM system will thus a priori have the possibility in principle of fighting strategic as well as tactical targets. Other entirely realistic possibilities also arise that would activate such a system in a "strategic" scenario. The point is that such systems would be concentrated during "non-threatening periods" on the territory of countries participating in the theater ABM system—the United States and Russia, among others.

The very fact of the presence of such ABM systems in the United States, tried out and tested for the defeat of actual targets, however, will be considered by our specialists as posing a serious potential threat to the naval components of our strategic nuclear forces. In the event of a worsening of Russian-American relations, after all, the United States, without violating its international obligations, would be able to deploy a mobile ABM system promptly, close to the Russian border, and send naval vessels and aircraft into the Barents and Okhotsk seas, thereby blockading the launch areas of most of our SLBMs, unable to reach distant naval patrol regions in concealed fashion or in significant quantities. Analysis shows that the deployment on U.S. ships and aircraft of approximately 1,500 missiles for the intercept of SLBMs in the boost phase, taking into account the actual characteristics of the combat command-and-control systems of submarines with ballistic missiles on board and their factors of operational stress (the share of nuclear ballistic missile submarines that are on patrol at any moment in time), will lead to a roughly ten-fold lessening of the reciprocal strike of the naval component of our strategic nuclear forces [SNF].

Second, as has already been noted, the ICBM and SLBM warheads reduce their speed considerably, by almost three times, owing to braking in the Earth's atmosphere in the final phase of their trajectory. Agreement to the creation of theater ABM systems with the characteristics under discussion thus signifies obtaining the opportunity of deploying a target-based system for the interception of ICBM and SLBM warheads in the final phase of their flight. The United States was developing two low-altitude ABM interceptors in the 1980s—the HEDI for the interception of targets at an altitude of 30–45 km, and the LEDI for interception at an altitude of 15 km. The linking of the two systems into a single system would permit the United States to create a "two-

tiered" "intra-atmospheric" system of ABM defense that would markedly increase its reliability.

Third, THAAD type ABM weapons, being tested for the interception of warheads flying at speeds of 4.5 km/sec outside the limits of the atmosphere (at altitudes of more than 150 km), will also be able to intercept warheads flying at a speed of seven km/sec, although it is true that the likelihood of such an interception will be somewhat less. The idea that the U.S. military will not rely on a system of anti-missile defense that has never been tested for the defeat of high-flying ICBM and SLBM warheads, but has been tested only for the defeat of the slower warheads of intermediate-range missiles, is highly debatable. This factor could also fail to be taken into account in the event of military necessity, and there are already instances of a completely different approach in practice (in the Desert Storm operation in particular).

Finally, the United States, according to the 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty, still has the right to deploy up to 100 ABMs that are intended to fight "strategic" targets—to intercept ICBM and SLBM warheads on the descending phase of their flight—at the Grand Forks ICBM base. Analysis shows that these 100 ABMs, supplemented by approximately 50 air-based interceptors tested against targets flying at speeds of 5.5 km/sec and operating as part of a system to warn of a missile attack, will be able to constitute another, third echelon of the U.S. land strategic ABM system.

The effectiveness of such a combination of anti-missile capabilities could prove to be quite substantial. Let us turn once more to the logic of estimates that has been retained and is unaltered since the times of the global confrontation of the USSR and the United States, and is thus generally accepted by specialists. In accordance with the START-2 Treaty, the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), given the presence of roughly 800—900 mobile ICBM launchers by the year 2003 and under conditions of an absence of an ABM system in the United States, will be able to inflict unconditionally unacceptable reciprocal damage at a level of 300—400 warheads. The naval component of the SNF could inflict roughly the same in the absence of any ABM defense whatsoever. If the United States were to deploy the ABM system described above with our de facto consent, the effectiveness of the reciprocal strike by the RVSN would be reduced to approximately 150—200 warheads, and the naval strikes would effectively be blocked. Those 150—200 warheads, however, would most likely be enough to inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage—that is, nuclear restraint in its traditional characteristics would be preserved under that scenario. But the true circumstances of current Russian reality, and first and foremost the crisis state of the economy,

intrude upon the finely tuned strategic estimates. It is entirely possible that under these conditions financial limitations will not permit the creation of RVSN forces in the aforementioned composition. A force of 105 "offloaded" SS-19 ICBMs, 90 Topol-M ICBMs in SS-18 silos and approximately 300 Topol-M mobile ICBMs by 2003 looks more realistic at the contemporary level of financing. An exceedingly small number of our warheads, on the order of fifteen to twenty or even just a few, will be able to reach their targets under those circumstances. They will of course be able to inflict catastrophic damage, but nuclear restraint—the imagined set of coordinates in which we have been living in recent decades—will most likely lose its persuasiveness therein. The danger of definite and, in the view of many specialists, exaggerated technical boundaries between "tactical" and "strategic" ABM systems thus seems even more apparent—there are still many vague areas in the prospects for the development of the strategic potential of Russia.

As a result of these actions, as well as the activity of the Americans in planning territorial ABM defense, the strategic situation will be perceived by Russian experts and policymakers as having lost the most important parameters of stability. It will be difficult under these circumstances to vouch that a number of domestic politicians will not push the country toward a new spiral of the arms race, now "at any price." The negative consequences of such a step will obviously not take long to tell.

Finally, we should not forget the reaction of other countries. It is obvious that even a limited system of ABM defense could raise the issue of the effectiveness of a reciprocal strike for a country such as China. The most logical step on its part under such circumstances would be a quantitative augmentation of its strategic nuclear potential, for instance by means of the additional deployment of several hundred multiple-warhead ICBMs, which would sharply undermine stability and international security. The logic of the development of such a scenario would lead inevitably to a "chain reaction" among third countries—an acceleration of the creation of their nuclear-missile potentials, and ultimately the loss of any hope of controlling the spread of nuclear missiles around the world.

Not all that many obstacles are seen along the path of this negative development. One of them is the sure, strict observance of the ABM Treaty and an extremely cautious attitude toward any adjustments to it. Such an approach would meet the interests of Russia to the greatest extent, since it, as opposed to the United States, is experiencing a profound economic crisis and will hardly be able to embark on the creation of similar

systems in the foreseeable future, even in the face of agreed technical parameters for theater ABM defense. It should also not be forgotten that the sources of threat itself are different for Russia and the United States, owing to their geographical positions. A careful and unbiased study of work in the nuclear-missile field, as part of an analysis of policy and the military potential of the states surrounding Russia, calls very much into question the idea that a real danger will arise to our country in the foreseeable future.

Calm expert discussion is essential for the start of such a discussion. Sad as it is to say, however, the possibilities for such a dialogue have now been narrowed considerably, if not undermined—not irreversibly, we must hope—both by the plans of the West to expand the NATO bloc to the East and by our military operations in Chechnya. The serious hitch that has arisen in our relations with the Western countries is threatening to disintegrate into a long-term crisis. The dragging out of military operations in Chechnya is giving political and financial circles in the West substantial grounds to become convinced of their notions of the unsteadiness of democracy in Russia, its internal instability and the lack of civilian democratic control over power and the power structures, and to draw the corresponding practical conclusions, curtailing their partnership. The situation that is arising is playing into the hands of those forces in the West that have always come out with calls to "keep the powder dry" or to create a cordon sanitaire around Russia. Similar apprehensions and sentiments have also been reflected in U.S. nuclear strategy, where a readiness "for the possible appearance of a hostile government in Russia" is a declared basic requirement for the strategic forces.

There have always been enough people on both sides of the ocean desiring to obtain access to the budgetary pie under any pretext. It is appropriate to recall here the animation that was evoked, including in our country, at the beginning of 1992 by the idea, unexpectedly announced by B.N. Yeltsin, of creating a so-called "global system for the protection of the world community" or simply some "joint" defensive system with the Americans. Thank God that when the interagency commissions sat down in full seriousness, it became clear that no one intended to give any money for such expensive undertakings—neither the United States nor the Russian government, which was beginning to have less and less. No one was able to be convincing regarding the presence of a common potential adversary either. Before we make fools of ourselves again—before the enthusiasts of anti-missile systems begin negotiating and realizing their plans in some form—attempts should be undertaken to begin broad, comprehensive discussion of the

initial conditions: the origins and nature of existing and potential threats to Russia and the United States, with the devising of suitable measures to counteract them.

Attempts at a narrow and purely military-technical approach (as is the creation of theater ABM defense) in this context will not hold a priority place in the system of possible measures where the focus should be placed not on post-factum reaction, but on joint monitoring with the prevention of undesirable trends and actions in the world community. So as not to make decisions that have every chance of being blocked by national parliaments, such discussion should be truly broad and comprehensive—with the obligatory participation of representatives of legislative branches and the involvement of independent experts. The risk is otherwise great of the appearance of solutions that, even while remaining on paper, could prove to be a constant destabilizing factor, while the real dangers connected with the spread of nuclear and missiles systems around the world will be devoid of the requisite, coordinated opposition.

Federal Assembly

State Duma Praises Results of Belarus Referendum

LD1905110895 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1016 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — State Duma deputies "with inspiration" met the results of the nationwide referendum on May 14 in Belarus which "confirm the steady striving of the Belarusian people towards unification with Russia," says a statement unanimously adopted by the MPs at a plenary sitting Friday [19 May] (290 votes).

"The position which the Belarusian people expressed on the issues regarding their relations with Russia, on the status of the Russian language and state symbols has become a persuasive testimony of a deep understanding of the key interests of our fraternal peoples," the document says.

State Duma deputies noted the "special role of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka who "despite the pressure, and attempts to distort the essence of the problem, forced the inclusion of the issue on granting the status of state language to the Russian language on the referendum's agenda."

Russian deputies hope that the example of the Belarusian president "will find support and understanding among the presidents of several other CIS countries who have repeatedly declared their respect of the Russian people and culture at different times on their way to power."

Simultaneously State Duma deputies addressed participants of the summit of heads of CIS member-countries scheduled for late May in Minsk "to start resolving problems of economic, political, scientific, and cultural construction of the CIS which are the key ones for the peoples of the former Soviet Union."

Calls For Russian Referendum on Integration

LD1905110095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1016 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — The lower house of the Russian parliament, the State Duma, on Friday supported deputy Sergey Baburin's proposal for holding in December 1995 a referendum on the reunification of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus into one state.

A total of 249 deputies voted for the formula proposed by house speaker Ivan Rybkin: "The house instructs the parliamentary committee for legislation to consider ways of raising the question of integration of the Russian Federation with the Belarussian republic."

Duma Seeks To Enhance Powers of Security Services

MK1805130095 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSO MOLETS in Russian 18 May 95 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Hold the Front Page!" rubric: "They Will Once Again Start Files on Everyone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It looks like the Federal Security Service [FSB] will soon be invested with rights the KGB did not even dream of. MOSKOVSKIY KOMSO MOLETS has learned that the State Duma has passed in first reading a draft law "On Amendments and Riders to the Law 'On Crime Detection in the Russian Federation.'"

In addition to the earlier right granted under the law to examine mail and tap telephone conversations, the law and order organs now will have the right to such crime detection measures as infiltration of operatives, sampling purchases, and the staging of commission of crimes. This also considerably expands the rights of the FSB. According to the draft law, all actions by special services connected with examining mail, telegraph messages, wiretapping the equipment of establishments (regardless of who owns them) are performed with the participation of FSB personnel and equipment. The FSB will also take information off technical communications channels, which means in plain language it will access computer nets and databases of all organizations without exception.

Incidentally, according to the draft law, the special services are regaining the right to what amounts to running detailed reports on citizens.

Duma Asks Grachev To Allow Lebed To Attend Hearings

LD1905114695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1016 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — The State Duma on Friday decided to ask that Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev order that Commander of the 14th Army, Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed, attend the parliamentary hearings on the position of this army deployed in the Transdnister Republic.

According to Chairman of the Committee for the CIS Matters and Relations with Compatriots, Konstantin Zatulin, the Russian Defense Ministry did not agree to send Lebed to the hearings. Zatulin has described the debate in the absence of the commander as "a mockery".

Duma Asks For Ruling on Legality of Local Party 'Cells'

LD1905111395 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1016 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 19 (Interfax) — The State Duma on Friday [19 May] asked the Justice Ministry to look into the legality of forming "local cells" of the Our Home is Russia election alliance at enterprises and organizations. That initiative by the Agrarian Party and the Communist Party of Russia was supported by 287 deputies.

Communist Party faction member Anatoliy Lukyanov said that the Russian President's decree of June 14, 1991 banned the creation of local bodies of any political organizations at places of work. Lukyanov said that either all political parties, including the Communists, should be allowed to open local branches, or a comprehensive ban should be confirmed. Lukyanov quoted the chief of the Voronezh region's administration as saying that local bodies of the Chernomyrdin election alliance had already begun to be formed at enterprises there.

The State Duma also voted for the proposal of Gennadiy Kulik, of the Agrarian Party, of Russia to recommend the Justice Ministry to suspend the registration of the Chernomyrdin alliance until the dispute over political party locals was settled. That proposal was carried by 250 deputies.

However, the State Duma's first Deputy speaker Mikhail Mitukov said that the Chernomyrdin bloc had already been registered.

'Fundamental Agreement' Reached on Forming Upper Chamber

MK1905105095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 19 May 95 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "Journal" rubric: "Chambers Agree on Principle of Federation Council Formation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft law on the formation of the Federation Council will be put to a second vote even before the end of May, Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the Duma committee on legislation and judicial and legal reform, has advised. Commenting on the results of yesterday's meeting of the two chambers' joint working group of legislation committees, he stated that fundamental agreement had been reached on a mechanism of the forming the Federation Council. A norm is supposed to be included in the draft law in accordance with which it is the job of the legislative and executive bodies of power to nominate candidates for the Federation Council, while voters are supposed to approve, as it were, their candidatures by casting ballots. As for the current Federation Council deputies, they will have the right to be nominated to run for the chamber through collecting voters' signatures — 1 percent of the voters in an electoral district.

Regional Affairs

Cuny Search Team Fails To Reach Shatoy

LD1805181995 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1655 GMT 18 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ruslan Maysurov]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Nazran, 18 May — A group of representatives from Ingushetia investigating the disappearance in Chechnya in April of U.S. citizen Fred Cuny, which today left for the populated area of Shatoy together with representatives of the Soros Foundation in Grozny, failed to reach Shatoy and was forced to return to Nazran. This was due to intensive combat operations carried out by federal forces in the region of the populated areas of Duba-Yurt and Chiri-Yurt. [passage omitted]

Hope for Cuny 'Decreasing Each Day'

MM1805152495 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 May 95 p 2

[Report by Besik Urigashvili: "No Trace of Fred Cuny Yet Found"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Reports that the mutilated body of a man discovered in Chechnya's Shalinskiy Rayon is presumably the body of U.S. citizen Fred Cuny have not

yet been confirmed. In fact Aleksandr Mikhaylov, head of the Russian Federal Security Service Public Relations Center, has stated that the body discovered in the village of Novyye Atagi certainly cannot be identified as the American's remains.

And although Mikhaylov cited counterintelligence information which cannot be made public, it is hard to explain such a confident and optimistic statement on his part, since two attempts to carry out an expert examination of the body, last Saturday and Tuesday, ended without results. The latest attempt to obtain the body of the dead man ended in failure because of continuing hostilities in Shalinskiy Rayon. Staffers of the Ingushetia Ministry of Emergencies and two Ukrainian doctors were ready to leave for Novyye Atagi, but the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] representative categorically refused to make the attempt after the federal armed forces command had refused to give any guarantees of the safety of the investigating team.

The Chechen militias, for their part, are prepared to hand over the body only to an OSCE representative, asserting in talks with the Ingushetia Ministry of Emergencies leadership that the presence of an international observer will prevent possible provocations by the federal troops. The Chechens did not specify precisely what kind of provocations they meant.

Nor is anything known about the two representatives of the Russian Red Cross and interpreter Galina Oleynik who were with Cuny. It seems that their fate is of less concern to Russian official bodies. A definite answer to the question of what practical efforts are being made to find them could not be obtained from any of the relevant departments.

Let me remind you that Fred Cuny was in Chechnya as a Soros Foundation consultant and was carrying out an evaluation of the distribution of humanitarian aid there. The last report from Cuny's group arrived on 4 April. After that, contact was lost. The vehicle in which the group was traveling was found later near the village of Bamut.

Fred Cuny's partialities and sympathies in this intra-Russian conflict were no secret to anyone interested. After his first trip to Chechnya within the framework of his mission, he published an article in the NEW YORK REVIEW on 8 April under the heading "The Murder of Chechnya." In the article he unequivocally condemned the actions of the Russian authorities and military, asserting that as a result of the federal armed forces' actions a large number of civilians had been killed, including old people, women, and children.

The 50-year-old Texan is far from a novice in hot spots. He has taken part in rescue missions in more than 30 countries, including such places as Somalia, Ethiopia, and Bosnia. He went to Chechnya because, according to his colleagues, he had a unique capacity to understand how best to help people in such situations.

The disappearance of Cuny's group in the southeast of Chechnya is one more confirmation that the Chechen war is without parallel in terms of the extent to which the elementary rules of war are ignored. So many violations of the rights of representatives of international humanitarian and human rights organizations and journalists in such a short time have not been observed in any other war in recent years.

Fred Cuny's relatives, staffers of the U.S. Embassy in Russia, and representatives of the Soros Foundation in Moscow have not yet lost hope of finding Cuny and the members of his group alive. However, that hope is decreasing each day. Let me remind you that nothing is yet known of the fate of two St. Petersburg journalists who disappeared in Chechnya in early spring.

Grachev Insists on Preconditions for Chechen Talks
LD1805124895 *Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1226 GMT 18 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Grigoriy Arslanov and Vyacheslav Tomilin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Beijing, 18 May — Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev is only prepared to meet Chechen field commander Aslan Maskhadov to discuss an end to the bloodshed if the Chechen side meets the preconditions of a full cease-fire, full capitulation, and the surrender of weapons.

Answering a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent in Beijing today, Grachev said: "If Maskhadov wants to, and he thinks I can decide something, after consulting the president, and if Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] gives the instruction, I can meet him, if it will really be any use, if the bloodshed really stops."

Pavel Grachev named recognition of the fact that Chechnya is a constituent entity of the Russian Federation as a political precondition for the meeting. He noted that only after the Chechen side meets these demands "can we talk about who to punish and who not to, and how we can rebuild the Chechen economy together."

Maskhadov Ready To Meet With Grachev
LD1805145795 *Moscow INTERFAX in English*
1323 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY (Chechnya), May 18 (Interfax) — Chief of the headquarters of the

Chechen armed formations, Aslan Maskhadov, has denied statements by representatives of the federal command on the split in the rebels' ranks. "This is more than a loose interpretation of my address to the Russian officers," he said on Thursday in an interview with Interfax.

The supposition about the split in the rebels' ranks was voiced by a representative of the federal command in Mozdok. Commenting on Maskhadov's address to the Russian servicemen where he appealed to them to halt hostilities, the representative said that Dudayev seems "to have lost the confidence of his close associates and now they are attempting to stake on Maskhadov."

"I have had and continue having powers to conduct talks with the Russian side within the framework of my competence, concerning military matters," said Maskhadov. "As to political issues, this is the prerogative of Dudayev as the president."

According to Maskhadov, he coordinates all contacts with the federal command and tendencies in the negotiations with Dzhokhar Dudayev.

Confirming the Chechen side's adherence to the talks with the federal command to stop "the senseless blood-bath", Maskhadov said, "In my address I said that I have never been a coward. And today I declare that I am ready to conduct talks with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev even on the Russian territory."

According to Maskhadov, his meeting with Grachev, initially planned for May 11, has been rescheduled for May 22.

Dudayev Critical of Chernomyrdin's Peace Proposal

LD1905133895 *Moscow INTERFAX in English*
1241 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY, Chechnya, May 19 (Interfax) — Dzhokhar Dudayev said that it would be absurd to hold talks with the officials of a regime propped up by Russian bayonets.

That was his response to a proposal made by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin that a kind of round-table conference be held, involving the National Accord Committee under Umar Avturkhanov, to resolve the Chechen crisis. According to Chernomyrdin, officials of the Territorial Board of Federal Authorities in the Chechen Republic, the OSCE mission and "the Dudayev entourage which controls the field commanders" should attend the meeting.

An officer in the Chechen headquarters told Interfax that Dudayev addressed a conference of his closest

supporters that was held in the mountainous south of the republic this week.

Dudayev is said to emphasize that the Russian leaders have exhausted their political credit but the potential for a peaceful resolution of the war has not been exhausted. He did not elaborate.

Update on Battlefield Situation in Chechnya

Four Soldiers Killed in Attacks

*LD1805125195 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian
1200 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The positions of federal troops in Chechnya were fired on 13 times in the last 24 hours. Four servicemen were killed and five wounded. This information was given to RIA by an official of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs press service.

Also today, a high-ranking Russian officer who wished to remain anonymous told the agency that next week the Russian troops will probably start storming the last stronghold of Dudayev's supporters — high-mountain bases in the southern and southeastern part of Chechnya.

AP Correspondents Attacked in Grozny

*LD1805131995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1252 GMT 18 May 95*

[By Sergey Khabotin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Itar-Tass) — Two correspondents from the Associated Press news agency were attacked by bandits Monday when they were approaching the Chechen capital Grozny. The assailants beat up the correspondents threatening them with guns, took away their car, stole videos, their documents and a large sum of money in foreign currency. Itar-Tass learned from the Russian Interior Ministry today.

Andrew Braddel, chief editor of the AP Moscow office, told Itar-Tass that on May 15, two correspondents on staff of the AP office in Tbilisi, Giya Papkhadze and David Kwandzhenadze, were stopped on the way home by a group of gunmen who got them out of their car, beat them up, stole documents, videos, money and bolted in the stolen car.

Braddel said that on the same day the AP correspondents appealed to the local authorities, representatives of the Russian Federal command in Chechnya and Chechen elders, asking for help to recover the stolen property. The AP staff was promised assistance, although the authorities made it clear that there was almost no chance to find the assailants and warned the correspondents that

if the bandits were not traced within the next 2-3 days, it would be useless to continue the search.

Braddel noted with regret that over the past few days no encouraging information had arrived, adding that it looks that the stolen things would never be recovered. "Anyway, we were lucky that no one was seriously hurt," Braddel said.

Chechens, Marines Clash South of Grozny

*LD1805153495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1323 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY (CHECHNYA), May 18 (Interfax) — Three Chechens were killed and seven wounded as a result of a clash with a detachment of the Pacific Fleet marines which is in the composition of the Joint Group of Federal Forces. The headquarters of the Chechen armed formations reported to Interfax that the clash took place on Wednesday near the population center of Chechen-Aul (8 kilometers to the south of Grozny).

According to the headquarters, the Russian side has also sustained losses in the course of the fight, there are both killed and wounded, the fighters destroyed one armored vehicle.

According to the same source, on Tuesday a Russian assault aircraft was brought down above Shali's southern suburbs (25 kilometers to the south of Grozny). The aircraft was destroyed by air defense means from the side of the Shali tank training area.

Meanwhile, a Russian command representative declared to Interfax that over the past days the Chechen side has been "spreading falsified information about the federal forces' aircraft being brought down by Chechens and about a great number of destroyed military equipment almost every day." The source voiced the supposition that this is done "for propaganda purposes" — in order to raise the combat morale of the Chechen home guards.

As far as brought-down aircraft are concerned this month the federal forces lost only one aircraft in Chechnya, the source underlined.

Russian Aircraft Reportedly Attack Villages

*LD1805144395 Moscow INFORMATSIONNOYE
AGENTSTVO EKHO MOSKVY in Russian
1330 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] "As soon as we hear about peacemaking statements by Russian politicians, we begin to prepare for further mass destruction of the civilian population and for attacks by Russian troops," Movladi Udugov, the head of the Chechen republic's

Department for Information and the Press, said in an interview with the Ekho Moskvyy radio station, commenting on the statement by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on 17 May.

"At 0500 this morning, Russian aircraft subjected Chechen villages to gunfire, which has still not stopped," M. Udugov said. "The main headquarters compared this air action with the one that happened on 31 December 1994, in the assault on Groznyy."

M. Udugov said that the Chechen side will welcome any initiative "when real steps are behind it," but V. Chernomyrdin's statement is "a typical piece of propaganda by the electoral bloc Our Home is Russia."

Russians Resume Strikes at Dudayev Positions

LD1805175495 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1510 GMT 18 May 95

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYYY May 18 (Itar-Tass) — A relative lull in the fighting in Chechnya over the past few days is apparently about to end. Federal forces resumed rocket and bombing strikes and bombardment at positions of Dudayev's armed supporters in south, south-east and west Chechnya. Sounds of bursts of shells carry to Groznyy.

There is no reliable data about the fighting. This information will apparently be contained in communiques of the press centre of the command of the joint group of federal forces on Friday.

According to a well-informed source, commander of the group of federal forces in Chechnya, Colonel-General Mikhail Yegorov met with deputy chairman of the Committee of national accord of Chechnya, Lecha Magomadov, and with deputy head of the territorial board of federal executive authorities in Chechnya, Vladimir Zorin, in Severnyi airport of the Chechen capital on Thursday morning. The contents of the conversation were not reported.

Moscow Vows Not To Bomb Mountain Villages

LD1805171295 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*
1535 GMT 18 May 95

[By Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GROZNYYY, May 18 (Itar-Tass) — Russian troops will not bomb mountain villages in Chechnya, Col. Gen. Mikhail Yegorov, commander of Russian troops in the region, said on Thursday [18 May].

Addressing the villagers through national television, the general recommended them not to live their settlements.

[sentence as received] "Your safety is within your villages", Yegorov said but did not specify for how long they should stay at home.

The general said that the Russian military came out for "smaller bloodshed" both for Dzhokar Dudayev's supporters and their own soldiers.

Yegorov reiterated the appeal to "the members of illegal armed formations to lay down their weapons and return to peaceful life".

Chechens Thwart Russian Advances

LD1805191295 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1711 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Arshty, Chechnya, May 18 (INTERFAX) — Chechen fighters Thursday spoke of thwarting an attempt by Russian troops to advance on Bamut, a hillside Chechen village close to Ingushetia. A column of federal troops on its way to the populated center of Merzoi-Gala, a few kilometers away from Bamut, had to stop its advance after coming under rebel attack, Chechen sources told Interfax.

A Chechen military official put the number of Russian casualties at seven.

He also spoke of another column of about 100 Russian tanks and armored vehicles being forced to retreat after failing to pass through a valley near Shali (25 kilometers south of Groznyy) to the hilltop village of Vedeni (100 kilometers south of the Chechen capital). The column had to turn back after the rebels hit the vanguard tank and two APCs, the official said.

According to Chechen sources, the rebel-held hilly parts of Chechnya came under bombardment by Russia forces in the past 24 hours. Russian aircraft dealt strikes on outlying areas of Mesket and Alleroi in the east, Serjen-Yurt, Duba-Yurt and Chiri-Yurt in the south and Merzoi-Gala, Yandi-Kotar and Achkhoy-Kotar in the west.

Federal Forces Rocket Opposition

LD1905053395 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 0440 GMT 19 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sharip Asuyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Groznyy, 19 May (ITAR-TASS) — Inhabitants of Groznyy were today awakened by powerful salvos from "Grad" and "Uragan" missile complexes deployed by the federal forces on the outskirts of the Chechen capital. Missiles thundered off towards Dudayev's positions in the south and south-east of the republic with 8-10 minutes' interval. The military maintains that the strikes are targeted at the forests stretching

40-50 kilometers to the south of Grozny in which, according to them, Dudayev's armed supporters are hiding.

Combat helicopters are periodically taking off from the "Severnny" and "Khankala" airfields and fly in the south and south-eastern direction. Explosions, muffled by the distance, can be clearly heard in the city.

Continued Fighting Near Bamut

*LD1905110695 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1016 GMT 19 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY (Chechnya), May 19 (Interfax) — Federal troops and Chechen militants kept fighting all night long near the small village of Merzoy-Gala, on the approaches to the Chechen stronghold of Bamut.

The Chechen command told Interfax that a federal convoy halted progress and its troops took up positions 800 meters away from Merzoy-Gala. The exchange of fire continued into Friday morning.

Russian troops made a new attempt to advance in the direction of the village of Serzhen-Yurt (southern Chechnya, 30 kilometers away from Grozny). According to the Chechen sources, the attack was rebuffed and one of the federal tanks was burnt down.

The Chechen sources report federal air raids on positions near the village of Alleroy (eastern Chechnya, 60 kilometers away from Grozny).

Moscow Allocates R410 Billion To Restore Chechen Economy

*LD1805213495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1941 GMT 18 May 95*

[By Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Itar-Tass) — First Russian deputy finance minister Oleg Velichko said that in May, Russia allocates 410 billion roubles to restore the Chechen economy. Velichko spoke at a regular meeting of the state commission for the restoration of the Chechen economy and social sector on Thursday [18 May]. He specified that investments make up 365 billion roubles, while the rest was financed by the government.

A total of 324 billion roubles had been invested in the Chechen economy by now. The Russian government intends to attract commercial banks to invest in Chechnya, Velichko said.

Finance Ministry Opposes Special Tax Zones for Regions

*MK1805131095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
18 May 95 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "The Finance Ministry Is Against Special Tax Zones in the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian Federation Finance Ministry considers the establishment of special tax regimes for particular Russian regions as inadmissible. According to Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Shatalov, "the Finance Ministry policy is that tax treatment should be approximately the same. It is another matter that the regions may attract manufacturing companies by varying their tax rates and creating a preferential environment."

Moscow Mayor Luzhkov Denies Presidential Ambitions

*MM1905131995 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 18 May 95 p 3*

[Readers' phone-in with Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov conducted by Olga Gerasimenko and five others: "Yuriy Luzhkov Does Not Want To Be Jacques Chirac"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Caller] My name is Larisa Grigorenko, I live in Khimki. Yuriy Mikhaylovich, with which mayors of foreign capitals have you had dealings? Do you not dream of following in the footsteps of Jacques Chirac, who has leapfrogged from the mayor's office to the presidency?

[Luzhkov] Actually Jacques Chirac and I have close, friendly relations. He has been to Moscow more than the others. He is an active, lively politician. He is quite a good economic planner, he has done a lot for his own city. Mayor of Berlin Diepgen and I have good, amicable relations, as with the mayor of Tokyo. I am on friendly terms with the heads of Athens, Istanbul, Stockholm, and Tel Aviv. And with the mayor of New York.

I congratulate Chirac on achieving his cherished goal of becoming president. I have no such aim. Because it is incorrect to draw a parallel between Chirac and Luzhkov. Everyone has his own views of his career, of his goals in life. For me a career does not mean posts. [passage omitted]

[Caller] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, my name is Aleksandr Borisovich Krasnoshchekov. I'm a Muscovite. Moscow, as we know, abounds in rumors. Here is one of them in particular. I have heard several times that somewhere, apparently in the heart of the presidential apparatus, a

presidential edict on your retirement is either ready or even all but signed. Do you know anything about it?

[Luzhkov] No, nothing at all. I think it is a rumor. And a malicious one at that. I think it's all lies to which no attention should be paid. I can say that I have difficult relations with some people in the president's entourage. But on the whole we work well, in harmony. I have never let the president down. And I do not intend to do so in the future.

[Caller] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, another question if I may. Again it concerns all kinds of conjectures. Your name is very often linked, especially in the press, with "Most-Bank." What is the actual state of affairs? There are even rumors that Gusinskiy is buying you real estate abroad. Do you in fact have dealings with Gusinskiy?

[Luzhkov] Yes I do, and why not? I also have dealings with the leaders of other banks. I do not consider this shameful. Because if we do not collaborate with banking systems there will be no point to our work. Eighty percent of financial capital is concentrated in banks.

[Caller] Does that mean you consider the virtual merging of banking structures with the authorities as normal?

[Luzhkov] No, why should it be? Everybody has his own function. A bank has money, the authorities have authority.

Now, as regards property abroad. I can tell you it is nonsense! Lies! Malicious, scurrilous lies. I have no property abroad.

[Caller] And Gusinskiy himself, has he any intention of returning?

[Luzhkov] He is here. [passage omitted]

Luzhkov Could Lose Job as Moscow Mayor
954F2306A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian May 95 No 20, p 2

[Unattributed article: "Luzhkov Is Being Handed Over"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Those who are following the political intrigue surrounding Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov should be prepared for serious changes in his destiny. Of all the possible alternatives, we will report to you the most drastic one. Information we have received indicates that the sluggish phase of the "Kremlin-mayor" conflict is turning into a rapid-action phase.

Of course it can all turn out to be not so and change at the last minute, but we can presently state with a very high degree of confidence that Yuriy Luzhkov will soon be discharged from his post "at his personal request" by edict of the Russian Federation president. Just as soon

as the anniversary hullabaloo, where the Moscow mayor shone in all his glory, subsides somewhat.

One can only venture a guess as to the true reasons behind such a decision. But according to our sources, the reason for the resignation (if such takes place) lies in the fact that certain compromising material has allegedly been gathered against the mayor. Including material on the financial activities of his wife. Here it seems we are talking about accounts abroad and real estate. It is being said that in exchange for his renunciation of political activity, future ordinary Moscow citizen Yuriy Luzhkov will be able to keep his freedom and "his own" interests.

Another detail of no small importance. Rumors concerning the mayor's accounts and real estate have been floating for a long time. But this time the situation would seem to be truly serious. It is being said that a role of no small importance in this outcome was played by Deputy Mayor V. Resin—privy to all matters of the mayor's business. And here they parted ways. Mr. Resin was even allowed to join the right-centrist bloc of Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin, into which Yu. Luzhkov... was not permitted.

As far as filling the possible Moscow vacancy is concerned, nothing unexpected will take place here. Analysts have long agreed that Mr. Chernomyrdin will place Oleg Soskovets, his bloc friend, in the position of acting city chief with the president's blessing. At any rate, Soskovets has already been through a rehearsal, when he conducted a conference on supplying the capital with foodstuffs. That is how party life is—the party is prepared to throw a pig-iron specialist "into the breach"...

Finally, if this bit of intrigue actually does come to pass, many Muscovites—including pensioners, veterans, and others—will most likely not enjoy the finale. All Muscovites have to this point been feeling at least some degree of concern for themselves. And whether or not the impassive O. Soskovets will be scurrying around all the vegetable storage facilities and garbage dumps—is a big question...

Kazan Conference Says Tatarstan Statehood Premature

MK1905114095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
19 May 95 p 3

[Report by Dmitriy Lukashov under the "Conference" rubric: "Tatarstan Statehood Idea Recognized as Premature. Nationalists Urge Expatriate Tatars To Vote for 'Russia's Choice'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A scientific-practical conference entitled "Improvement of the Platform to Revive the

Tatar Nation" organized by the Tatar National Movement jointly with Muslim religious leaders was held in Kazan this week. Taking part in the conference proceedings were some 100 delegates including Tatar academics, spokesmen of national parties and movements, as well as Muslim clergy.

Conference participants recognized that the idea of Tataria's statehood, for which Tatar national parties and movements had been campaigning for 10 years, was premature. In the words of Ildus Amirkhanov, chairman of the right wing of the All-Tatar Public Center, it was a mistake to gamble on the existing state structures. The national movement itself had no reliable social mainstay, for which reason its expectations failed to materialize. Tatarstan's statehood, he thinks, succumbed to pressure from Russia. In the view of conference participants, the national democratic movement is now supposed to focus on national self-determination, national development, and on internal life rather than on achieving state sovereignty.

A memorandum adopted at the conference points out that these objectives ought to be reached with the aid of education, religion, national culture, and use of the accumulated historical potential.

As for the all-Russia problems, Fauziya Bayramova, leader of the "Ittifak" Tatar party of national independence, stated, for example, that Tatar national parties and movements would urge the republic's population to boycott the elections for Russia's State Duma this coming fall. In her view, citizens of Tatarstan should take no part in the elections held by a "neighbor state of Russia."

Some 75 percent of Tatars who live outside the republic in other regions in Russia, Fauziya Bayramova thinks, should take part in the elections and support those democratic forces of Russia that are oriented toward economic and political reforms, but "under no circumstances for communists, fascists, or the 'Russia is Our Home' movement of Viktor Chernomyrdin." "We," Mrs. Bayramova said, "are preparing an appeal to Tatars living outside the republic with a request to support the 'Russia's Choice' bloc."

Fertilizer Shortage Bedevils Spring Sowing in Altay
MM1905123495 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN
in Russian 18 May 95 p 1

[Report by Ivan Semykin: "Ministers Gave Guarantees... Altay Farmers Did Not Receive All the Fertilizers and Commodity Credits Thus Guaranteed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Altay Kray — By the usual standards, spring was unusually early this year and fall-

plowed land and winter and perennial grasses were harrowed in April in most rayons. Spring grain crops now occupy a little over 500,000 hectares. The principle is to sow less but better. In the kray as a whole the grain area will be reduced by 150,000 hectares. The reason is simple — even grain production is unprofitable. But thought has been given to the increased demand for vegetable oil, so there will be an extra 40,000 hectares of sunflowers in the kray. The amount of fallow land will be increased by 100,000 hectares — better to give the land a break than to produce weeds.

All the signs are that Altay will be without mineral fertilizers again this year. The government promised 41,700 tonnes of active material, but in fact little more than 5,000 tonnes have arrived. The farmers hoped, the ministers guaranteed, but the plants are not supplying the stuff, their excuse being that they do not have the raw materials or covered freight cars. Although there are plenty of both for fertilizer exports.

This 5,000 tonnes is 10 percent of what is required, or 0.7 kg per hectare sown — one-half of what we had a year ago. And if you were to take the indicators of five years ago as your reference point, they would be 250,000 tonnes. After this should one expect a good harvest? The Uvarovo Chemical Plant has not dispatched a single carload of ammophos to the kray and not a single tonne of double superphosphate has come from the "Svyatogor" joint-stock company (Krasnouralsk, Sverdlovsk Oblast). The Altay grain growers are even being let down by their neighbors — the Kemerovo "Azot" production association. Only 950 of the 9,500 tonnes of nitrogen fertilizers have been supplied. Personal contacts are no help either. Kray representatives have repeatedly been out to all the aforementioned enterprises and have twice been to Moscow, to "Rosagrokhim." With the same result as before.

Farms have also failed to raise the arable yield through their own efforts, using organic fertilizers. What prevented them was scarce and expensive fuel and lubricants and the lack of spare parts to repair agricultural equipment. For example, only 50 kg of mulch per hectare were put on the fields in the entire winter. In the kray as a whole this figure was 0.04 tonnes. Some 30 kg of organic fertilizers were applied per hectare.

The seed problem has been resolved with difficulty. There are even corn seeds in the kray. A little over 3,000 tonnes of them have been lying around in a local firm for more than a year. But these seeds have not generated any income yet because the firm is demanding "live" money from the farms. It will not accept any other form of settlement. But there is no live money! Despite

all the government's promises, there are no commodity credits yet either. Nor is there a clear policy on advance payments for supplies of grain to federal stocks. What advance payments! The Russian Agriculture and Food Ministry still owes the kray 20.8 billion rubles of federal budget money for last year.

More than 60,000 tonnes of solar oil have come into the Altay through commercial structures. There should be enough for the initial weeks of the sowing period. But motor oils and gasoline are in disastrously short supply. Seeds have to be taken to the fields by wheeled tractors and the drills loaded manually. Omsk oil refinery workers are refusing to accept the commodity credit introduced by the government. It is the shortage of sowing and soil cultivation equipment and its fitness for work that are causing the most worry. And that is with 2 million hectares of spring plowing to do and an enormous number of weeds to contend with!

Spring sowing is the prelude to the agricultural year. The farmer's livelihood depends on how he conducts it.

Fire Flares Up at Site of Komi Oil Spill

LD1905052695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service
in Russian 0145 GMT 19 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Usinsk (Republic of Komi), 19 May (ITAR-TASS) — An alarming situation has arisen today at the largest section of the area polluted by an oil spill near Usinsk in the Republic of Komi. During the burning up works in the polluted areas a fire has flared up. An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned at the headquarters of the Ministry for Emergency Situations of the Republic of Komi that on Thursday [18 May] afternoon the oil men started burning up the remaining residue of the oil spill "to limit the danger of it getting into the streams and rivers during the spring flood." Competent sources report that contrary to calculations, the fire within the polluted area has spread beyond the intended area.

The situation was brought under control as a result of the emergency measures. All the necessary forces and means including fire-fighting and other equipment have been concentrated in the area where the spilled oil is to be burned up. Then the course of the evening and over the night measures were being taken to prevent the fire spreading further.

The press center of the Australian-American company AES/Hartech LTD., the principal contractor for cleaning up the area affected by the oil spill, reported that the fire has spread over 10-12 hectares in the area's north-western section. Immediately after the conflagration,

heads of the joint-stock company left for the site of emergency and offered necessary help and equipment to the fire brigade commanders.

The company's representative said he is confident that the fire will not spread to the sections adjacent to the area on fire. "Fortunately, these sections have already been cleaned from the oil spill and it is unlikely that the fire will spread further," he said.

Maritime Representative Criticizes Central Government

LD1905132095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1301 GMT 19 May 95

[By Leonid Vinogradov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NAKHODKA, May 19 (Itar-Tass) — "The Russian Government is failing to fulfil its commitments to the Maritime Territory," Vladimir Ignatenko, presidential representative in that part of Russia, told Itar-Tass. "Instead of tackling the concrete problems, now facing the Territory, some members of the government are trying to seek the source of all its troubles within the local Administration," he noted. As many as 46 various commissions have come from Moscow to the Territory during the past two years. "They have yielded nothing useful, producing merely an unsound atmosphere around Governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko," the presidential representative stated.

Ignatenko believes that the Governor is acting in accordance with the Russian Constitution and is upholding Russia's interests in the Far East. This refers to the demarcation of the border between Russia and China, the expulsion of foreign citizens from the Maritime Territory, who were illegally staying in its towns and villages, and the Administration's persistent demands to solve the problem of the fuel and energy complex, which is doomed to perish without the government's assistance.

Ignatenko adduced as an example the problems facing the "Spassk Cement" joint-stock society. This major producer of cement in the Russian Far East was compelled to substantially increase the price of its production due to the exceedingly high prices fixed for electricity. As a result, it has lost its positions on the markets of thirteen countries of the Asia-Pacific Region.

Ignatenko said that individual members of the government should stop "seeking extremists" on the periphery in order to cover up the problems that have accumulated in the region through the fault of the central authorities. "Today," he added, "the Federal debt to the Maritime Territory adds up to more than one trillion roubles."

Economic Issues

Yeltsin Orders Issue of Gold Certificates

LD1805163495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1432 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (FIA-Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Thursday ordered issuing "gold certificates," a new type of government security to be backed by gold, a senior Finance Ministry official said.

The issue of certificates to a sum of 2 trillion rubles is scheduled for the end of June, the official, Bella Zlatkis, told a news conference at the Central Bank headquarters in Moscow.

The issue of gold certificates meets the General Conditions for the Issue of Federal Bonds approved by the government on May 15, Zlatkis said.

Petrov Presents 1996 Fiscal Policy Guidelines

LD1805202195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English
1747 GMT 18 May 95

[By Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, May 18 (ITAR-TASS) — Russian first deputy finance minister Vladimir Petrov estimated federal budget deficit for 1996 at 4% of GNP which makes up approximately 76 trillion roubles. The projection was based on the analysis of sources of financing not related to money emission, he said.

Petrov presented basic guidelines of fiscal policy for 1996 at Thursday's session of the Russian government.

The first deputy finance minister said Russia would keep to non-inflationary measures to cover its budget deficit. Budget planners suggest that major budget revenues in 1996 will come from all types of securities, foreign financing in the amount of 7.6 trillion roubles, credit reserves of international financial institutions in the amount of 23.4 trillion roubles, and proceeds from the Russian Central Bank's purchasing state securities worth five trillion roubles at the secondary market.

Petrov said there were plans to significantly change the existing tax system over 1995-96 in order to reduce domestic manufacturers' tax burden.

He also said that federal defence spending in 1996 would be centered around producing brand-new weapons and equipment. Spending for military research and development programmes should be left at the current level which is 10 per cent of federal expenditures for military construction and maintenance of the Armed Forces, or about 2.2 trillion roubles.

Petrov said it would be appropriate to consider possibilities of allotting more budget funds to support law enforcement and national security agencies in order to ensure greater economic security and intensify combating crime.

It is also planned to promote certain loans of the International and European Banks for Reconstruction and Development.

Proceeds from imports and centralised export of weapons and military equipment will remain major revenue sources in foreign trade.

In 1996, Russia is expected to repay 8.5 out of its 120-billion-dollar foreign debt, according to a draft budget for 1996. Funds will be used to both service and cover the debt, the deputy minister said.

Cabinet Session on Budget Reported

MK1905092095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker under the "Sketch" rubric: "Budget-96 is Drawing Ever Closer, Closer, and Closer. Tax Policy To Change Substantially"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The preliminary discussions had so thoroughly "kneaded" the concept of the 1996 budget and coordinated the positions that yesterday's sitting of the government went virtually without debate. For the first time in the post-reform years, the country is getting a chance to pass a budget before the start of the [next] year, which is very important for the economy and normalization of the budget process. Now much depends on the State Duma, where the budget concept and the main economic parameters will be received 15 June. Five days later parliament will also be receiving the budget itself in the shape of thick volumes of figures.

The budget provides for 1 to 1.5 percent monthly inflation, something, in the words of First Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Petrov that "will make it possible to speak about suppressing inflation." The budget parameters were worked out on the basis of an exchange rate of 6,000 rubles [R] per \$1. Budget revenue has been worked out at R273 trillion, and spending at R349 trillion. A deficit of 4 percent of GDP (gross domestic product) will be covered, like this year, by methods other than issuing money." This means that the deficit will not be a source of inflation," said Mr. Petrov. The government plans to reduce considerably the size of foreign loans by limiting them in the deficit to R31 trillion or to 40 percent in the sources of covering the deficit, against the current 58 percent. To be preserved next year is the principle: We do not take more credits than we repay (that is to say, \$8.7 billion.)

Tax policy is to change considerably in 1996. The tax burden on enterprises will ease through the scrapping of the special tax on enterprises, thus cutting the VAT [value-added tax] by 13 percent. The scrapping of the tax on exceeding the rate of wages signifies that the profit tax is being reduced from 35 percent to 28 percent. This will leave enterprises with an additional R35 to R37 trillion. In a bid to make up for budget losses, the Finance Ministry has found new sources of revenue. Considerable gains are expected from reinstating the state monopoly on alcohol products. Putting a halt to the smuggling of goods into Russia from abroad is seen as a considerable reserve. This will be supplemented by more efficient tax collection and the abolition of existing tax breaks. Mr. Petrov said the number of VAT breaks alone runs to 37. The same applies to profit tax breaks, where the corresponding government decree of 5 May will be, as expected, supplemented by yet another anti-entitlements decree before the end of the month.

Projected spending in 1996 will match that of this year or 18.7 percent of GDP. The deputy finance minister said that the government has rather limited elbow room as regards the spending structure. Besides, outlays for servicing foreign and domestic debts are to be upped. Nevertheless, in the words of Mr. Petrov, funds for public health, education, science, and culture will be increased. State support for the military-industrial complex and defense outlays will stay at the present level. First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin, however, was not happy with R93 trillion (5 percent of GDP), and he demanded in the government sitting that appropriations for the Defense Ministry be increased.

\$8.5 Billion Allocated for Foreign Debt

LD1805212395 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service*
in Russian 1249 GMT 18 May 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 18 May — In the framework of cooperation with international financial organizations in 1996, it is planned to attract several loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development [IBRD] and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD]. It is planned to use \$9 billion on financial credits and \$8 billion on investment credits. Vladimir Petrov, first deputy finance minister, said this, presenting the main directions of the budget policy for 1996 at a government sitting today.

He said the investment loans will be used to support the industry: \$175 million to restore the oil-production industry, \$106.6 million to support agriculture, and \$70 million to develop financial institutions. As for financial loans, they will in fact be used to liquidate the budget

deficit. Apart from the IBRD and EBRD loans, next year it is planned to use \$1.1 billion of the last tranche of the reserve credit the International Monetary Fund [IMF] granted this year. In addition, if Russia succeeds in implementing the economic program for repaying the reserve credit, at the end of 1995 it might hold talks with the IMF on the so-called expanded reserve credit, which is provided for a period of three years. If things go well in 1996, Russia can expect to receive about \$2 billion from it.

Petrov said that proceeds from import operations and from centralized exports of arms and military equipment would remain the main sources of income in foreign trade in 1996.

A considerable part of the foreign debt, which amounts to \$120 billion at present, is to be repaid in 1996. The draft federal budget for 1996 allocates \$8.5 billion for servicing and repaying the foreign debt.

\$8.7 Billion Included for Imports

LD1805215295 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*
1756 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) — A total of \$8.7 billion is expected to be fixed in the draft federal budget for financing imports in 1996, Russian First Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Petrov told Interfax today after the meeting of the cabinet on the guidelines for the budget policy for 1996 finished.

He said the main section within the structure of borrowing consists of "untied financial credits" from international financial organizations, which would total \$4 billion. Petrov said the "untied financial borrowing" would be \$1.5 billion, "tied export credits" — \$2.4 billion and "tied credits" from international organizations — \$0.8 billion.

Petrov said that borrowing for repaying Russia's foreign debt (which now exceeds \$120 billion) would be carried out if an agreement was reached with creditors on the terms for giving credits which would not seriously affect the level of service of the foreign debt during the next two years.

According to the Finance Ministry, the federal budget's expenses on serving the foreign debt in 1996 may be \$8.5 billion.

Petrov said that liberalization of foreign economic activities would increase the amount of export of goods in 1996 by 15%-20%. He said this would be equal to budget revenues of \$2.8 billion. However, the budget will miss \$1.5-1.8 billion because of lifting export duties in 1996.

Ruble's Rise Seen as Artificial, Unhealthy

MM1905105295 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 19-26 May 95 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Lyasko under the rubric "State Planning Committee": "Dollar Worth a Bit Less"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fact that in May the U.S. currency's exchange rate stabilized and then fell back should not cause rejoicing among patriotic supporters of the Russian ruble. Indeed, after hesitantly hovering around the level of 5,125-5,130 rubles [R], the "green-back" has been in constant decline. By 10 May it had almost dropped through the level of R5,100 to the dollar, and 10 days later it was very close to the R5,000 mark. Let me remind you that the omniscient Economics Minister Yasin predicted this back in April.

The accuracy of the minister's forecast suggests that this decline is a carefully planned action by the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank. Indeed, is there any reason why the ruble should be going up in value? Production is continuing to fall, especially in the light-industry and food sectors, and also in the high-technology sphere. The increase in prices in April was theoretically planned at 6 percent by the government, but the actual figure was almost 9 percent.

Moreover, the cheap ruble has always been the main crutch of our raw material exports: You can extract oil and gas more cheaply, and sell them at a higher price. When you know that fuel and metal exports from Russia provide 70-80 percent of the budget's hard currency revenue, it is easy to see that the real rise in the ruble's value toward that of world currency is a disaster for producers of oil and ore.

It is a different matter that a dollar that is declining in value is always a source of profit for those who import goods from abroad. The logic is simple: For a given quantity of rubles you can buy more and more hard currency in order to pay for contracts for ham and "Snickers" bars. And since domestic ruble prices in Russia are continuing to shoot up, importers are double winners: When they sell the imported goods, they get an extra profit in rubles.

Admittedly, the problem is that the more Bulgarian tomatoes and German schnapps they import into our homeland, the harder it is to sell all this. The population, which suffers from chronic wage arrears, simply cannot spend money on expensive purchases. Moreover, people's real incomes have fallen and are now \$85 per month, as against \$110 at New Year. Russians' purchasing power is deteriorating, and a severe sales crisis is emerging.

So apparently the U.S. dollar's new exchange rate is to the disadvantage of neither exporters, traders, nor ordinary people. So who is losing out? Correct, our beloved government. It has a headache — how to make ends meet when there is a R70-trillion hole in the budget. And the best "Andrews answer" to a headache is to make banks, firms, and the population invest money where it is most necessary for the budget simply by twisting everybody's arms.

How has the government managed to lower the exchange rate? First of all it stopped printing money and providing credit to plants and collective farms. During the first quarter R6 trillion was removed from circulation, and no new money appeared. The wage arrears, the refusal to pay for the state order in the defense sector, and the replacement of money for the spring sowing with gasoline loans are all part of the same picture. It's a simple prescription: Don't give money to anybody in the state, and put out the fire when disaster beckons — as with the miners.

This is how the ruble famine arose in Russia and, in order to avoid dying of it, banks and exporters began to unload some of their hard currency proceeds. This immediately caused surplus supply on currency markets. The dollar began to fall. Thus by May day everyone with spare money was told to aim at the same goal. In other words, if you want to remain a winner in monetary terms, invest in state securities. The purchase of bonds, even if you don't speculate in them but just sit stupidly waiting to redeem them, guarantees 130-140 percent in interest.

Another good point about state securities is that the state will redeem them on time whatever happens. However, the government needs money in order to redeem its bonds. Around R7 trillion in May, for instance. How will it get this sum? Correct, by selling new bonds. And the rules of the pyramid game require that banks and others with money constantly buy up the new issues. So their money must not be diverted to anything else, such as the dollar. Only by moving forward, only by recklessly investing in the official pyramid, will we arrive at the triumph of capitalism and help the government to make ends meet at last.

Here is a recent example. An auction to place 6-month bonds worth the crazy sum of R5 trillion was supposed to have been held 10 May. The banks began to scrape together the money for this. And the dollar, forlorn and no longer of interest, immediately dropped by over R100.

So the rise in the ruble, paradoxical though it may seem, is an artificial and unhealthy phenomenon. As soon as the government has overcome its May difficulties, the

ruble will again start to fall approximately as fast as prices go up inside the country. By winter it should reach the level of R7,000 to the dollar, to ensure that Western loans plug the intended hole in the budget — around 40 trillion.

Aleksandr Potemkin, director of the Central Bank Foreign Transactions Department, believes that the ruble could strengthen for a long while if inflation starts to decline sharply in the near future. Prices went up 2 percent over the big May holidays. Taking into account the new customs duties and the dacha season, inflation will be around 7-8 percent in May. So what reason is there for the ruble to go up in value?

**Livshits Denies Rumored Central Bank
Decentralization**

*MK1905111095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY
in Russian 19 May 95 p 5*

[Unattributed report under the "Journal" rubric: "Livshits Denies Rumored Central Bank Decentralization"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksandr Livshits, the Russian president's economic aide, has categorically denied rumors of a possible decentralization of the Russian Federation Central Bank. "There was no and is no any such edict or draft edict," Livshits stated, adding that "it would be totally wrong to do any such thing today." The president's aide has also underscored that in the future the activity of the Central Bank of Russia will strictly abide by the recently passed law on the Bank of Russia.

Aviation Industry Reports Substantial Losses

*LD1805214495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1944 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 18 (Interfax) - The separation of air companies from airports, now under way in Russia, aggravates the problem of multi-million [currency not specified] losses for both the Russian aviation and land services, said the Fourth International Conference of Airports which opened in Moscow today.

Participants in the conference said the profits of air companies had decreased because of the fall in the amount of transportation. Experts explain this by increased prices for fuel and technical services in airports which were raised by about 200% over the last year and increased tariffs on air navigation and airport duties which rose by about 100%.

Airports suffer losses because of decrease in the regularity of flights, the insolvency of air companies' delayed

payments for air navigation services and the transfer of their social funds to the balance of airports.

The conference proposed to take several measures on the state level to ensure the efficient performance of air companies. The measures should include the introduction of regional rates as regards payments for technical services and payments of air navigation duties, the creation of optimum conditions for national and foreign investors as well as state regulation of prices for fuel in various regions of the country.

A total of 66 Russian air enterprises (29% of the total number) have been transformed into joint-stock companies. About 40 large airports (out of a total of 1,000 airports) have become independent organizations.

**Energy Crisis Prompts Ministry To Seek New
Powers**

*MM1805184295 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 May 95 First Edition p 2*

[Report by Vladimir Kucherenko under the rubric "In the Russian Federation Government": "Do We Have Enough Fuel? The Ministry of Fuel and Energy's Power Will Be Strengthened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 17 May the Commission on Current Issues under the chairmanship of First Vice Premier O. Soskovets was extremely worried about the state of affairs in a sector that is vital to our lives — the fuel and energy complex.

In January-April 101.3 million tonnes of oil and condensate were extracted — 3 million tonnes less than in the same period of 1994 and 1.3 million tonnes less than the planned indicators. For the same old reasons: payment defaults. Furthermore, deliveries under interstate agreements have not yet been carried out for this year: The mechanism has yet to be drawn up, because of friction between the Ministry of Fuel and Energy and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. But exports of "black gold" again increased, by 3.7 million tonnes, which admittedly is also less than planned.

Privatization has done virtually nothing to help. A real investment famine is in evidence. Pipelines are falling into disrepair and breaking. The number of pipeline breakdowns soared from 40,000 in previous years to 50,000 in 1994. The volume of investments in the fuel and energy complex compared with the first quarter of 1994 — which was by no means a good year — slumped by 18 percent, amounting to only 12.2 percent of the plan for this year. The attempt to overcome the situation by increasing prices for oil, fuel, and lubricants was also unsuccessful — prices are rising even faster in other sectors.

In March the government adopted a decree on commodity credits for the countryside: The fuel and energy complex is supposed to supply it with fuel and lubricants on account, at 10 percent of cost. But the schedule for deliveries has not been met. Yu. Shafranik, head of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, explains: 10 percent is not enough, you need at least 45 percent to cover expenses. Therefore 755,000 tonnes less gasoline and 707,000 tonnes less diesel fuel was delivered to the farmers than in 1994. And the countryside's fuel reserves are therefore lower than a year ago. The government decree of 31 December stipulating the creation of agricultural reserves of 1 million tonnes of gasoline and the same quantity of diesel fuel in the first quarter has also not been fulfilled.

There is also a strained situation regarding deliveries to the Defense Ministry. Appropriations for the purchase of fuel and lubricants for the army fell by a further 46 percent — how can they conduct exercises and train the troops, against the background, what is more, of combat operations in Chechnya? Aviation is suffering worst of all: Only 48 percent of the kerosene it needs has been bought.

Another problem is the Far North and the Far East. According to Yu. Shafranik, only 16 percent of the plan has been appropriated as yet for the shipment of petroleum products there, while at least 70 percent is needed in the second quarter.

What is to be done about the fuel and energy complex, how can its consumers be helped? Yu. Shafranik proposes reducing taxes and excise duties, exempting deliveries to the Far East and "knocking down" export duties. At the same time there should be tax holidays for enterprises making capital investments, for the period necessary until they pay their way.

But others see things as far more difficult. What is happening in the sector in general? Yu. Yarov, for instance, calls for an explanation of why they are in such haste to sell the major privatized companies, yet they are in no hurry to repair the wells? Vice Premier O. Soskovets summed up:

In 1994 we at the commission for resolving the defaults crisis uncovered flagrant cases where at privatized enterprises debts to suppliers were flourishing, yet funds were being sent abroad. Since that time virtually nothing has changed. And the Ministry of Fuel and Energy is devoting too little attention to these problems.

Yes, a special interdepartmental commission on the fuel and energy complex should be set up. But who can provide complete information on the oil companies' activity today? Neither the Ministry of Fuel and Energy

nor the Ministry of the Economy can do that — the companies are now independent, privatized. Yet it is plain to see that the sector's infrastructure is falling into increasing disrepair. So the question of a new role for the Ministry of Fuel and Energy must be raised, of giving it more powers, more authority....

It was decided immediately to tackle the problems that have accumulated over the years and to draft either a large-scale government decree or a presidential edict on the fuel and energy complex. Ten days were allowed for the drafting of the necessary document....

Finance Ministry Criticizes Coal Company Chiefs

MK1905091095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
19 May 95 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Shibanov under the "Conflict" rubric: "Finance Ministry Doubts Wisdom of 'Rosugol' Existence. The Company Gets Carried Away by 'Channeling' Miners' Discontent and Pressing for Budget Subsidies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A government commission has analyzed the causes of the permanent crisis and social unrest in the coal sector. According to data available to members of the commission, and facts that came to light during a trip to Rostov Oblast this past spring, the main reasons for a number of miners strikes were not the global problems of the old coal-mining areas but rather a lack of "adequate structures and organizational-financial mechanisms capable of ensuring a minimum of responsible cost-accounting management of the sector's subsidized enterprises." In particular, a letter from Vitaliy Artyukhov, Russian Federation first deputy finance minister, to Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Shafranik maintains that budget funds in support of the coal industry are being used ineffectively.

Mr. Artyukhov cites as an example the fact that the miners strike in Rostov Oblast took place when the funds provided to the sector were only 7 percent short of the target which "in principle could not have caused the nonpayment of wages for many months."

In the Finance Ministry's view, an unnatural situation has taken shape where the government's complete responsibility for its financial commitments to coal miners is countered by a similarly complete irresponsibility of the "pseudo-market managerial hierarchy of the coal industry led by the 'Rosugol' company. Fully supported by the budget, its practical workings do not accord with the state's interests. Paradoxically, the worse is the state of affairs in the sector, the better it is for "Rosugol." The more funds go to support the coal industry, the bigger

sums it has at its disposal. At the same time, the managerial hierarchy has learned to "channel" rather effectively the miners' discontent with the government and the Finance Ministry leadership.

The Finance Ministry is pressing for a switch to a contract-based system of relations between the state and subsidized enterprises of the coal sector. Importantly, the higher the share of subsidies in the aggregate receipts of a mine, the tougher should be the terms of the production contract.

The Finance Ministry suggests that the Fuel and Energy Ministry should, while fulfilling the functions of state regulation in the sector, act as a customer, apportioning specific subsidies, formulating contractual terms to corresponding enterprises and their leadership, as well as monitoring the observance of these terms in making budget appropriations. In other words, the Fuel and Energy Ministry should uphold in the government the state's interests rather than those of "its own enterprises." The Finance Ministry believes that the same should apply also to the other departments in charge of money-losing sectors that prefer "to act out the role of 'defenders of the people.'" The Finance Ministry is discovering that, against their backdrop, it is "the only 'protective bastion' of the budget. [quotation marks as published]

In principle the functions of signing contracts and of monitoring their observance can be delegated also to the "Rosugol" state enterprise, but only as a "reconciliation option."

Ways To Stop Concealment of Oil Export Money Considered

*MK1805104095 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian
18 May 95 p 1*

[Report by Aleksandr Bekker in the "Leak" column: "Hard Currency Receipts Under Strict Control. Oil Will Be Monitored Before Customs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past year special oil and oil products exporters held back nearly \$700 million in hard currency proceeds without good reason. This figure, with references to authorized banks, was cited yesterday at a session of the government Operational Commission on Streamlining the System of Payments and Settlements. True, Anatoliy Fomin, first deputy fuel and energy minister, considers this sum exaggerated. Even so, he, along with all those present, admitted that the nonreturn of hard currency is a very acute problem.

Deputy Economy Minister Ivan Materov believes that this problem has been brought about partly by the

directors of oil complex enterprises who have been deliberately lowering contract prices and then leaving unaccounted-for proceeds on foreign bank accounts. According to the Federal Currency and Export Control Service, in the first quarter of last year the difference between contract and world prices per tonne of oil was \$2, and in the fourth quarter it grew to \$11. The control mechanism based on transaction documents, in effect as of last year, does not eliminate the possibility of manipulating the amount, quality, and prices of exported products.

The abolition of the institution of special exporters, a progressive measure from the point of view of general economic liberalization, in Russia's specific conditions does not ease the problem of currency control. Therefore participants in the session talked about the need to introduce a system of pre-customs assessment of the quantity and quality of export goods and the compatibility of declared prices with world market prices. With respect to strategic raw materials, it is proposed to introduce standard contract forms indicating the volume of deliveries, the dates for transferring the proceeds, and bank guarantees. The session participants, however, did not agree about whom to entrust to carry out pre-customs appraisal. Anatoliy Kruglov, chairman of the State Customs Committee, is convinced that pre-customs appraisal should be made incumbent on state structures. Commission Chairman Anatoliy Chubays believes that the services of commercial firms should not be rejected, "but they should be placed under indirect state control." It is planned that pre-customs assessment of the quantity and quality of goods will be phased in gradually as of 1 July.

As for sanctions for failure to return hard currency proceeds, this question was not legally finalized: Laws do not give a clear-cut definition of the deliberate concealment of hard currency receipts. Exporters, when inspected by state services, always have the following words at the ready: "We were not concealing anything; we were just going to remit hard currency to the state today."

This is why the provision on the application of penalties in the event that hard currency is not paid in within 180 days as per contract terms, which is recorded in the law On Currency Regulation and Currency Control, is in effect inoperative. Under these conditions, a presidential edict cutting the payment term to 60 days, which was proposed at the commission session, will hardly change anything.

International Affairs

Clinton Visit Seen Giving 'Impetus' to Ties

AU1805155095 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY
in Ukrainian 16 May 95 pp 1, 9

[Report by Taras Petriv: "When a New Order Is Established, Ukraine Will Not Be a Mere Observer"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We worked with Ukrainians with as much openness, enjoyment, and trust as with our long-time partners and allies, and President Clinton showed particular inspiration, said one of the members of the U.S. delegation that had held negotiations in Kiev, prior to the return to Washington. For both sides, the main task of that state visit was to probe each other without any stringent demands and to outline possible trends in further cooperation.

For B. Clinton, the visit to Kiev was also necessary for internal political considerations — as a response to the criticism by the oppositional Congress of the administration's Eastern policy. Especially important for Kiev were personal meetings between Ukrainian and U.S. politicians where minor issues were quickly resolved and where information was exchanged and attitudes to global problems "probed." Consultations continued not only at the negotiating table. For example, Acting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk even used a chance to have a half-hour informal talk with the U.S. President's university pal Strobe Talbott, who is presently a special adviser for issues of new independent states. They conversed to the music of Tayisiya Povaliy and Iryna Bilyk.

As B. Clinton later stressed, during the negotiations the sides particularly emphasized economic and security issues. In particular, to Leonid Kuchma's call to build a new world order by joint efforts, the head of the U.S. administration answered that the United States does not intend to initiate hasty expansion of NATO, thereby leaving Ukraine without a NATO umbrella. Washington answered in the affirmative to Kiev's initiative to conclude a special accord between the North Atlantic Alliance and Ukraine within the framework of "Partnership for Peace." In 1995, the United States will grant Ukraine more than \$1 million for its participation in the "Partnership for Peace" program and, importantly, in 1996 our state may already count on \$10 million in aid. Also, B. Clinton spoke in Kiev about Ukraine's role as a center of stability in Europe. This may be regarded as the United States' desire to build its relations with our state as with a reliable outpost of democracy on the continent.

Of particular importance were negotiations on economic cooperation. The U.S. President stressed that the United

States would, as promised, grant Ukraine \$250 million to pay for this year's essential imports. During the visit, Ruth Harkin, president of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, said that her organization will sponsor a special conference in Chicago on 11 July that will deal with investments of private U.S. capital in the Ukrainian economy. We will also receive U.S. expert assistance in the evaluation of the cost of those Ukrainian oil, gas, and chemical enterprises that are subject to privatization in connection with the creation of the joint Ukrainian-Russian enterprise "Gaztranzit." As is known, Russia tends to underestimate the cost of Ukrainian property. Ukrainian representatives managed to convince the Americans of the need to cooperate extensively and specifically in studying problems associated with the accident at the Chernobyl AES. A statement was signed on the intention to create the International Research Center for Nuclear Safety and Environmental Protection. Such a step may lead other states, too, to seek participation in the global research project in the Chernobyl zone. It is important that Ukraine and the United States will also develop joint commercial projects in the sphere of space. The United States is ready to make use of Ukrainian fundamental science and technological achievements in order to earn money together.

B. Clinton's visit to Kiev has given a strong impetus to the development of extensive bilateral contacts. At the same time, it was a kind of publicity for Ukraine, which is acquiring an image of a modern democratic state.

Results of Clinton's Visit to Kiev Viewed

WS1905104595 Kiev VSEUKRAINSKIYE
VEDOMOSTI in Russian 16 May 95 p 3

[Report by Sergey Nesterenko: "Ukrainian Motives in U.S. Politics Will Help Our Country Sing Solo in the European Chorus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perhaps Bill Clinton's visit to Kiev has exceeded the expectations of the most courageous optimists. Its results should change profoundly both the foreign and domestic political state of Ukraine. The U.S. President called our country one of the top priorities of the political strategy of the United States in Central and East European regions.

Both Bill Clinton himself and members of his administration unanimously call the political and economic course pursued by the Ukrainian president the main driving force of progress in Ukrainian-U.S. relations. Leonid Danylovych Kuchma was promised all kinds of support, and a credit of faith, unprecedented for all CIS states, was granted to him. The day of meeting with Bill Clinton could be rightfully called the triumph day for

Leonid Kuchma. It will be possible to discuss specific agreements and figures some time later, but it is not difficult to foresee the variety of serious changes in the life of Ukraine even now.

Three Sources of U.S. Interest in Ukraine

There is only a four-year span between the U.S. President's first visit to Kiev — it was George Bush who came to the then Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on 31 July 1991 — and Bill Clinton's current visit, but the vector of the U.S. strategy toward Ukraine has turned by 180 degrees over that period of time. At the time, George Bush — by the way, the United States assessed his speech so negatively that it was ironically called the "chicken's speech in Kiev" implying that Bush was a "chicken" in politics — tried to prove the inexpediency of creating an independent Ukrainian state in his statements. Bill Clinton, however, now stated that the United States will do everything possible to support Ukraine's independence. What made the United States change its course to such a degree?

A top representative of the Clinton administration named three primary reasons for this. First, "Ukraine has the same territory as France and a population of between 52 and 53 million people. It is located in the center of the new Europe. If we look to the next century, it is of similar strategic importance to both the United States and Europe. Our president has come for nothing other than to express his interest in building new and reliable relations with Ukraine."

Ukraine's signing of the Treaty on Nuclear Nonproliferation is the second reason. Our country — ranking third in the world in the amount of its nuclear arsenal — has not only voluntarily given it up, but it also complies with the Trilateral Agreement — according to which our missiles are delivered to Russia to be destroyed there at U.S. expense — greatly ahead of schedule. "We supposed that this process would last a long time; Ukraine, however, is ready to get rid of its missiles by the end of 1996."

Leonid Kuchma's course of economic reform is the third reason. "Last year, the president completely changed the economic climate in Ukraine, which held to the planned, administrative-commanding economic system longer than all the states of the former USSR. Ukraine turned to a market economy only last summer."

These reasons — mentioned by a U.S. Administration representative — for changing the U.S. course toward Ukraine look quite weighty, but they are not very convincing. The enumerated factors only bolster the development of Ukrainian-U.S. cooperation, but the primary motive for the unexpected outburst of "love" on

the part of the United States toward Ukraine should be looked for obviously in Washington's foreign political interests. Perhaps a clue is hidden in the following words of the same representative of the Clinton administration: "In 1993, the interests of both the U.S. President and the secretary of state were focused on Russia, while in 1994 — they were on Ukraine. We now are going to build relations in this region not only with Russia, but also with its very large and important western neighbor."

Did Russia's Cold Trigger Ukraine's Warmth?

Over the last six months, the polarization of relations between the United States and Russia has become more obvious. Contradictions and mutual claims began with a conflict over expanding NATO by East European countries — the United States entirely favored the NATO expansion, while Russia was no less categorically opposed to the idea — and continued to increase at an avalanche pace, acquiring more and more new problems. A recent U.S.-Russian deadlock — triggered by Russia's deliveries of equipment to Iran, which will help develop nuclear weapons — has not been resolved. Even though Bill Clinton pinned great hopes on his visit to Moscow to observe the 50th anniversary of the Victory Day, where he hoped to change Boris Yeltsin's opinion on the issue, he failed. The state of Russian-U.S. relations after negotiations between Clinton and Yeltsin are characterized in the United States as "neither warm peace, nor cold war." Clinton will likely pay dearly for Yeltsin's obstinacy: The Senate did not fail to criticize him severely for the "lack of pressure" in negotiations with the Russian president.

There are many other reasons for cooling Russian-U.S. relations. In view of the current situation, the United States is forced to urgently look for its new outpost [avanpost] in the CIS. So, Ukraine suits this aim splendidly. By the way, it is symptomatic that U.S. representatives willingly support economic cooperation between Ukraine and Russia, but they try to ignore political cooperation issues. It is not ruled out that the cold reception of Clinton at the Kremlin triggered his warm visit to Ukraine.

What do such developments promise for Ukraine? Since the United States is a recognized world leader, the warming up of Ukrainian-U.S. relations automatically implies progress in our relations with the West in general. U.S. relations with Moscow will rather develop in inverse proportion to those with Ukraine. The pace of this process will primarily depend on specific moves by the West regarding both the strengthening of Ukraine's international status and the amount of economic assistance rendered to it. In view of the current situation, Ukraine's joining NATO — that would in fact deprive

Russia of its military and political influence in virtually all of Europe — would be most desirable for the United States and its allies. It is curious that if before the West regarded Ukraine's opportunity to join NATO as ephemeral, U.S. representatives now refer to nothing other than Ukraine's unwillingness to join this bloc. Thus they make it clear that if Ukraine wishes to join NATO, there will be no objections.

The out-of-bloc doctrine does not allow Ukraine to join NATO, however, in view of the current situation, it is not ruled out that this will change. In general, a new course of Ukrainian-U.S. relations opens quite promising prospects to us on the international arena.

What Did the Presidents Discuss?

Economic reform in Ukraine was a "number-one" issue in negotiations between Bill Clinton and Leonid Kuchma. Specific U.S. support for economic reform, launched by Kuchma, was discussed. Of the \$700-million aid, offered by the United States to Ukraine, a grant of \$350 million is designated specifically for economic reform, in essence, considered a gift. A Clinton administration representative stressed that "issuing the largest part of assistance in the form of a grant is unusual for Western countries. The United States alone extends almost all of its assistance through grants." Through these measures the United States is going to support the process of privatization and development of small business in Ukraine. In addition, the United States plays a leading role among the Western countries in bolstering Ukraine's financing through the IMF, the World Bank, and the G-7 countries.

Both Ukraine's further disarmament and various options of U.S. assistance in this sector became one more important subject of the talks. Russian-Ukrainian relations ranked third in importance among the issues discussed. According to Bill Clinton and his team, Leonid Kuchma continues to resolve a difficult issue — strengthening Ukraine's independence, given close economic and political relations with Russian — extremely efficiently. The problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet, however, is still in a deadlock. The United States has nothing against becoming a mediator in negotiations on this issue; it expresses this wish by its mediating success in concluding the Trilateral Agreement. The Kremlin, however, categorically opposes this option. Nevertheless, as of today, it seems that the mediator's participation will resolve the problem of dividing the Black Sea Fleet in the best way.

Bill Clinton "Did Not Notice" the Legislature

To take radical measures against the Supreme Council leftist-conservative majority, Leonid Kuchma needed a

buttress in the form of support from the international community, and primarily, from the United States. And, he obtained this support, which was perhaps better than he could expect. Bill Clinton and his team made it absolutely clear: The United States supports Kuchma and his government. In addition to repeated compliments paid to the president and the Cabinet of Ministers, Clinton's unwillingness to meet with any legislative leaders clearly demonstrated U.S. support for the [Ukrainian] president. In general, he behaved as if there were no Supreme Council at all, and a Clinton administration representative stated directly that one of Ukraine's primary problems is the presence of opponents of economic reform in the Supreme Council. Since the United States invests huge funds in economic reform in Ukraine, naturally, it has an interest in Kuchma's victory: If his opponents win, millions of U.S. dollars in investment will be simply lost. Not to mention other aspects of U.S. strategic interests in Ukraine.

Summarizing the results of Bill Clinton's visit, it is possible to forecast that they will immediately lead to both a considerable strengthening of presidential power and a toughening of Kiev's positions in negotiations with Moscow. Eventually, economic reform will gather speed.

Hungary's Horn Arrives, Talks With Kuchma

LD1805173695 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Gyula Horn, prime minister of the Republic of Hungary, arrived in Kiev today on an official visit. He held a private meeting with President Leonid Kuchma. The agenda for the Hungarian prime minister's visit envisages that he will also meet Supreme Council Chairman Oleksandr Moroz and acting prime minister Yevheniy Marchuk. A number of joint Ukrainian-Hungarian documents are expected to be signed on the results of the bilateral negotiations.

Romanian Foreign Ministry on Gorbulin Statement

LD1805115595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1024 GMT 18 May 95

[“INTERFAX-UKRAINE” news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 18 (Interfax-Ukraine) — Romania's Foreign Ministry has qualified statements made by Secretary of the presidential National Security Council Vladimir Gorbulin as “not corresponding to reality and distorting Romania's principal position.”

At a briefing in Kiev on May 12 he declared that “in the near future Romania cannot be admitted to

NATO because it does not reject its territorial claims on Ukraine."

The statement of the press secretary of Romania's Foreign Ministry handed over to the Interfax-Ukraine agency points out that such assertions "contradict the interests of further development of Romanian-Ukrainian relations."

The statements makes it clear that Romania's position, which persists in discussing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by both countries, cannot be equalled to "laying territorial claims" on Ukraine. Romania has repeatedly declared that it respects the existing borders and has no territorial claims on any state, including Ukraine, the document underlines.

The Soviet-German agreement known under the name Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact fixed spheres of the USSR's and Germany's influence in Europe on the eve of the war between these countries.

"Ukraine has no influence and cannot play any role" in the issue of Romania joining NATO, the statement underlines.

Influence of 'Extreme Right' Examined

954F2266A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No. 18-19, 9 May 95 p 12

[Interview with Stanislav Artemenko by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Lyudmila Lavrova; place and date not given; and commentary by Aleksandr Sabov, under the headline: "Heil, Ukrainian Lads! Sieg Heil, Russian Lads! Are Recurrences of Fascism Possible in Ukraine and Russia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The anniversary of victory in a war in which half a century ago fascism and Stalinism clashed may well be marked today as the defeat of both ideologies—both the one that preached the dominion of some nations over others and the one that aspired to grind them into a single "international family."

But, practicing mimicry, both ideologies are alive, even if there are practically no states on earth that are ready to inscribe them on their constitutional facades. Fascism long ago shook up its ideological baggage, and even, to a certain extent, moved in the direction of its old adversary. We are not talking so much about a "black international" of small groups splintered by "leader cults," which are still setting their hopes on "order" and "strength"—some not concealing their kinship ("Russian fascism"), others, on the contrary, furiously refuting it ("ultranationalists"). The very ideas that were drawn from the once irreconcilable doctrines are becoming internationalized. The so-called "new right-

wingers"—the group of Alain de Benoist in France, Jean Tiriart in Belgium, and others—proclaim anticapitalism and even antinationalism, but in exchange advance the idea...of "European nationalism," and in Russia, Aleksandr Prokhanov's group, which has fraternized with them, declares that "communism and socialism are attractive to the extent that they insist on the necessity of social justice"....

In this fantastic mosaic of "reinterpreted" and "cleansed" ideas, the UNA (Ukrainian National Assembly) and its militarized daughter structure, the UNSO (Ukrainian National Self Defense) have long called attention to themselves. The political ambitions of the young leaders of this organization, their splashy declarations, which stir up public opinion, the military training, and the participation of UNA-UNSO detachments in conflicts on the territory of the Dniester region, in Abkhazia (on the Georgian side), and in the republics of the former Yugoslavia have secured them an unambiguous reputation: ultranationalists, extremists, neo-fascists.... Lately, emissaries from UNA-UNSO have appeared in Moscow, where they willingly make contact with the press. "I do not ordinarily give interviews to Muscovites. Because, to put it mildly, I am not crazy about them...." Thus does UNSO subdivision commander Oleg Solovey begin his conversation in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (No. 14, April). "Now we want to set up contacts and find sympathizers in Russia"—so another Ukrainian guest, Stanislav Artemenko, ends his interview to our newspaper. What kind of sympathizers does UNA-UNSO seek in Russia, in the name of what ideas and plans? And will "our folks" respond? Especially after the leader the National-Republican Party of Russia, parliamentary deputy Nikolay Lysenko, tore up the yellow and blue flag "as a sign of protest against Ukrainian policy in Crimea," and in Ukraine's Supreme Council one of the three UNA-UNSO deputies, Oleg Vitovich, lost no time in subjecting our Russian tricolor to the same execution....

This, perhaps, is a kind of landmark in modern history: More and more boldly, muscular Russian and Ukrainian young fellows with modernized swastikas on their sleeves are elbowing their way into "big politics." One may have no doubt that the names and faces of these new "heroes" are pleasant to many patriots in their fatherlands. While they are at daggers drawn with each other, it is possible to remain spectators and to enjoy watching them from off to the side. But at the first signs of like-thinking on their part, it would be best to run home and dig a bomb shelter in the kitchen garden.

So what kind of like-mindedness are the "new right-wingers" looking for? For what? And—who and with whom?

Stanislav Artemenko: "We Will Paint Icons Ourselves...." An Interview With One of the Leaders of UNA-UNSO

[Lavrova] So, among the signboards of the political parties and associations in Ukraine with which we are already familiar—the democrats, communists, liberals—who else is looming on the horizon of your post-Soviet social environment?

[Artemenko] They label us "extreme right-wingers," but in that case, as our organization leader Dmitriy [name as published] Korchinskiy justly remarked, we are an "extreme rights-defending organization," or, if you like, radical democrats. And more than enough myths have been created about UNA-UNSO.

To speak about fascism as applied to us is either political infantilism or deliberate political intriguing. Fascism in Ukraine as a topical political ideology ended in 1943. As distinct from Russia, Ukraine really did have its own national fascism, which developed in parallel with the Italian and the German. Here were our own ideologists and movements—Dmitriy Dontsov; Stepan Bandera's Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN); the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), headed by Colonel Yevgeniy Konovalets, and then by General Roman Shukhevich. They operated in Galicia. But also on the Right Bank, that is, in Soviet Ukraine, similar organizations also existed. That is one more myth, that Ukraine is heterogeneous. It is no longer a secret that before the beginning of the 1950's, one of the centers of the OUN-UPA was located in Dnepropetrovsk, and its last commander in chief was taken precisely during the march to the western lands. And Dontsov himself was from Melitopol. After the war, when he was already in Europe, he wrote a lot, participated in the activity of the "right-wingers," and became friends with Salazar....

[Lavrova] Yes, the bloody trail of the "activity" of the organizations named by you has not been blotted out from the memory of the peoples of Russia, and, I hope, neither has it been from that of Ukraine....

[Artemenko] I am not now making any appraisals, I want to be correctly understood. In its time the UPA, taking advantage of anti-Bolshevik sentiment, attempted to find ground in Russia, in Turkestan, among the Don Cossacks. But the plan of the anti-Bolshevik bloc of peoples fell through then. A handful of Russians came to us. And today we observe with surprise the fuss, one cannot call it anything else, around fascism in Russia. What use is this reanimation of political corpses? Borrowed fascism has no political future; its ideas as a political weapon are not topical today. A historical changing of landmarks has taken place. And if "new left-wingers" have appeared, why not "new

right-wingers"? From the first day on, we stood in opposition to such marginal organizations as Rukh or the KUN (Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists). Nothing that they proposed promoted the true revival of the mass consciousness, the formation of Ukrainian statehood; it sowed turmoil and discord. They did not see the contours of the new society.

Here in Ukraine, the state is formed according to the principle of "who stands behind" some or other authorities in power. Kravchuk was a protege of Nordex, and AG-Ukraine was for Kuchma. Sometimes it is impossible to determine even the party representation of the deputies. Their programs are a screen shading the interests of this or that group of monopolistic capital. They do not offer society a single fundamentally new, constructive ideology, but only provide a parliamentary cover for the period of primary accumulation.

[Lavrova] And you propose...

[Artemenko] We do not propose anything; we are simply creating a squad of like-minded people, who are to struggle for society's survival, and in the long term, also for an all-Slavic union. Of course, in unity with everyone who wants to join us. UNA-UNSO is not a party; we are a community, or, as we say, a superpersonality. Our main goal is unification and salvation. After all, we divided up not into states but into fiefdoms.

[Lavrova] After so many curses for the "Musclevites," have I now misheard you? Are you talking about the Union?

[Artemenko] In 1989 we raised the Ukrainian flag for the first time. UNA hailed the dissolution of the USSR, although we were set up before the fact. And now we are for unity.

[Lavrova] But what kind?

[Artemenko] When Richard Sorge conducted an interview with General Daikari, he asked how the boundaries of Manchukuo would look. The general took a little bottle of soy oil, poured it out onto the map, and asked: Can you determine the boundaries of the oil stain? Everything will depend on our political will and capabilities.

[Lavrova] Many political forces are fighting now for a certain unity, but it is as if they are acting from the position of advantages: Some are bothered by customs, or problems of citizenship, and some want to fortify their borders.... You are new people on the political scene, and besides that you are young people, unassociated with the former nomenklatura; in your vision of the future, there are entirely different motives. Elucidate them.

[Artemenko] It is ridiculous to listen to explanations of this type: America (the IMF, the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], the UN, and what else?) is coming now and will help us. Here they are ready to descend to the level of Third World countries, but then, so they say, after that.... However, there will never be any "then." The worldwide division of labor took place long ago. No one needs Ukraine as an industrial reserve, a labor force reserve. Three-quarters of the planet are now already onlookers at life's holiday. What kind of society is it where everyone trades and no one produces anything? The state has forfeited its universal function as an intermediary between production and the consumer, and moreover, it has made production unprofitable, and we are everywhere seeing a refusal to work; idleness reigns here. Our high technologies and scientific discoveries and developments have turned out not to be called for on the market, which is oriented on taking out raw materials. Business has changed its original meaning in our language and signifies vulgar trading, it is not important in what—oil, one's personal belongings, weapons, capital. And at the same time, the mediation of the bureaucrat is pure currency.

What are the masses, young people, to engage in? Our main concern is the children. If we save the younger generation, the children will save their old folks. We see the way out only in the community. Our mottoes are: Share your brother's lot; concern; mutual assistance; support. Small-scale production in the century of space and computers might appear ridiculous to some people, but now—I repeat—it holds the salvation of the personality in the destructive element of inactivity. Let it be in just one part of Ukraine, but we will realize our plan, we will form "liberated zones" among the orgy of destruction. Only in such a way will it be possible to endure, otherwise there will be universal lumpenization and the dictatorship of princelings at bayonet point.

[Lavrova] And then from a "liberated zone" to a state, but what kind? A democratic one, socialist, clerical? Or to a monarchy?

[Artemenko] Terms—that is scholasticism. Whatever the conditions and circumstances will be, that is what we will build. Pilsudski was trying to build socialism, and he built Poland. Christianity dreamed of heaven, and the Byzantine Empire was born.

[Lavrova] For the time being, you have three deputies in the Supreme Council of Ukraine, but do you have many followers?

[Artemenko] In our structures, by Western calculations, there are 12,000-16,000 active members. In popularity, the UNA is outstripping all the social and political associations in Ukraine; the press writes about us

constantly. In addition, we are also a cultural and educational organization—our own newspapers, journal, theatrical collective, rock groups, and we plan to put out our own video production. Real policy is made not where "right-wingers" or "left-wingers" are shouting out their slogans. In order to control it, it is necessary to learn to control the circulation of capital—it is not important whether it is black-market or legal. Today the person who is worth anything speaks not even with the aid of a weapon, but with money.

[Lavrova] And are you getting this control?

[Artemenko] I can tell you only that the sources of our financing, as distinct from many parties and associations, are located in Ukraine. We constantly get reports from the West: Rukh got such-and-such an amount from the State Department; KUN, such-and-such an amount.... We stand on our own.

[Lavrova] Do you have a leader suitable for that grandiose task that you contemplate, and what are the upcoming plans of your organization? We will not guess as to the new Kievan Rus at this point....

[Artemenko] We have created our centers throughout the whole of Ukraine, and now we want to set up contact and to find like-minded people in Russia. We want to bring the "good news" that all is not over, that Armageddon does not threaten us yet, that we are fated for reunification. Well, and we do have a leader, a ruler, call it what you like. He is Dmitro Korchinskiy, and he enjoys the unconditional support of the organization. Generally speaking, it is time that brings forth leaders, they come at the necessary moment. Parliament is viable only in the form of the people's representation, not from the parties, but from the estates. The one with authority is the one who is elected by some public strata, some professional associations or other. The reason that legislative authority does not in fact enjoy influence today is because the majority of its members rely on the self-serving interests of a narrow group of people.

And Kievan Rus, possibly, is much closer that you think.

P.S.

We would like to establish two factual discrepancies in the interview with the Western Ukrainian guests: In the publication ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, to the question as to the numerical strength of UNA-UNSO's ranks, the answer was 8,000 people (half the size), and on the origin of "party money," a reference is made to "our countrymen from Canada." Does that mean that not all the sources of financing come from Ukraine?

However, much more fundamental is the question about the sources of intellectual nourishment of political for-

mations of the UNA-UNSO type in modern independent Ukraine.

Aleksandr Sabov: The "Oryans" Versus the "Musclevites"? A Commentary by Our Observer

According to the last population census in the history of the USSR, 4.363 million Ukrainians lived in the Russian Federation in 1989, of which the largest colony was in Moscow and the Moscow suburbs—438,000 people. I do not know whether these figures have changed—probably! I personally felt no discomfort until one trip to my small motherland, where I had a long talk with the well-known philologist Pavel Pavlovich Chuchkoy, from Uzhgorod University, when suddenly, in the midst of the smooth flow of the conversation, we smacked up against a reef. "Well, after all, the three of our nations had a common cradle!" "The little cradle, perhaps was indeed a common one," agreed the scholar, "but there were three mute babies in it, and each was separate."

Hmmm.... Pavel Pavlovich had joined Rukh; that is why in the ancient crib, instead of one "common" infant, there suddenly turned out to be three! "I hope that they are at least triplets?" "Of course they are triplets, that is understood. But the myth that Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians 'separated later' is one that it is time to discard."

At one time the destruction of that myth made a great impression on me. Then I calmed down: Well, all right, if they are triplets, they are triplets! They have the same mother, the same roots. However, the stocking had already started to creep down....and one fine day I found out that my ancestor, the proto-Ukrainian, with his "Auuu!", had anticipated his Russian and Belarusian brothers....by an entire 5,000 years!

When was this discovered? Who proved it? But we must start with the political prehistory of the discovery, or, as they write in the newspapers in Galicia, to introduce the political class—the assembly of political figures of the revitalized "Ukraine-Rus."

Yuriy Shukhevich, son of General Roman Shukhevich, the last commander in chief of the UPA, who was executed by the Soviet authorities. He spent his life in prisons and camps, and returned home blinded and ill. He was elected head of UNA and commander in chief of UNSO, and was "symbolically" nominated as a candidate for president of Ukraine.

Dmitro Korchinskiy, deputy of the "historical leader," himself having quickly risen behind his back to be the leader of UNA-UNSO. "The nation has formed its own avant-garde. The avant-garde has gone through its first battles. The enemy incurred significant losses. The enemy is already afraid...." That is on the first,

Abkhazian, operation of UNA-UNSO volunteers, who were sent to fight "for Great Georgia," as tomorrow they are prepared to fight "for Great Ukraine," if, God forbid, the threat of "federal schism" menaced it. The organizer of the Abkhaz baptism was Korchinskiy. In July 1993 the Lvov newspaper POST-POSTUM, with reference to "its own experts," reported that "about 1,000 Ukrainians are participating in the region of military operations." Counteractions by the Security Service of Ukraine (telephone calls to homes—"Are you aware that your son (brother, husband) is being sent as cannon fodder to the Caucasus?") did not have an effect: According to the testimony of O. Vitovich, UNSO territorial commander of Lvov Oblast, the volunteers threw off any doubts they may have had when they found out that this was an opportunity to "oppose Russia," since Russian soldiers were on the Abkhaz side.... UNA-UNSO constantly stresses that its people are not "wild geese," not mercenaries fighting for pay, but selfless volunteers, dedicated to a principle. Which seems to remove them from prosecution according to the law that forbids citizens of Ukraine to serve as mercenaries on armed conflicts on foreign territories.

Oleg Vitovich. Four years ago, when he was still a deputy to the Lvov Oblast Supreme Soviet, he pronounced on the city's central square a speech that is remembered by thousands of Lvov residents: "Today we are no longer satisfied with the slogan, 'A Ukrainian independent state.' We dream of a superpower; we dream of the leadership of the Ukrainian nation. We dream of the kind of state that could itself dictate conditions to the entire world.... We understand that this struggle will be a mortal one: Either the Musclevites will be victors over us or we over them...."

All this after the disintegration of the USSR, when the "Musclevites" had already left! It is true that in our Carpathian regions they left behind them not the best remembrances of themselves. The population of Ukraine's Left Bank greeted the Soviet troops with flowers, bread, and salt in 1939—and in two short years, still before the beginning of the war, they had managed to become disillusioned with "reunification." Nevertheless, the flowers and the bread and salt were repeated in 1944—and the terror was also repeated, even more monstrous, since Bandera-ism served as a pretext for it. Korchinskiy and Vitovich know this, just as I do, from the testimonies of our fathers and the archives. Of course, this must not be forgotten. This is something we are obligated to tell even to our grandchildren. But both to remember and tell, if one can express it this way, "the whole way," from the Carpathians to the "Green Wedge" (that is what they call Galicia in the Far East).

I can vividly imagine what would happen if some kind of crazy Russian fascist announced that all of the Russians' misfortunes sprang from the Ukrainians living in Russia (and today they are the largest national minority in Russia), that they eat their bread and in general "are all Banderites".... eh? How would you react there in Galicia, Pan Korchinskiy? Would you mobilize volunteers to defend us? And you, Pan Vitovich, in response to the provocation of a Russian brute, would you again attack the Russian flag? Do not bother: Your Russian like-thinkers (Oh—you are at daggers drawn? But after all, you are on the same thought wave), that is right, they—at least, publicly—are not that crazy. They would not dare to be. Such is the social environment here—do you understand?—public opinion itself would grind them into dust. They would "turn off the microphone," as they do in our parliament and in yours.

But tell me, how is the Lvov social environment, in which there is no small Russian population, supposed to react to the dream, uttered aloud by one of your comrades-in-arms, to "arrange a St. Bartholomew's Night in Lvov for the Russians"? Or to the admission by another comrade-in-arms, having returned from Georgia with a war wound, that UNSO's further plans are a "struggle with Russian imperialism in Estonia and the Green Wedge"? What do the Galicians have to defend, or with whom do they have to struggle, even in the Far East? So will you see in the local Russians only colonists, and in the far-away ones, imperialists? But do you really not sense that you yourselves are crossing the line, both at home and outside it?

They do not sense it. And there is a reason for this. Its name is myth. In the Kiev newspaper PROSVITA, a most scholarly article was recently published, "The Language of the Musclevites in Connection With Their Origin." Hmmm....it turns out that the Great Russians and their language bear no relation whatsoever to the ancient Kievan Rus! Because they descended from....an alien people! Somehow, I, a Ukrainian, just cannot seem to figure out what the fascist-acting infant Lysenko is babbling about off to one side of me, and how it was that the fascist-acting infant Vitovich, also a Ukrainian, really, understood everything and responded to such a provocation by ripping up the Russian flag! And if this is even "parliamentary forms of struggle," then what will happen tomorrow with such understanding of each other from the first half a word? Yes, if things continue on this way, I am afraid that Valeriya Novodvorskaya, who recently advised Ukrainians to elect as president People's Deputy Stepan Khmara, Ukraine's first parliamentary rowdy, will up and change her mind from Khmara to Vitovich. And then, logically

speaking, there is no way we can be satisfied with Zhirinovskiy—what did he bug us for with that Russian foot-washing in the Indian Ocean! We want somebody a little more intense now, Madame Novodvorskaya!

I want to cite a vivid example of how the new socium (the new social environment) forms its own new politicuum (new political class), or vice versa. My junior colleague of the pen but old acquaintance, Vasil Baziv, editor in chief of the Lvov newspaper ZA VILNU UKRAYINU, was beaten with sticks right in his office by UNA-UNSO fighters. Well, what did you do that to the editor for, guys—what was the matter with him? Was it not his newspaper that gave the floor to a professor at the journalism department of Lvov University Pan Yosyf Los, who scientifically proved that Jesus Christ was born not in Palestine, but in Western Ukraine? Well, if even the cradle of the Christian world has migrated to Galicia, then what do you need that Muscovy for now, that God-forsaken "Third Rome"?

But the socium, aroused by myths, demands new dreams of reason. That is not enough! More!

L. Silenko, "a prominent Sumerologist, ethnologist, philosopher, and historian," author of the scientific work "Magian Faith," (New York, 1979), which sets out the bases of the Native Ukrainian People's Faith. Lives in the United States. On the basis of his book, the Ukrainian literary man C. Plachinda composed his "Dictionary of Ancient Russian Mythology." Let us leaf through these works:

"The Etruscans (Rusins)—an ancient Ukrainian tribe that resettled from the Carpathian region and Galicia into Northern Italy in 1300 BCE. On the rich Etruscan (Ukrainian) culture, the ancient culture of Greece and Rome grew up."

"The Oryans (Aryans)—the most ancient name for the ancient Ukrainians.... Tamed the horse, invented the wheel and plow"....

Exactly! After all, the Oryans (bastardized: Aryans)—that is from the word "oraty," or "to plow," in Russian! Die, "tillers" of Russian fascism, you could not say it better!

"Oryan Ukraine" is the cradle of human civilization, the great-grandmother of all Indo-European peoples.... The very ancient Ukrainian language was none other than early Sanskrit (so you can shut up for good now, Belarusian aliens!). But Silenko and Plachinda discovered something different: It turns out that for more than 100 years, proto-Ukrainians ruled Ancient Egypt, theirs was Pharaoh Shishak—a pure Ukrainian ["khokhol"], that is obvious.

All of this delirium has been printed, published, and publicized for several years now, ever since freedom of speech and independence at once opened all the sluices to pseudo-science and false fantasy. Friends from Ukraine have only shrugged their shoulders in response: "So what, how can you take two charlatans seriously? That is for fools—and let the fools read this stuff to their hearts' content!"

But even deputies read this stuff. And right now, knowledge derived from the new myths is being thrown out in incendiary fashion, into the socium, to the people. It is being read—with a pencil, with notations!—even in the Ministry of Education of Ukraine! It was from there last year that a circular flitted on the introduction of a new educational discipline in the schools and educational establishments—"scientific nationalism." In return...well, what do you think? Exchanging an awl for some soap was suggested to the nation's ministry by former teachers of the scientific communisms, who had been left without their lessons. And it is true: The new subject differs little from the old. It is "supernation" here and "supernation" there—it is just another way of grinding something into powder. And so that the nationalism should look scientific, anyway, it was officially introduced into the discipline that Ukrainian-ness exists and came from the Tripolye, Eneolithic culture (4000-3000 BCE), that is, the former "elder brother" is being flipped the great big bird from 5,000 years ahead.

Four years ago, Democratic Russia seemed excessively radical to Kiev, just as Rukh seemed so to Moscow. Four years later, both Democratic Russia and Rukh had ceased to be supports of democratic power precisely because both here and there, they were overtaken, rumpled, and overturned by the nationalistic wave, which may indeed have been perfectly patriotic at bottom, but with a menacingly raised crest [khokholok]. Is the whole wave obedient to this crest, or is it nothing more than a mark frothing on top—blow on it and it is gone? It is already not a simple matter to answer that question, even. Without having taken the de-ideologization to the end, the state plunged headfirst into a new ideology. To give it the role of arbiter in the competition of political ideologies existing in society is something the democrats could have done only while they held a great deal of power and political will. To the extent of the diminution of both the one and the other, the entire vertical line, from the head to the little toe, is concerned with the selection of a force that would not allow it to fall. But force knows only one form of payment: It will be necessary to surrender to it, and ideology—well, that is for dessert.

P.P.S. Therefore, Pan Artemenko's assertion that Ukraine long ago passed through the phase of fascism and for that reason there is no return to it, and in Russia the reanimation of that alien corpse is altogether impossible, is, to put it mildly, untenable. The American philosopher Erich Fromme foresaw the advent of "a technological, laughing fascism," even, with complete robotization of human behavior and spirit. He could also take as a measure "European nationalism," which the "new right-wingers" are already proposing from their philosophical Olympuses. However, our heroes are far away from these measures; exactly they can be recognized perfectly well by the old ones.

Official on Not Joining CIS Customs Union

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[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received] — It is planned that the summit of CIS member-states, which is due to take place in Minsk on 25-26 May, will consider, among other issues, accession of other countries to the customs union formed by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Ukraine is not planning to join the customs union at the Minsk summit, Yuriy Kravchenko, chairman of the State Customs Committee of Ukraine told UNIAN on 18 May. He emphasized that this is the official opinion of the president and the government of Ukraine.

Yuriy Kravchenko referred to the absence of political and economic parity between the member states of the customs union as an obstacle in the way of Ukraine's accession.

According to Yuriy Kravchenko, the participants in the customs union should be equal, "like in Europe, where none of the countries dictates its terms to others."

National Affairs

Kuchma Sees Moroz Speech as 'Open Political Move'

LD1805212095 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1910 GMT 18 May 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 18 (Interfax-Ukraine) — President Leonid Kuchma views the speech of the parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Moroz at the plenary session Tuesday as an open political move.

"Moroz finally demonstrated his true attitude to economic reforms and the transformation of government," the presidential press secretary Mikhail Doroshenko told Interfax-Ukraine.

"Diplomacy aside there is every reason to say that the speaker of parliament publicly announced his opposition to the president and presidential policies," Doroshenko said.

According to him, such an attitude would deserve attention, if it were not preceded by declarations of solidarity with the president and the executive branch of power in general. Nevertheless, Doroshenko said, it is logical considering the recent decision of the Executive Committee of the Socialist Party which Moroz heads.

"There was nothing new in the speech. Besides, it was based on numerous distorted facts from the country's political and economic life. It did not contain any objective analysis", Doroshenko said.

The press secretary drew attention to the claim that the economic situation in Ukraine worsened during the first quarter of the year while according to official statistics there was a slight rise in production compared to the 38.4 percent drop during a similar period last year. Besides, inflation went down radically from 21 percent in January to 5.8 percent in April.

The claims that the gross domestic product shrank to one third or that energy consumption in Ukraine is 10-15 times greater than in other countries are also groundless. Doroshenko admitted the existence of negative trends but on a smaller scale.

He also recalled the declaration of the speaker that the office of the Prosecutor General discovered over 5000 legal acts passed by executive bodies in 1994 that contradicted the constitution and acting legislation. "It is true that the office of the Prosecutor General conducted such an examination, but not at instructions from parliament. The violations were made by local councils and executive bodies", the press secretary added.

According to him, President Kuchma gave instructions to carefully study all facts from the report of the speaker and inform the public about the actual state of affairs. Appropriate decisions should crown the work.

However, the press secretary said, the very first analysis has indicated that most of the facts are dubious.

Neither can one overlook the tone of the speech or the emphasis on negative trends that were openly admitted back in April in the annual report of the president to parliament. The trends were mentioned to find a way of resolving them, to formulate concrete suggestions, not for the sake of politicking, the press secretary stressed.

At the same time he agreed with the anxiety about the negative consequences of the absence of a government. "But who appointed the cabinet ten days before presi-

dential elections? Can the president be held responsible for that?" Doroshenko wondered.

"Oleksandr Moroz said much about the threat of criminalization, the corruption in government bodies. The threat does exist and we can only welcome the concern of the speaker about it. We wish him to be consistent in this matter to the end," the press secretary said.

He added that several proposals from Moroz deserve attention and support, on condition a concerted version of the government law is passed. The debate on the law will show what is hidden behind the "message of greeting" of the chairman of parliament. "If this is an invitation to cooperation, the president is ready for it. If it is a challenge, it has to be accepted," Doroshenko said.

Kuchma Unable To Attend Closed Parliament Session

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1607 GMT 18 May 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No. 92 (836); compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The speaker of parliament Oleksandr Moroz told parliament President Leonid Kuchma would be unable to attend a closed session of parliament scheduled for Thursday and found it reasonable to put off the session. IF Note: The closed session was supposed to focus on a number of questions: the formation of the cabinet, another reading of the presidential bill on government, the situation in Crimea and the coordination of the efforts of legislative and executive bodies.

The speaker told deputies that there are three ways of handling the presidential bill: to approve it as a whole, to approve with amendments or to discuss only the articles that were not approved during the previous reading.

"The bill offers practical balances between executive and legislative bodies, strengthens the executive power and the possibilities of the president to perform executive functions," Moroz stressed.

"Considering the provisional nature of the law (till the adoption of the new constitution) both the president and the parliament should not risk and drop out the articles on impeachment, the dissolution of parliament and the right of the president to hold referendums," Moroz said.

At the same time he described as the most acceptable version the April decision of parliament not to discuss the bill as a whole but only the articles that were not

approved during the second reading so that the general debate would be put off for a later date.

Meanwhile, five parliamentary groups circulated a statement Thursday demanding the speedy adoption of the law on government and thus the approval of a clear vertical executive branch of power. They were alarmed by the possible continuation of the comprehensive crisis in the country.

The statement suggests the speedy formation of the cabinet which should submit a program of action for 1995 to parliament.

Deputies also think that for the time of chairing parliament Moroz should step down from the leadership of the socialist party.

The presidential press secretary Mikhail Doroshenko told the press that Kuchma has decided in principle about holding a public vote. According to him, the president will make the final decision after the parliamentary discussion of the government law. (Earlier Kuchma said that if the parliament turns the bill down, he intends to hold a referendum on confidence in the parliament and the president.)

"A positive result of the referendum would permit the continuation of the current strategy of radical reforms without heeding the empty rhetoric in parliament", Doroshenko stressed.

Decree Answers Crimea Referendum Protests

954F2290A *Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA*
in Russian 12 May 95 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Council of Crimea: "On the Protest of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine of 27 April 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A protest has been sent by the prosecutor general of Ukraine against Decree No. 423-1 of the Supreme Council of Crimea of 25 April 1995 "Organization of an All-Crimea Referendum" proposing that the said decree be revoked inasmuch as it conflicts with:

1) Article 3-1 of Law 1286-XII of Ukraine of 3 July 1991 "All-Ukraine and Local Referendums" and Articles 3 and 8 of Law 92/95-VR "The Autonomous Republic of Crimea," which make no provision for the approval of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea at an all-Crimea referendum;

2) Article 71 of the Constitution of Ukraine ensuring the supremacy of the laws of Ukraine.

Putting to a referendum a question concerning support for the law of Ukraine "The Autonomous Republic of Crimea" is not within the jurisdiction of the republic.

Having studied the arguments of the prosecutor general of Ukraine, the Supreme Council of Crimea considers it possible to satisfy his protest in part and to exclude from Decree No. 423-1 of 5 April 1995 the question of support for the law of Ukraine "The Autonomous Republic of Crimea" as not being in need of additional approval.

The rest of the protest is to be rejected since a referendum on the question "Do you approve the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea abrogated by the Supreme Council of Ukraine unilaterally on 17 March 1995?" does not conflict with the laws of Ukraine. Specifically, Article 3-1 of the law of Ukraine "All-Ukraine and Local Referendums" establishes that the subject of a republic (Republic of Crimea) referendum may be the adoption, revision, or cancellation of decisions on matters referred by legislation of Crimea to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Crimea.

In accordance with clause 3 of Decree No. 93/95-VR of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 17 March 1995 "Procedure of Implementation of the Law of Ukraine 'Abrogation of the Constitution and Certain Laws of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea'" and Articles 2, 3, 4, and 8, clause 5 of the law of Ukraine "The Autonomous Republic of Crimea," legislative instruments adopted by the Supreme Council of Crimea shall be operative where they do not conflict with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine. Thus the Supreme Council of Crimea is entitled to adopt legislative instruments that do not conflict with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine.

In accordance with clause 1(2) of Article 11 of the current Law 210-1 of the Crimean ASSR of 22 November 1991 "The Referendum," provision is made for an all-Crimea referendum on questions of the approval or abrogation of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea. Considering this, the decree "Organization of an All-Crimea Referendum" adopted by the Supreme Council of Crimea does not conflict with legislation of Ukraine and does not violate Article 71 of the Constitution of Ukraine concerning the supremacy of its laws for it does not exclude approval of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea by the Supreme Council of Ukraine. Thus in this respect the protest is unfounded.

Considering what has been stated, the Supreme Council of Crimea decrees:

1. That the protest of the prosecutor general of Ukraine of 27 April 1995 be satisfied in part.

2. That a revision be made to Decree No. 423-1 of the Supreme Council of Crimea of 25 April 1995 "Organization of an All-Crimea Referendum." The deletion from clause 1 of the question put to an all-Crimea referendum on 25 June 1995:

"Do you support the Law of Ukraine 'The Autonomous Republic of Crimea' of 17 March 1995?"

"'Yes,' 'No.'"

[Signed] S. Tsekov, chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea.

City of Simferopol
4 May 1995
No. 427-1

Decree Creates Referendum Commission

954F2290B Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA
in Russian 13 May 95 p 1

[Decree of the Supreme Council of Crimea: "Commission of Deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea for the All-Crimea Referendum on 25 June 1995"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For rendering the central, rayon, city, city rayon, township, rural, and precinct referendum commissions and the local councils of people's deputies and their executive committees practical assistance in the organization, preparation, and execution of the all-Crimea referendum of 25 June 1995 and guided by Article 63 of the law of the Republic of Crimea "Standing Orders of the Supreme Council of Crimea," the Supreme Council of Crimea decrees:

1. The formation of a commission of deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea for the all-Crimea referendum of 25 June 1995 composed of:

Aleksandr Ivanovich Frolov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea, leader of the commission of deputies;

Yuriy Nikolayevich Zyryanov, chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Local Government and the State Structure, deputy leader of the commission of deputies.

Members of the commission of deputies:

Vladimir Nikolayevich Brodin, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Andrey Vladimirovich Bruns, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Vladimir Rafailovich Bublikov, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Mikhail Grigorovich Bystrov, chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Health Care and Fitness Center-Resort Treatment;

Natalya Aleksandrovna Grudina, deputy chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Credentials, Deputies' Ethics, and Organization of the Work of the Supreme Council;

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Zhukov, chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for the News Media and Relations With the Public;

Lidiya Nikolayevna Kovalenko, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Vladimir Ivanovich Kolodkin, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Natalya Viktorovna Krasnovskaya, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Aleksandr Georgiyevich Kruglov, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Aleksandr Vladimirovich Loyevskiy, deputy chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for the News Media and Relations With the Public;

Viktor Petrovich Mezhak, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Yevgeniy Petrovich Melnik, deputy chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Military Matters, Security, and Defense of the Rights of Servicemen;

Aleksey Alekseyevich Melnikov, deputy chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Constitutional Development, Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order;

Vadim Konstantinovich Mordashov, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Morozov, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Viktor Georgiyevich Nikolayev, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Gennadiy Nikolayevich Reshetnikov, chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Social Matters;

Vitaliy Stepanovich Rudakov, chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Constitutional Development, Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order;

Tatyana Ivanovna Ryabchikova, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Fedor Fedorovich Snegirev, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Andrey Anatoliyevich Stavitskiy, deputy chairman of the Standing Commission of the Supreme Council of Crimea for Education, Science, Culture, Youth Affairs, and Sport;

Vladimir Sergeyevich Troshin, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea;

Vladimir Mikhaylovich Khomyakov, deputy of the Supreme Council of Crimea.

To ensure strict compliance on the territory of the republic with the law of the Crimean ASSR "The Referendum" members of the commission of deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea shall participate actively in all the activities related to the organization, preparation, and execution of the all-Crimea referendum of the corresponding referendum commissions.

[Signed] S. Tsekov, chairman of the Supreme Council of Crimea.

City of Simferopol
4 May 1995
No. 431-1

ITAR-TASS Referendum Report Denounced

954F2305B Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA
in Russian 16 May 95 p 1

[Statement of the Russia-Unity faction of deputies]

[FBIS Translated Text] The report of the ITAR-TASS correspondent from Simferopol that 53 deputies of the Crimean Parliament had signed a statement on the need for the transformation of the Supreme Council of Crimea into a "so-called Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea" for drafting a new constitution and for its subsequent presentation for approval by the Supreme Council of Ukraine in place of an all-Crimea referendum on the constitution does not correspond to reality and is outright disinformation aimed at exacerbating the situation in Crimea and around it.

Any statement of some deputies of the Supreme Council of Crimea adopted in violation of the current standing orders without a session of the Supreme Council of Crimea having been convened is illegal and has no legal mechanisms of realization.

Only decisions of a session of the Supreme Council of Crimea convened and conducted in accordance with current laws of the Republic of Crimea and Ukraine

and also adopted by a majority vote of the deputies in the procedure established by the standing orders of the Supreme Council of Crimea are lawful and qualified.

It is widely known that the Supreme Council of Crimea has already adopted a decision to hold a referendum on the Constitution of Crimea, which does not preclude but presupposes the negotiations of authorized representatives of the Supreme Council of Crimea and the Supreme Council of Ukraine on an entire set of issues. The parliament of Crimea has adopted no other decisions and has authorized no one to make statements on behalf of an alleged majority of deputies.

It is regrettable that the ITAR-TASS correspondent uses unverified information, both in respect to the number of supporters of unlawful actions among a small number of deputies and concerning the state of affairs in the Supreme Council of Crimea, and thereby confuses public opinion.

Council Appeals For Support for Referendum

954F2305A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA
in Russian 16 May 95 p 1

[Appeal of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of Crimea]

[FBIS Translated Text] Expressing its aspiration to a peaceful, legal, democratic settlement of the disagreements that have arisen between the authorities of Ukraine and Crimea, the Supreme Council of Crimea has resolved to schedule an all-Crimea referendum for 25 July 1995. The following questions will be put to the referendum:

1. Do you approve of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea abrogated by the Supreme Council of Ukraine unilaterally on 17 March 1995?

2. Do you support the creation of an economic and political union of the three states: Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine?

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of Crimea appeals to all public associations of citizens of Crimea to participate actively in the organization and execution of this democratic undertaking and to nominate their representatives for the all-Crimea central and local referendum commissions.

Demidenko on Ending Crimea Presidency

954F2289B Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA In
Russian 13 May 95 p 1

[Remarks by A. Demidenko, vice premier of the Republic of Crimea and chairman of the Commission for

Liquidation of the Office of the President of Crimea, recorded by O. Volodin: "The Institution of the Presidency Has Been Abolished, And We Should Proceed From This Fact"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An account of the work of the so-called Liquidation Commission was presented to the deputies at a plenary meeting of the Supreme Council of Crimea on 4 May by A.F. Demidenko, vice premier of Crimea.

We would recall that this commission was formed by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in connection with the well-known decision on the abolition of the institution of the presidency in Crimea. There are many rumors surrounding it, including those concerning the forcible eviction of ex-President Yuriy Meshkov from his office in the Supreme Council of Crimea building, the turning off of the water on the sixth floor, and so forth.

We asked A.F. Demidenko, vice premier of the Republic of Crimea and chairman of the Commission for Liquidation of the Office of the President of Crimea, to comment on these and other reports.

I will say first of all that all of us—both the government and the parliament of Crimea—should be guided not by some emotions but primarily by current legislation. Differing views may be taken, for example, of the decision of the Supreme Council of Ukraine to abolish the institution of the presidency in Crimea, but this decision is a fait accompli. And the Crimean executive has to abide by this decision.

The incitement of political passions around the work of the Liquidation Commission, on the other hand, and, even more, all kinds of rumors and inventions would seem to me to be entirely impermissible. I believe that the cause of the rumors concerning the "forcible eviction" of Yu. Meshkov and members of his staff is largely also the reluctance of those who are laying this to our charge to familiarize themselves with the actual facts. And this could have been done best by direct participation in the work of the commission. But the leadership of the Supreme Council of Crimea declined to send its representatives, despite the corresponding requests on our part.

Indeed, directives have been issued officers of the Supreme Council of Crimea security service that they pay special attention to ensuring that citizens visiting this building have passes. Since there have already been instances of the disappearance of costly equipment, and our commission has to register all material assets which were on the books of the president's team.

But it is not, after all, a question merely of "office equipment" or furniture. I would remind you that the Office of the President of Crimea consisted of several dozen persons. And, in accordance with the law, employment has to be found for all of them, we have to see to it that the wages due them for two months are paid, and so forth.

Many of these people, incidentally, are very realistic in their assessment of the current situation and are not disposed to see it as some arbitrary act on the part of the executive. As distinct from certain deputies, who have adopted toward the Government of Crimea an unconstructive position, to put it mildly.

Crimea's Tsekov Airs Views on Elections, Referendum

LD1805162195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1323 GMT 18 May 95

["INTERFAX-UKRAINE" news item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, May 18 (INTERFAX) — Chairman of the Crimean Parliament Sergey Tsekov believes that it is unlikely that Kiev will take the decision to dissolve the Crimean parliament. In an interview with Interfax on Thursday he expressed hope that "emotions will not rise above reason" in the Ukrainian parliament.

In addition, Tsekov believes, if the Crimean problem is solved through the use of force, the Ukrainian parliament will not reach its strategic goals.

"Sooner or later, new elections will have to be held. If there are new, really democratic elections, their result for Ukraine will end up to be worse. And the question on the rights of the Crimeans and on the relationships with Ukraine will again be put on the agenda, probably, in a tougher form," said Tsekov.

Speaking about the referendum in the Crimea, he denied the allegation that this "is an act of separatism and Crimea will secede from Ukraine as a result."

"The referendum will be held in line with the Crimean Constitution in the wording of May 6, 1992, whose Article 9 says that Crimea is part of Ukraine and maintains relations with it on the basis of the treaty and agreements," said Tsekov. It has never been a question of the violation of Ukraine's territorial integrity and its borders. It's a question of the division of powers between the state bodies of Crimea and Ukraine."

The referendum on the Crimean Constitution will take place on June 25, the same day as local elections.

Delegation Head on Results of Kiev Talks

954F2289A Simferopol KRYMSKIYE IZVESTIYA
in Russian 13 May 95 p 1

[Interview with Vladimir Klychnikov, leader of Crimean deputy delegation in Kiev, by L. Chevelcha; place and date not given: "We Slam the Door in the Face of Mistakes, and in the Confusion the Truth Is: 'How Do I Get In Now?'""]

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of deputies of Crimea has been working in Kiev. We asked Vladimir Klychnikov, leader of this parliamentary group, to describe the results of the trip and his impressions and conclusions.

[Chevelcha] Vladimir Nikolayevich, you recently returned from Kiev. How did the "battle reconnaissance" go on the eve of the forthcoming consideration of the "Crimea question" by the Supreme Council of Ukraine?

[Klychnikov] Our recent trip to Kiev, to the Supreme Council of Ukraine, was not entirely "battle reconnaissance," perhaps, but exchanging information and learning the mood of the deputies of Ukraine was part of our mission, nonetheless, as was also conveying to them the objectively evolved situation. We agreed to work in this aspect. Earlier, in my view, relations had been built wrongly: The delegation worked only with the leadership of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. We, on the other hand, met with the leadership and with the factions and with individual deputies. The more members of parliament are familiar with objective information, the better adjusted their decisions will be. The results of the recent trip showed that the mood of members of the corps of deputies is most varied. But we were convinced that the Supreme Council of Ukraine as a whole has not yet formulated pure and simple its attitude toward what we have generated together in the last month. While trying not to inflame the situation, therefore, our delegation deemed it necessary to warn that a drastic, inappropriate response on Crimea would play into the hands of our radicals, but no more than that. It should be considered that in Crimea, and in parliament also, there are forces that are merely waiting for such a turn of events. No one would benefit from this. Let us take, for example, an extreme scenario—the dissolution of the parliament of Crimea. The radical part of our Supreme Council—the Russia and Russia-Unity blocs—would immediately perceive this step as a drastic power method of Ukraine, accusing it of all sins, and would, most likely, depart for its constituencies and continue the opposition to all actions of Kiev in Crimea. Instability on the peninsula would, of course, grow, and ahead lies the resort season, and its disruption would mean a loss of enormous sums for the treasury, which would

have a negative impact both on the economy of Crimea and on the state of Ukraine. Having heard our arguments, many deputies agreed with them. While having no desire for such a development of events, nonetheless, they understand something else also: Truncated, half-baked decisions on Crimea are no solution either. The proposal made by some deputies who had traveled to Kiev earlier that rights be reserved merely to a limited parliament is also invalid from the viewpoint of the law. In the two days of our work with the deputies of Ukraine, therefore, we agreed to look together for an acceptable solution in the current situation. Many people in Kiev agreed, of course, that the Crimeans should sort things out and determine their position themselves. If they cannot, a solution other than the dissolution of the parliament of the republic is not to be expected.

[Chevelcha] What is meant by the Crimeans determining their position themselves? Formulating a new constitution?

[Klychnikov] Yes, this is precisely what was meant. But it was a question first and foremost of the fact—and we make no secret of this—that there is with us a stalemate situation within parliament. The Supreme Council is, in fact, divided into two halves. Kiev is proposing that we first of all find some compromise among ourselves in our corps of deputies, because in this situation the Crimean Parliament is not in a position to adopt normal decisions. And, of course, we are being asked to get down to work on a new version of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea.

[Chevelcha] To what extent is this request importunate or categorical? Are recommendations as to the provisions of this fundamental document being made?

[Klychnikov] By no means. We are not being given prescriptions on precisely the kind of constitution that we should have. There is talk about the fact that it is our right to draft the basic state document, but also of the need for us to work together, argue, offer alternatives, and agree on the wording. Of course, the extreme right, which is stating categorically that it does not accept Crimea as a republic and is prepared to reduce it to an oblast, is also defending its positions in the Supreme Council of Ukraine. But the majority of Ukrainian deputies—the left, communists, socialists, centrists, agrarians—are quite mature and balanced people. They have sufficient votes in principle for adopting a balanced decision on Crimea. If, of course, we find a common language with them. We agreed that we must in the time allotted us—up to 20 May—determine our position on a new constitution. This concluded our trip to Kiev, during which we truly sensed that the basis of normalization with Ukraine should, for

all that, be sought primarily here, in Simferopol, and that we need to sort things out ourselves in the Supreme Soviet and formulate the general line.

[Chevelcha] Vladimir Nikolayevich, but will you succeed here in persuading the deputies of the need to draft a new constitution? After all, very many voices are being heard against this matter being raised even.

[Klychnikov] At this time, unfortunately, a majority of the Russia and Russia-Unity factions rejects the consideration of a new version of the constitution. The Reform faction, on the other hand, has at this time opted for nonparticipation tactics. The others will, I hope, support us. After all, it is not a question of the surrender of all positions, we could produce a radical document and defend it. This would be normal, and the Supreme Council of Ukraine would see that we had truly gotten down to work. But when people adhere to positions of unconcealed confrontation, this is incomprehensible. If you do not wish to work, you should, then, quit parliament. There are, after all, certain realities. A politician is good and meaningful in that he goes to people and explains why this or that needs to be done at a given moment. The idea remains, no one is backing off from the idea of Crimea's independence. But there is an objective reality, to which we cannot close our eyes. Kiev is the center, money comes from Kiev, the government is subordinate to Kiev.... Ukraine is the subject of international law, not Crimea.... By our unconstructive approach, however, we are working not only against ourselves but against Crimeans also.

Article Views NPT Issues Based on Russian Data

AU1805114895 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA
in Ukrainian No. 10 (75) 11 May 95 p 8

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Vitaliy Chechylo: "The Underwater and Surface Reefs of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Based on the February 1995 Report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] The trend toward the reduction of nuclear armaments, points out the report of the [Russian] Foreign Intelligence Service, would have been totally impossible if the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] had failed to limit the sphere of the "geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons." The treaty specified the range of countries possessing nuclear weapons and largely confined them to its framework. The mechanism for ensuring international control by IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] over the fulfillment by the NPT participants of their obligations stipulated by the treaty made a significant contribution to strengthening the nonproliferation status. By the end of 1994, IAEA had signed approximately 100

accords with member countries on full-scale guarantees and carried out about 33,000 inspections of more than 500 nuclear facilities.

The NPT mechanism has proved to be effectual and efficient in conditions of disintegration of one of the nuclear superpowers — the USSR. As a result of joint efforts by nuclear powers, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus officially agreed to eliminate the nuclear arsenals on their respective territories and join the NPT as nonnuclear states. About 600 strategic warheads have already been transferred from Ukraine to Russia. Nuclear weapons are being actively withdrawn from Belarus and Kazakhstan. It is planned that, by the end of 1996, there will not remain a single nuclear charge in these countries. [passage omitted]

Generalizing the available data, specialists of the Foreign Intelligence Service arrived at a conclusion that, without the NPT, in the mid-1990's the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons would have been much greater. At the same time, the treaty has created a basis for comprehensive cooperation in the sphere of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

However, the treaty itself and the practice of its implementation are not without faults and shortcomings. The main shortcoming does not stem from the content of the treaty proper, but from the fact that it does not cover all the states of the world community. There still remain countries that develop their military programs and, in view of that, do not join the treaty on principle. This group includes Israel, India, and Pakistan, who, taking advantage of their nonparticipation in the NPT, have in fact become owners of military nuclear technology. In the opinion of experts of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the fact that certain nuclear states have not joined the NPT is the main threat to the nonproliferation provisions. They have become examples to be followed by "threshold" states (those approaching the status of possession of nuclear weapons) and "near-threshold" states (that seek to manufacture nuclear weapons, but still lack the corresponding infrastructure). All of this has an adverse effect upon international relations and poses a major threat to the nonproliferation provisions. For example, on the eve of the conference on the prolongation of the NPT, a group of Arab countries announced their negative attitude toward the prolongation, explaining this by the availability of nuclear weapons in Israel, which has not joined the treaty.

The unacceptability for the cause of peace of the existence of nuclear states outside the NPT is obvious. That is why the use by the world community of its authority for eliminating this contradiction in favor of

the NPT must be regarded as one of the main goals in strengthening the provisions stipulated by the treaty.

Yet another weak point of the NPT and of the practice of its implementation is in the insufficiently strict control over nuclear activity. As a result, the scientific and industrial potential created in some of those countries that have joined and those that have not joined the treaty has objectively enabled them to proceed along the road toward possessing nuclear weapons. An improvement of the system of guarantees and of the entire IAEA mechanism must increase the agency's ability to reveal undeclared nuclear activity and first and foremost, indications of military orientation in the nuclear programs of some states.

The report by the Foreign Intelligence Service particularly focuses on an analysis of the functioning of international mechanisms for control aimed at ensuring nuclear nonproliferation and on the place occupied by IAEA in the system of such control. Notwithstanding all of its merits, IAEA needs to be improved. The Foreign Intelligence experts list a number of organizational and technical measures that might help achieve this goal. These measures include submission by states that are members of IAEA of exhaustive data on their national nuclear programs and the carrying out of unannounced inspections without previously giving their time or place. Other measures for intensifying control over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also proposed, including those that use possibilities of national intelligence organizations.

Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the NPT clearly states that the question of prolongation of the treaty may be resolved by a simple majority vote held by its participants. In view of this, analysts of the Foreign Intelligence Service have considered four main scenarios:

1. Indefinite extension of the treaty;
2. Extension of the treaty for an additional long term;
3. Division of the procedure of prolongation into specified periods of time (five to 10 years), and each prolongation must be correlated with specific circumstances, mainly by members of the "nuclear club";
4. Absence of positive results at the conference.

Russia insists on precisely the first variant (indefinite prolongation of the treaty), finding it to be the best one. Analysts of the Foreign Intelligence Service make a conclusion that the second solution is also a considerable positive result, even though it is inferior to indefinite prolongation of the NPT. The third variant is considered to be unacceptable, as it creates a number of additional complications. It may be necessary, at the end of each

term, to create a new mechanism for adopting decisions. Besides, the fate of the treaty is made contingent upon signing additional accords.

The fourth variant (the absence of positive results) is considered to be the worst. Even such a treaty as the NPT, which is far from being perfect, is the "pivot on which the entire world system of nuclear nonproliferation rests." Further existence of the treaty is the most important condition for maintaining strategic stability.

In accordance with available data, 70 member states came out unequivocally in favor of the unconditional and indefinite extension of the treaty; three countries were unambiguously against; 38 agreed to the prolongation on certain conditions; and 60 have not yet made up their minds or have not voiced their opinions. The correlation of forces at the conference in New York will depend to a certain extent on the strength of arguments in favor of maintaining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which, although far from being perfect, has been sufficiently effective over a quarter of a century. No political ambitions should impair the relative balance in the nuclear sphere that has taken shape in the world.

I am adding brief information on potential owners of nuclear weapons.

Potentially Nuclear States

Argentina has a raw materials foundation for the development of atomic power engineering, and among Latin American countries, it has the best developed nuclear industry. Atomic electric power plants [AES] are built and used. A member of IAEA, it has signed the Tlatelolco Treaty and also the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials.

Brazil also has a reliable raw materials base for the development of atomic power engineering. AESs are built and used in the country, scientific personnel is trained, and several nuclear research centers function. Brazil is a member of IAEA. It has not joined the NPT, considering it discriminatory. However, it has ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty and the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. There is no evidence that it possesses nuclear weapons. However, periodically, one gets information on the existence of a major advanced research program of applied military character. This "parallel nuclear program" is being pursued under the guidance of the armed forces command.

Israel is a country that unofficially possesses nuclear weapons. Israeli leadership neither confirms nor denies their availability. The capacities of the functioning

heavy-water reactor and installation for processing irradiated fuel are sufficient for manufacturing between five and 10 nuclear charges a year. Besides, reserves of fissile plutonium may be increased with the help of a heavy-water reactor with a capacity of 250 megawatts at a new AES the building of which was announced back in 1984.

On the whole, using the available resources, Israel could, over the period between 1970 and 1980, potentially manufacture about 20 nuclear warheads and, by now, between 100 and 200 warheads. The country's scientific and technological potential enables it to continue an improvement of the design of its nuclear weapons, in particular, create modifications with increased radiation and accelerated nuclear reaction. Nor can one discard Tel Aviv's interest in the development of thermonuclear weapons.

For strategic considerations, Israel refuses to join the NPT.

India also belongs to those countries that unofficially possess nuclear weapons. It pursues an advanced program for applied military studies. The country has a high industrial and scientific and technological potential, highly qualified national personnel and material and financial resources for creating weapons of mass destruction. It is one of the few developing states capable of independently designing and building nuclear power units and of carrying out various operations within the framework of the fuel cycle, starting from uranium extraction and ending with regeneration of spent fuel and reprocessing of the [nuclear] waste.

Although a member of IAEA, India did not sign the agreement on placing its entire nuclear activity under IAEA guarantees and has not joined the NPT, considering it discriminatory with regard to nonnuclear states.

The country has its own uranium reserves. Major results have also been achieved in the development of the technology for using thorium in the fuel cycle; thorium reserves are quite large. There also are large capacities for the production of heavy water (more than 200 metric tons a year). At present, nine industrial and eight experimental reactors function in the country. The experimental reactors and their fuel cycle are not covered by IAEA guarantees.

Having accomplished in 1974 an explosion of its nuclear device, India laid a powerful foundation for the development of its military nuclear program.

Until recently, Iraq carried out its rather extensive program for nuclear research of applied military significance. However, by the beginning of the "Desert Storm"

operation (January 1991), the implementation of Baghdad's program for the creation of nuclear weapons was still at an early stage, and it did not have nuclear charges.

By now, production capacities for obtaining nuclear materials and creating nuclear charges from them have been destroyed. The highly enriched uranium, which was in Iraq under IAEA guarantees, has been taken out of the country. There is no evidence suggesting that Iraq continues to develop nuclear weapons.

Iraq is a member of IAEA and a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Iran does not possess nuclear weapons. Nor are there any convincing indications that it has a well-coordinated and integral military nuclear program. Without outside assistance, Tehran is unable to organize production of military nuclear materials. In 1970, Iran ratified the NPT, and since February 1992, has allowed IAEA to inspect any of its nuclear facilities. Not a single IAEA inspection revealed any violations of the IAEA requirements.

However, some Western experts believe that there are certain reasons to prevent Iran from implementing its peaceful nuclear program even under the control of IAEA. Official U.S. representatives at various levels repeatedly stated that they are convinced Iran is pursuing a military nuclear program and may allegedly achieve this goal in just another five years. Hence, it is concluded in Washington that countries-suppliers of nuclear technologies must refrain from any cooperation with Iraq in the nuclear sphere. However, analysts of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service believe that allegations about Iran are often based upon obviously unverified information. The level of this country's achievements in the nuclear sphere does not exceed similar indexes of another 20 or 25 countries of the world.

In the past, North Korea was a signatory to the NPT and accord on placing its entire nuclear activities under IAEA control. However, in March 1993, Pyongyang announced its pullout from the NPT and in June 1994, also from IAEA. However, these statements have remained nothing but declarations.

North Korea conducts various types of research in the sphere of nuclear power engineering, and a raw materials base and a network of atomic industry facilities together with specialized research institutes constitute the country's nuclear complex. Apparently, at the beginning [rubezh] of the 1970's, North Korea adopted a political decision to start work aimed at creating nuclear weapons. However, due to various difficulties, the military part of the country's nuclear program did not

develop continuously. The intensification of the external political and economic isolation added up to the difficulties in the sphere. Relying largely upon their own capability, the North Koreans did manage to create and almost complete their plutonium nuclear cycle. However, the present scientific and technological level and the technological equipment used at the North Korean nuclear facilities do not make it possible to manufacture an effective nuclear blast device.

Pakistan started implementing its military nuclear program in the mid-1970's. In accordance with available data, Islamabad has technological capabilities for fast production of between six and 12 nuclear devices with a capacity of about 20 kilotons.

Pakistan is a member of IAEA, but it has not joined the NPT and does not take part in international accords on control over nuclear export. Pakistan's official authorities do not deny their country's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, but maintain that such weapons will not be created to be used against any state. "The maintenance of military readiness" is dictated by the "continued disbalance" in the military sphere with India.

In the very near future, Islamabad intends to start building at least another two or three nuclear reactors. On the whole, there are grounds to state that Pakistan's nuclear technology is at a sufficiently high level and that the nuclear center at Kahuta is capable of producing highly enriched uranium — sufficient for the creation of nuclear weapons.

The Republic of South Africa [RSA] is the first state in the world history that has voluntarily given up its nuclear weapons, having in fact unilaterally accomplished nuclear disarmament. In 1991, the RSA joined the NPT as a nonnuclear state. The same year, it concluded an agreement with IAEA on full guarantees.

A political decision on the creation of a "limited nuclear arsenal" was adopted in 1974, and, in 1979, the first nuclear charge was produced. By 1989, the RSA had manufactured five nuclear charges with an estimated capacity of between 10 and 18 kilotons. The seventh device had been in the stage of production by the time the decision on the destruction of the entire arsenal was adopted. The dismantling of the already created six nuclear charges was completed in August 1991. Facilities at the disposal of the military nuclear program were subjected to conversion.

Japan is guided by three well-known principles: "Not to manufacture, not to acquire, and not to keep nuclear weapons on its territory." However, these principles have not been given the status of law. Japan is a

participant in the NPT and has an agreement with IAEA on full-scale guarantees. At the same time, the country has a long-term program for the development of nuclear power engineering and is well advanced in this sphere. More than 40 AESs function in Japan and account for more than 30 percent of electricity produced in the country.

Experts of the Foreign Intelligence Service believe that Japan does not presently have nuclear weapons or means for their delivery. At the same time, one cannot ignore the incompleteness of the decisions associated with effective control over nuclear materials or openness of the Japanese nuclear program as a whole.

Foreign Ministry on CIS Economic Union

*LD1705174195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1500 GMT 17 May 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no dateline as received] — The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry has considered the proposal of representatives of the border regions of Ukraine and Russia recommending Ukraine join the agreement on creation of a CIS economic union as a full member. UNIAN has learned this from sources close to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

The Foreign Ministry, with proposals from the Foreign Economic Relations Ministry, Justice Ministry, and State Customs Committee, has concluded that such an entry would be premature, because during preparations for the agreement proposals by Ukraine on protecting its economic sovereignty were not taken into account.

The Foreign Ministry thinks it would be too early to raise the question of customs and monetary unions and the unification of national legislations because they require the completion of the economy's structural reconstruction. The process of Ukraine joining the GATT/WTO may be made subject to a customs union. In that event Ukraine may lose the possibility to independently draw agreements on free trade with other states. Besides, the customs union will not allow development of Ukraine's own economy and its exports, because the technologies and goods of countries that are not members of the CIS customs union will not be able to break through the customs tariffs.

The Foreign Ministry is convinced that the status of an associated member of the CIS economic union will allow Ukraine to develop relations in both eastern and western directions. Ukraine's participation in that agreement will be viewed as a change in its foreign policy, which will affect its perception by EC countries as an independent state.

The Foreign Ministry believes Ukraine's signing of the above-mentioned document can be viewed by Russia as a pretext for pressurizing our state into a military and political structure in the framework of the CIS. The joining of the agreement can result in the suspension by national parliaments of the EC countries of the process of ratifying agreements on partnership and cooperation with Ukraine.

The Foreign Ministry is convinced that Ukraine's full membership in the CIS economic union can result in its distancing from central European states both politically and economically. That would require reviewing the economic agreements concluded by Ukraine with other states.

The Foreign Ministry thinks a decision on Ukraine's joining the CIS economic union requires obligatory ratification by the Supreme Council.

Supreme Assembly Passes Law on State Power

*LD1805174095 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1525 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kiev [no date as received] — On 18 May Ukraine's Supreme Council passed in its entirety the law "On State Power and Local Self-Government in Ukraine" by a majority of 219 to 104 votes, with 17 abstentions.

The deputies also accepted a proposal by Serhiy Sobolyev, the chairman of the Reforms parliamentary faction, to amend Article 27 of the law with the provision disenabling the president to hold, pending the passage of a new constitution, a referendum on any subject except for those that relate to the constitution. [passage omitted]

Economic Issues

Government Requests Larger SDR From IMF

*LD1805111195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
0905 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — One of the ways to solve the payment crisis will be to increase Ukraine's quota in the International Monetary Fund. This opinion was voiced by Deputy Finance Minister Borys Sobolev at the Financial Club session on 17 May.

Sobolev said that, in accordance with the IMF program, Ukraine must begin payments on the STF [Systemic Transformation Facility] credit already in 1997 and on the stand by credit in 1999. However, in his opinion, Ukraine cannot do that because that will worsen the conditions of trade. Therefore, Ukraine's quotas in the IMF must be increased.

According to Aleks Sundakov, the IMF representative in Ukraine, it is only possible if another SDR [Special Drawing Rights] emission is issued (the last such emission was carried out in 1976 in the volume of \$30 billion through raising the world prices on energy carriers). However, the solution of this issue, according to him, depends on the IMF Board of Directors.

The current quota of Ukraine in the IMF is 997 million SDR — special drawing rights. It was determined in the times of the Soviet Union.

Bank Official Sees Easing of Hard Currency Rules

*WS1805120595 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0107 GMT 18 May 95*

["Special to INTELNEWS" by Serhiy Shevchenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, May 17 — In the near future the National Bank of Ukraine [NBU] will take a number steps aimed at liberalization of Ukraine's hard currency market, said NBU Deputy Governor Oleksandr Kireyev on Wednesday.

According to Kireyev, it is expected that the NBU will annul its decision on obligatory sales of 10 percent of hard currency earnings to its reserves. The bank official said that the NBU found this regulation inefficient and has decided that foreign currency will be bought on the interbank market.

In addition, to expand the market of current monetary operations, commercial banks will be allowed to buy foreign currency for subsequent sales through currency exchange offices on the interbank market. To toughen its control over the banks that carry out hard currency operations, the NBU will demand that such banks raise their statutory assets to ECU 500,000. The banks fail to meet these requirements by Sept. 1 will be deprived of their hard currency licenses, he said.

Kireyev said that although re-registration of hard currency licenses of 350 organizations out of the total of 2,000 organizations currently having such licenses was completed by May 15, such re-registration will be continued. According to Kireyev, these 350 organizations were permitted to have their hard currency licenses re-registered by the NBU regional branches. Out of these 350 organizations only 200 have annual hard currency turnover of \$70,000, which is the basic criterion for re-registration.

Officials in Lvov on Potential Gas Cutoff

*WS1805115395 Lvov MOLODA HALYCHYNA
in Ukrainian 6 May 95 p 1*

[Interview with "LvivHaz" Production Amalgamation Manager Mykhaylo Shevtsiv and Ihor Makovetskyk,

chairman of the Lvov Oblast Committee for Fuel and Gas, by Halyna Myts; place and date not given: "This Is Not a Joke — Gas Is Going To Be Cut Off"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Due to people's irresponsibility and lack of discipline in paying for gas, and Ukraine's considerable debts to Russia, which could trigger cutting off the gas supply to the Republic, gas supply to the people will be cut off beginning 10 May for the entire summer period. This was the approximate gist of a telegram — signed by Acting Prime Minister Ye. Marchuk — that arrived in Lvov on 3 May.

We asked "LvivHaz" Production Amalgamation Manager Mykhaylo Shevtsiv and Ihor Makovetskyy, chairman of the Lvov Oblast Committee for Fuel and Gas, to comment on this document.

[Myts] What will the fulfillment of the government telegram lead us to in practice? Will it resolve the gas problems?

[Shevtsiv] In my opinion, it will not resolve these problems, because it is necessary to pay for gas. I believe that both the Ukrainian Supreme Council and the government are playing the "who- wins" game, while the people suffer. Recall at least the recent Supreme Council decree from 18 April. It envisaged the Cabinet of Ministers' suspending a decree on new gas tariffs. At the same time, another government document instructed us to perform necessary recalculations beginning 1 February. The people read the document, and did not lose hope that prices would be changed. As a result, virtually no one paid gas bills in February and March.

[Makovetskyy] Regrettably, there are contradictions in the documents. The people expect that prices for services will indeed be reduced. Therefore, in January, when gas was almost 9.6-fold cheaper, the people paid more than they pay now. I believe that newspapers should have explained to the people that they had to first comply with the government resolution, but not the Supreme Council's decree. Perhaps it would have been possible at the time to avoid such extreme situations.

I am not sure that this is a way out, because considerable overconsumption of electricity is inevitable. It is even difficult to imagine which electric energy system would bear it. This is a vicious circle: Gas is required to produce electricity. I am afraid that there will be no light in our houses in the immediate future as well.

[Myts] It is difficult to believe that gas will indeed be cut off. How will this be done in practice?

[Shevtsiv] I can be sure about only one thing: We are forced to comply with government decisions. Therefore, it is possible that gas will be cut off in rural areas first.

It is precisely the population in rural areas that, according to the telegram, will suffer most. We also thought why it should be so. The debts of both the city and rural areas are the same, because gas tariffs do not differ. Perhaps it is implied that the population of rural areas is — all the same — most hurt in financial terms, because their wages are the lowest. Perhaps, the city will not be disconnected from the gas network....

[Makovetskyy] How will everything look in reality? My personal — expert — forecast is as follows: Gas will be gradually cut off in rural areas beginning 10 May. Why precisely in rural areas? After all, the people in those areas have wood- and coal-burning stoves.

It is possible that in the beginning the people, who have paid their gas bills, will also suffer. If this, however, occurs, it will not last long. We will look for a way out of this situation. To all appearances, we will decide whether or not to turn off gas spigots, and put on a lead seal based of each individual case.

At least, our documents, currently being drafted for submission for approval, instruct the "LvivHaz" to prepare all its services — by 7 May — for the gradual gas cut off.

Efforts Made To Increase Gas Supplies

954F2291A Simferopol KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 May 95 p 1

[I. Dyakov report: "Hoping Not To Be Left Without Gas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been a twofold reduction, approximately, in the flow of natural gas to Crimea from Ukraine, which, in turn, obtains the main quantity of it from Russia.

According to S.A. Mikhaylov, minister of industry and power of the Government of Crimea, the reason for the exacerbation of the situation are the nonpayments. Many enterprises, organizations, and farms are not paying for the gas they consume. Ukraine's debts to Russia and Turkmenistan are growing. The stringency of the demands on Crimea's natural gas consumers is rising in this connection.

A government directive has been issued on this score. The conclusion of contracts between the consumers of natural gas and the Chernomorneftegaz and Krymgaz associations and their unswerving fulfillment are planned. The arrears must be paid off before 1 June of this year. Actions brought against the debtors will be considered by the court of arbitration. They are being warned of a cutoff of supplies of this type of fuel in the event of tardy payment for it.

Reports have appeared in the news media to the effect that in Ukraine the supply of gas to rural localities could be curtailed. Crimea has a chance to avoid such an undesirable development of events. Our own natural gas reserves should help us out. Efforts are being made to increase its production. It is planned in the present year to increase it to 630 million cubic meters. The blue fuel is to be pumped into an underground repository. Approximately 3 trillion karbovantsy will have to be found for this, it is true.

The minister told us that there should be no reduction in supplies of natural gas to the domestic sector. But the payments problem has to be resolved here also.

Gas Supply Shut-Off Resisted by Local Authorities

*LD1805134595 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
1150 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Poltava — Failure to settle the amount outstanding for the gas consumed has led to 3,250 companies being disconnected, Bohdan Klyuk, the head of Ukrhazprom [Ukrainian Gas Company], told a conference of oil and gas industry chiefs, attended by the president of Ukraine.

He said that some local authorities resisted disconnections, with Ukrhazprom staff often prevented from access to the sites. "There are cases of unauthorized resumption of gas supply to the businesses cut off," Bohdan Klyuk said.

At the same time, he added, the gas industry was "on the brink of stoppage." By 1 May, Russia delivered to Ukraine approximately \$1 billion worth of gas, while the payment made did not exceed \$213 million.

At the conference, Leonid Kuchma confirmed that he had once again raised the issue of debt repayment in a telephone conversation with Russia's Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin. The Ukrainian president commended the government's firm stance on debtors' disconnection, as the situation where Derzhkomnaftohazprom's [State Oil, Gas, and Oil Refining Industry Committee] internal debt reached 230 trillion karbovantsi, was not sustainable.

This was report by a UNIAN correspondent from Poltava.

Belarus

U.S. To Fund Dismantling of Missile Launch Sites

LD1805205595 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1859 GMT 18 May 95

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: reports by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, May 18 (Interfax-West) — The U.S. will grant Belarus an additional six million dollars to scrap the foundations of the already dismantled Kronshtadt launch sites, Belarus' First Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy Tsepkalo told Interfax in Minsk.

As he said, Belarus will not allow the further scrapping of the foundations of the dismantled Kronshtadt launch pads "under barbarous technology."

The pads were designed to launch short and medium range nuclear missiles.

According to Tsepkalo, Belarus "believes that to scrap concrete pads by means of explosion is unacceptable." "As life has shown, this does great ecological damage to the local environment. A lot of trees get destroyed by the pieces of concrete flying in all directions," he noted.

All in all there were 81 pads of the Kronshtadt type in Belarus, Tsepkalo said. Two of them have been exploded.

The high-ranking diplomat said that he "made a special trip to Washington with photographs showing ecological damage done to the environment, so that the USA, which had at its disposal technologies for scrapping launch pads acceptable to Belarus, could give the necessary aid."

"Belarus' plea met with support in the USA, and the Americans agreed to grant additional funds," Tsepkalo concluded.

Lukashenko Ruling on Arms Elimination Praised

WS1905114795 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY
in Russian 17 May 95 p 3

[Article by Valentin Akulov, president of the Belarusian Geopolitical Academy: "Everything Must Be Absolutely Clear"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Belarusian president's decision to suspend the elimination of conventional weapons met with a wide resonance in the Republic — varying from approval to sharp criticism. I am not mentioning the demarche of the West, which was predictable. In my opinion, everything must be absolutely clear in this

issue. All kinds of "silent maneuvers" are simply not appropriate. It is for this reason that I would like to tackle this problem again.

At least three aspects are represented in this problem: The legal aspect, the economic aspect, and the military one. I would like to dwell on each of them for a while.

Thus, to what extent does our president's decision correspond to international legal norms? I claim that from an international-legal perspective this decision is irrevocable. The Treaty on Limitation of Conventional Weapons was not signed by Belarus; it was signed by the USSR leadership. There is no doubt that our Republic, being one of the Soviet Union's successors, has certain commitments regarding the treaty. However, I would like to draw your attention to Article 35 of the Vienna Convention of 23 August 1978. In particular, it stipulates that any treaty which was valid for a predecessor-state at the moment of another state's succession, becomes invalid if the conditions for its application have fundamentally changed.

In this case we are dealing with exactly the same kind of situation. The aforementioned treaty was signed by the USSR when the geopolitical situation was absolutely different. Those conditions have fundamentally changed and Belarus, according to international legal norms, has all grounds to raise the issue of reviewing that part of the treaty which infringes on the Republic's national interests. Thus, the accusations voiced by the Belarusian Popular Front [BNF] that the Belarusian president had violated the Republic's international commitments, indicate one thing — sheer legal ignorance of the BNF leadership, experts, and advisers.

Let us now consider the economic aspect. It is widely known that the USSR deployed its most powerful and mobile military formations along its borders, primarily in the western direction — Belarus and Ukraine. After our "emergency threesome" [Yeltsin, former Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich, former Ukraine's President Kravchuk] sentenced the USSR to death in 1991, and wisely declared that every republic should come in possession of everything on its territory, we inherited a strange legacy — large stocks of military hardware, most of which, however, was to be scrapped.

How much does it cost our taxpayers? VO SLAVU RODINY has already published reports about how much it costs to scrap an aircraft, a tank, or an armored vehicle — I will not repeat that. I would only like to add that work on cleaning up territories used for scrapping the hardware will not be less costly than the scrapping. That is why I am asking: Do we have enough money to burn? Why, instead of making a profit, we have to suffer financial losses? The hardware is of supreme quality

and can be sold at a profit. Why can we not do that? Is it only because the West, primarily the United States would like to have a total monopoly on the world's arms market?

Finally, about the military-strategic side of the issue. NATO was established as a counterweight to the Soviet Union's postwar strength. The Soviet Union dissolved not long ago, and the Warsaw Pact sank into oblivion. It would seem that all the objective reasons for the existence of that powerful military structure in Europe have disappeared. However, not only has it not been disbanded; on the contrary, it continues to strengthen on a daily basis, drawing more and more states into its orbit. Why? We are being told that NATO is a guarantor of peace. However, let us take a closer look at that guarantor.

I am not going to speak about the aggregate military power of NATO members. The so-called "fast-response forces" alone, which are part of NATO's Allied Ground Forces, comprise 14 army corps, 48 divisions, and more than 200 aircraft. Add to this the so-called "rapid-deployment forces" comprising an army corps, 200 combat aircraft, and 30 naval ships. NATO's Air Force includes 254 wings (4,430 combat aircraft, including 400 aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons). NATO's Navy comprises 537 ships of various types and around 400 combat aircraft. In light of this, it would be reasonable to ask: What kind of peacemaking functions is this military monster going to perform, and where would that be? Until recently, the United Nations and its peacekeeping force were considered guarantors of peace. At present, certain forces would like to assign this function to NATO. For us they are offering "Partnership for Peace." Let me ask: What kind of peace? The kind of peace when the United States, covering itself with a fig leaf of the United Nations will dictate its will to the entire world? That is some partnership, indeed.

We have our own national interests, including those related to our security. We must protect them, as do all other states, that have dignity. Certain gentlemen should realize this simple truth and mind their own business.

Finally, the last issue. I can understand the reaction of the West. It was not difficult for me to understand the BNF's reaction. The only ambiguity is: Whose interests do the so-called patriots advocate in Belarus, the patriots bellowing about "nezalezhnasts" [independence]? Whom do they represent? Whom do they serve?

Commentary Views Results of 14 May Referendum

WS1805135395 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian
17 May 95 p 1

[Commentary by Valyantsin Zhdanko: "The President Received Another Carte Blanche. Neither Language, Nor Symbols, Nor Opposition Are Preventing Him From Leading Belarus to Prosperity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 14 of May 1995 became the boundary and turning point for many processes that have been taking place in our country for the last few years.

Another overwhelming victory of [Belarusian President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka not merely consolidated his personal clout as president, and not only served as a powerful blow against the national democratic opposition, from which the latter will certainly not recover anytime soon.

The referendum became a common portrait of the entire Belarusian society. This plebiscite quite correctly mirrored the real features of a country that is still called the independent Republic of Belarus.

It is completely obvious that on 14 May the majority of Belarusians, at their own will, put an end to the nation's timid attempts to elevate the status of the Belarusian language, exerted since 1990. The second spring of national revival in the 20th century is over. The period, which will perhaps enter history as the "second Belarusification," has concluded without any significant and noticeable success in the area of rooting Belarusian among the public. The Belarusian language, being made equal with Russian, will lose this competition, and will be removed to the periphery of public life, to remote villages, and narrow circles of the national democratic creative intelligentsia. From this point, there is only one step to its total decline and disappearance. This may be decided during the next few generations. If native speakers will pass away, the language will also perish. Will the nation survive in this case? The referendum showed that the Belarusians are not guided by the instinct of self-preservation.

On 14 May, the "Pahonya" and the white-red-white flag actually lost the status of state symbols, and again, as during the Soviet era, were outlawed. It is quite possible that many of those who voted for the red-and-green flag and the rye-flax-and-clover wreath under the red star voted for the life that existed under these symbols. They voted for cheap sausage, free accommodation, stable prices, and guaranteed jobs.... The paradox lies in the fact that, after the referendum, prices put in the official Russian language and under the Soviet flag will not

change. And if they do change, than not in terms of decreasing.

Alyaksandr Lukashenka demonstrated brilliant political intuition and knowledge of the psyche of the people he rules. As a matter of fact, the president received another *carte blanche* for the immediate future. The results of the referendum make it possible to begin an action aimed at political unification with the Russian Federation as early as tomorrow. The question as to how Belarus can be used — either as a part of Russia or a convenient supplement — is already being discussed by Russian politicians and mass media.

Therefore, the road ahead for the truly popular President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is clear and free. His opponents from the Belarusian Popular Front, whom he considered the most dangerous and against whom he urged to vote, were humiliated and besmirched by an official propaganda campaign, accused of nearly fascism, and rejected along with their language and symbols.

I doubt that the profound crisis in the democratic camp is favorable to the president. In the short run, Alyaksandr Lukashenka will have no serious political opponents. This means that there is nobody against whom he could aim his just wrath, and that he has nobody to blame for preventing him from overcoming instability, ruin, economic chaos, unemployment, crime rise, sky-rocketing prices, and inflation.

The 14 of May was a turning point for the democratic forces as well. This movement, in its previous form, has exhausted itself. New leaders, corrected programs, and fresh ideas are needed. In this respect, the grave defeat in the elections may prove to be favorable for them.

Communists, 'Nostalgia' Prevail in Elections

WS1805124695 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA
in Belarusian 17 May 95 p 1

[Commentary by Andrey Nikolski: "Under the Red-and-Green Flag Toward a Red Parliament?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Among politicians, there is currently no topic more interesting than the results of the first round of parliamentary elections. The number of candidates has decreased. Such notorious individuals as Viktor Chykin, Syarhey Haydukevich, or Henadz Danilaw must put off their hopes until better times. Generals Henadz Lavitski, Pavel Kazlowski, Yawhen Bacharow, Pyotr Chaus (former interior minister), and Viktor Piskarow have lost their parliamentary seats. Many journalists will no longer warm themselves under the "parliamentary sun" either. Moreover, disfavored former editors in chief Ihar Asinski [SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA] and Yosif Syaredzich [NARODNAYA

HAZETA], who had been doomed to victory, were defeated as well.... Although their names had been on everyone's tongue for several months, it seems that this was not enough for the villagers.

The countryside is generally longing for the past, judging by the initial results. The first group, though insignificant, is led by farm managers. People from agricultural regions obediently voted for local leaders. I had an opportunity to listen to some of those orators — candidates from the Agrarian Party. These countryside grandpas were reading the same text written, evidently, by some professional ideologist.

I also know well many farm chairmen, who are currently ending their parliamentary term. The majority of them are keen on production. Parliament, however, is not a seminar on exchanging experience. Parliament requires such skills as reading a lot, making in-depth analyses, and drafting wise laws. The times when a deputy representing some rayon would fight for allotments for cars, spare parts, fertilizers, or scarce goods with the help of vodka and gourmet meals are gone.

We are dissatisfied with the current Supreme Soviet, namely because it did not pass good laws.

It seems that everything will recur, since the voters did not even mention skills concerning drafting laws.

Despite the fact that capitalist Klimaw and communist Storazhaw advanced to the second round in one of the constituencies, one can make a preliminary forecast that agitators for the ill-famed "shining future" will find more understanding among the people than among rich businessmen. As many as 170 members of the Belarusian Communist Party advanced to the second round, that is approximately 75 percent of all candidates fielded by this party. Former presidential candidate Vasil Novikaw, known for his fanatically communist convictions, was 1 percent short of becoming a deputy in the first round. Doctor of sociological sciences Ivan Katlyarow, whose forecasts have always smacked of ideology rather than science, also advanced to the second round.

Democrats incurred serious wounds: As few as 44 members of the Belarusian Popular Front, and eight members of Alyaksandr Dabravolski's United Democratic Party progressed to the second round.

The Party of Popular Accord has not yet analyzed the first round's results. Although one of this party's active members, Pyotr Zhushma, became a deputy, its leader Henadz Karpenka will have to fight hard with a rayon interior affairs department chief.

As our correspondent Syarhey Butkevich reports from Vitsebsk, one can quite positively state that elderly people, who do not trust young people, dominated among the participants in the elections. These voters, who did not hesitate to come to the polls despite their age, apparently voted not for specific individuals (with whom they could not become familiar during such a short period of time), but for a certain political platform, or more precisely, for a return to the past, when the unlimited rule of the Communist Party did not cause concerns about the ruble's further exchange rate. This nostalgia for the past helped candidates bearing communist slogans come first, and left democrats and even centrists behind.

Party Leaders on Election, Referendum Results

WS1805115095 Minsk MMC in English
0700 GMT 18 May 95

[From the INFORMATION SERVICE BULLETIN]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] An MMC [Mass Media Center] correspondent asked the leaders of the political parties and movements of the country to comment on the results of the first round of the elections and the republican referendum.

BPF [Belarusian Popular Front] leader Zyanon Paznyak: "Personally, nothing came as a surprise to me. As I predicted, very few people were elected as deputies in the first round. It is true, I thought that the Front representative Valyantsin Golubev would be elected straight away in Minsk. He would have had every chance of being elected if about another 150 people had gone to the polls. As it was, the elections were declared invalid. The fate of the future parliament will be decided in the second round. However, it became clear that there is a really marked polarization of the voters. In spite of how canvassing went on in Minsk, mainly BPF and PCB [Communist Party of Belarus] representatives have got through into the second round. Undoubtedly, the film "Hate: Children of the Lie" also played a negative part against the BPF candidates. For example, I lost 15-20 percent of the votes because of that film. As far as I observed, the overall influence of that film on various groups of people was not clear-cut. Young people and more intelligent people immediately spotted that it was a fake and the film inspired rage in them. But the people with a lower IQ who the film was aimed at, believed those lies. It is a repeat of the 1990 situation where the Central Committee of the CPB's propaganda department and the KGB were in operation. The authorities of today are consciously breaking the law in order to win the elections. We will naturally be making an appeal to the courts against the film-makers and may possibly win it,

but it will already be too late to change the election results then.

As far as the second round of voting is concerned, it is highly unlikely that it will bring any results. It has not been ruled out that neither of the two candidates will achieve the necessary number of votes. It is very likely that the second round will not be valid at all and the required number of voters will not go to the polls. It is always the case that less people turn up at the second round than the first. That happens in any state. On average, just over 60 percent of the electorate took part in the elections here, and even less in Minsk — 52 percent. Therefore, it is likely that the main task in the second round will be to make the populace turn out to vote. Although it is more likely that the regime will attempt to do everything possible to call off the second round, and since they are in control of the radio, television and an experienced Goebbelsesque propaganda organisation, this kind of attempts will be successful."

Commenting on the referendum results, Mr. Paznyak remarked that changing the symbols will bring about a complete ruination of the country's international authority, and will virtually be the beginning of its destruction.

In reply to a question concerning possible options for future events in Belarus should the second round of the parliamentary elections be called off, Mr. Paznyak said that if this happens, the old Supreme Soviet will remain in power, the antidemocratic trend in the state will intensify and the process of losing the economy will accelerate. Furthermore, Zyanon Paznyak feels that the communists will considerably strengthen their position in Belarus, which is essentially happening already.

In the opinion of the BPF leader, the continuation of these events on the base of the future economic recession and the dropping standard of living will lead to tension in society. Nevertheless, Mr. Paznyak presumes that the BPF's authority will be substantially higher by Autumn. According to Zyanon Paznyak, if the elections are not held, the president should not celebrate his victory. The Popular Front leader stated that we can only talk about a presidential victory if he makes real improvements to the economy, like General Pinochet did.

Valeriy Yefimov, secretary of the central council of the Farmers' Party [FP]: "We have not yet got reason to be dissatisfied with the way the voting went or the referendum results. We did not receive any complaints at FP headquarters concerning candidates from the Farmers' Party coming up against any illegal obstacles. Four of our candidates have already been elected as deputies

to the new parliament and another 70 Farmers' Party representatives have gone through to the second round. According to our information, communists and independent industrialists will be among the FP candidates' second-round rivals. We are hoping to gain no less than 40 seats in the future Supreme Soviet."

Vladimir Zaytsev, one of the leaders of Slavyanskiy Sobor "Belaya Rus" [White Russia Assembly]: "The reason for the elections being invalid in a lot of constituencies is due to the BPF's ultranationalistic stance. Having usurped the media for many years, the Popular Frontists have brainwashed citizens in a way that was beneficial to them. As a result, lots of zombie people did not go to the polling stations. I assess my party's prospects as being averagely optimistic in the election process. The high percentage of citizens who voted for the questions asked by the president in the referendum evidently demonstrated the maturity of the Belarusian population."

Winners in First-Round of Elections Listed

WS1805123595 Minsk MMC in English
0700 GMT 18 May 95

[From the INFORMATION SERVICE BULLETIN:
"Candidates Going Through to Second Round"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In one Minsk constituency, the former vice premier Viktor Hanchar and Uladzimir Zablotkiy (the prime minister of the BPF [Belarusian Popular Front] shadow cabinet) went through to the second round [of national legislative elections]. [Supreme Soviet Chairman] Myacheslaw Hryb got through to the second round in Sharkovshchina district in the Vitsebsk region. Supreme Soviet presidium member Uladzimir Novik; the deputy chairman of the BPF, Yuriy Khodyko, and the chairman of the National Bank, Stanislaw Bahdankevich, also made it into the second round. The secretary of the Party of Communists [PCB], Syarhey Kalyakin, and Uladzimir Nester of the BPF went through from one constituency, as did the chairwoman of the joint-stock merchant bank Belarusbank, Tamara Vinnikova, and the chairman of the Belarusian League of Human Rights, Yawhen Novikaw, from another constituency. Also going through to the second round are the writer Nikolay Cherginets; the chairman of the board of the joint-stock group Andrey Klimov and Company, Andrey Klimov; the chairman of the Party for Popular Accord, Henadz Karpenka; the head of the Frunze district militia department, Pyotr Shkut; the president of the Businessmen's Union, Uladzimir Karyagin; BPF representatives Syarhey Naumchik, Vintsuk Vechorka and Viktor Ivashkevich; a member of the "masterminds" team, Valentina Golubeva; Stanislaw

Shushkevich; and the chairman of the Party of Communists, Yawhen Tolkachyov.

BPF chairman Uladzimir Antsulevich and Party of Communists representative Dmitriy Ivanov are through from one constituency. Also going into the second round are Vyachaslaw Kebich and the head of the control service of the presidential administration, Vasily Dolgoyov.

Eight PCB representatives, three BPF candidates, one BSDH [Belarusian Social Democratic Assembly] representative and some others got through to the second round of the elections in Vitsebsk. Among them were the editor-in-chief of NOVAYA NARODNAYA GAZETA, Natalya Masherova, and Communist Party Secretary Vasily Novikaw.

Among the deputies who made it to the second round of the elections in Mahilew was the chairman of the parliamentary legislation commission, Dmitriy Bulakhov.

Yuriy Malumov, the chairman of the presidential committee for fighting against corruption, will be continuing the second-round contest in Babruysk.

Going through to the second round of the elections in Soligorsk are the vice-chairman of the Belarusian Independent Trade Union, Vasily Yurkin, and miner Uladzimir Pashkevich; the chairman of the Belarusian Independent Trade Union, Viktor Babayed, and miner Syarhey Pinchuk; and the chairman of the regional branch of the independent trade unions, Leonid Markhotko, and communist Valyantsin Shcherbin.

The editor-in-chief of the newspaper SVABODA, Igor Germenchuk, went through a considerable way ahead of his rivals in Svetlogorsk, and the last of the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus Anatoliy Malofeyev, was a long way in front of his rival in Mozyr. The Prosecutor General, Vasily Shaladonov, also made it into the second round.

Representatives of the Republican Party for Labour and Fairness and the Party of Communists made it into the second round in three Brest constituencies, communists are up against independent candidates in another two constituencies, and the Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada [assembly] representative went through together with an independent candidate in one constituency.

The leader of the Party of Communists, Viktor Chikin, and his constituency rival from the BPF, Artur Volskiy, did not make it into the second round from Minsk. Other unlucky candidates were the composer Igor Luchenok, deputy Nikolay Skorynin, deputy and chairman of the committee for openness and Human Rights, Syarhey

Davidovich, and the editor-in-chief of the newspaper BELORUSSIYA, Igor Osinskiy.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Returns From, Comments on ROK Economic Talks

LD1805200095 *Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian* 1400 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The official visit by President Nursultan Nazarbayev to the ROK ended today. The plane with the Kazakh delegation on board landed about 90 minutes ago at the capital's airport. [passage omitted]

[Begin Nazarbayev recording] Our first official visit to the ROK has ended. [passage omitted] Documents eliminating dual taxation, and on protection of investments are to be signed. This lays the ground for businessmen to work freely.

The heads of our companies which deal with the top business circles of the ROK accompanied me. As you heard, they said that over two days they had done what they were unable to do over years, or at least in the last half a year. I introduced all of them. There were meetings with business people, separate meetings with major companies such as Samsung, LG Gold Star, and Khvan Khva, with which we had serious conversations on improving work of enterprises such as the Dzhzhkazgan nonferrous metallurgy combine, the Karaganda metallurgical combine, oil enterprises, consumer goods manufacturing enterprises, and ways to attract funds to them. That is to say, we are talking about \$3-4 billion private investments by South Korean companies into Kazakhstan. These are great deeds. These are not credits, these are private investments. We have to create the conditions. I think this is the main success. This means that new jobs will be created, their experience in management and marketing will come here, and this will help our economy and for the future of Kazakhstan flourish.

So I think that our start, our debut in the Asian and Pacific region — after the talks with the president of Indonesia, and now with South Korea, and planned contacts with Australia and the whole southeast, and Kazakhstan's entry into the Atlantic-Pacific economic cooperation and security system of South-East Asia, and the Arab world and the Gulf states is now our line. [sentence as heard] After establishing such contacts in the West — with the United States and Western Europe — we are now turning our attention to Asia, the southeast, the developing states. We are pursuing a considered and targeted policy on equal cooperation with west, east, south and north. [end recording]

Radio Views Results of ROK-Kazakhstan Summit

SK1805012095 *Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Korean* 1200 GMT 17 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] ROK President Kim Yong-sam and Kazakhstan President Nursultan A. Nazarbayev agreed to strengthen their friendly relations and to promote cooperation in such areas as trade, investment, cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries.

As a result of the summit meeting, the two heads of state issued a joint communique saying that the two countries will conclude agreements on double taxation avoidance, investment protection, and other necessary agreements as soon as possible.

The two heads of state exchanged views on the situation in the CIS countries and in the Northeast Asian region. ROK President Kim Yong-sam highly evaluated Kazakhstani efforts to maintain the nuclear nonproliferation regime, while President Nazarbayev expressed firm support for the realization of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, which was agreed between South and North Korea in 1992.

Talks Resume With Uzbeks on Gas Deliveries

954F2301A *Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian* 11 May 95 p 8

[Article by Rustam Dzhevdetov: "Kazakhstan Waits For Cheap Uzbek Gas. Obstacles on the Path to Central Asian Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Negotiations

As our SEGODNYA correspondent learned in Tashkent, negotiations between delegations of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the question of further deliveries of Uzbek gas, interrupted in the middle of April, were resumed at the beginning of May.

Uzbekistan has already temporarily halted deliveries of gas to Kazakhstan several times: first in the autumn of 1993 and then in the spring of 1994 and 1995. This peculiar method of economic pressure is not new in Central Asia. The practice of cutting off the gas supply was begun by Turkmenistan, which produces more gas than all the rest of the countries of the region. The victims of the closing of the "gas valve" in turn were Georgia, Armenia, and Ukraine. Unlike Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan supplies gas to its neighbors—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Because of the system of distribution of energy sources that developed in the former USSR,

Uzbekistan supplied the region while Turkmen gas was used for the rest of the territory.

In spite of the repeated conclusion of agreements for gas deliveries from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in exchange for return deliveries of goods, the gas continues to be shut off periodically. Countries of Central Asia are experiencing serious economic difficulties and frequently are not able to pay for the delivery of gas. This problem is aggravated especially during the fall and winter period when gas consumption increases and the corresponding payment is not made.

The countries of Central Asia have a "raw material economy" and they all produce approximately the same products: oil, gas, cotton, nonferrous and precious metals. At the same time the main processing centers are located far outside this region. These states are actually competitors and in spite of their declared desire for cooperation, they can hardly be real partners.

It is obvious that each of the countries of Central Asia is relying on various allies (Turkmenistan—on Iran and Turkey, Kazakhstan—on Russia, and Kyrgyzstan—on Turkey and Western Europe). Partners in investment projects are selected correspondingly. And Uzbekistan, having managed to change partners repeatedly in four years of independence, has as a result arrived at the idea of a special "Uzbek" path.

In this situation the future of the idea of a Central Asian association, which was put forth by the president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev in January 1993 and supported by Askar Akayev and Islam Karimov, seems doubtful. This plan envisioned a unified customs and tax space, free movement of goods and services, and the creation of a unified settlement center for the three Central Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan). Initially this idea evoked something like enthusiasm in political circles of the region. A year later, in January 1994, the three countries even signed an agreement for the creation of a unified economic space, declaring special and closer integration of their economies within the framework of the CIS.

But even the first months after the conclusion of the agreement showed that its implementation was practically impossible. An association presupposes some loss of sovereignty, and the local political elite do not want that. Relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are fairly complex (mainly because of the open antipathy between the presidents). And relations between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are far from ideal.

Thus the very term "Central Asia" means simply a group of states that are geographically close but quite dissimilar to one another. Therefore it is quite probable

that the countries of the region will continue in the future to pursue economic policies aimed in different directions.

Slovak Delegation Continues Cooperation Talks

LD1805185295 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian 1100 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kazakh-Slovak talks were held today at the Kazakh Ministry of Industry and Trade. Relations between Kazakhstan and Slovakia are now at a new qualitative level. At today's official meeting, at which the Kazakh side was represented by Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Sobolev, and the Slovak side by deputy prime minister and finance minister Sergej Kozlik, issues of bilateral cooperation were discussed. Both countries are interested in joint projects and developments in the spheres of industry and trade. The issue of lifting visa requirements between Slovakia and Kazakhstan was also discussed.

Kazakhstan is interested in investments from Slovakia and in joint banking projects.

The Slovak delegation will continue work with its Kazakh colleagues tomorrow.

Trade, Scientific Agreements Signed

LD1805211595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1711 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Almaty, May 18 (INTERFAX) — On Thursday in Almaty, Slovakia's and Kazakhstan's delegations signed an intergovernmental agreement on trade-economic and scientific-technical cooperation.

The parties have now started working out documents on mutual protection of investments and on avoidance of dual taxation, Slovakia's Vice Prime Minister Sergej Kozlik reported to journalists.

According to Kazakhstan's Vice Prime Minister Viktor Sobolev, in 1994 foreign trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Slovakia totalled \$21 million. Three joint ventures engaged in middle-man activities have been registered in Kazakhstan.

**Alleged Parliamentary Election Irregularities
Examined**

954F2298A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 31, 30 Apr-7 May 95 p 14

[Article by Leonid Nikitinskiy, MOSKOVSKIYE
NOVOSTI special correspondent: "The Journalist
Against the Central Electoral Commission"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow-Almaty—Political
events in Kazakhstan have resonated not just in the
CIS, but in the West as well. Is there a real threat of
authoritarianism in this republic?

The vote-of-confidence referendum on President
Nazarbayev was preceded by a brilliant maneuver that
ended in the presidential edict "On the Establishment
of a Commission on Job Placement and Assistance to
Former Deputies."

In this grand game that has been under way exactly one
year, only one person has been playing fairly. Journalist
Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya, about whom quite a bit has
already been written, confirmed in a meeting I had with
her in Almaty that she had decided to take part in the
elections at the outset of 1994 more as a journalistic
experiment than anything else. But as newer and newer
obstacles were placed in her path, a passion overtook
her and, if you will, a sense of justice being flouted.

Kvyatkovskaya went to the Constitutional Court of
Kazakhstan after the election results were published.
Deputy rayon administration head Adilbekov was de-
clared the victor in Almaty's Abylaykhanovskiy Elec-
toral District, although preliminary results by precinct
showed that Kvyatkovskaya had a large lead. Neither
the Central Electoral Commission nor the district com-
mission showed her documents confirming something
to the contrary.

Here it is necessary to clarify exactly what Kazakhstan's
Constitutional Court is. This body was confirmed by the
previous Supreme Council of the republic without any
particular complications on 2 July 1992, consisting of
12 individuals recommended by President Nazarbayev.
A significant number of the Constitutional Court judges
previously worked in the administrative organs section
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Kazakhstan under Kairbek Suleymenov—presently state
adviser on matters of legal policy, a man close to
Nazarbayev.

The Constitutional Court engaged in fairly intensive
activity as it began its work. In particular, it waged
a protest against the law on the minimum consumer
basket, which turned out to be less than the subsistence
minimum.

The authorities could not be favorably disposed to-
wards such "unsanctioned" activity. The new Consti-
tution therefore significantly curtailed the powers of the
Constitutional Court. First and foremost, the court was
denied the right to accept a case on its own initiative.
And another stipulation was made, an extremely im-
portant one in light of the "Kvyatkovskaya case": If a
dubious enactment were to be repealed by the organ that
originally issued it, this would automatically terminate
applicable proceedings in the Constitutional Court.

Following these new procedures, Deputy Constitutional
Court Chairman Igor Rogov complained, the court
found itself pushed aside from significant events. The
Constitutional Court desperately needed a "big case."
The Kvyatkovskaya affair promised to be exactly that—
but not as big as finally turned out. Whereas originally
the matter dealt with Almaty's Abylaykhanovskiy Elec-
toral District alone, as case matters progressed, aspects
of far from local significance rose to the surface.

The grossly unequal slicing of electoral districts came to
light, for example—with almost 91,000 people having
the right to vote in Abylaykhanovskiy District, to 30,000
in Auezovskiy, and 17,000 in Baykonurskiy. During the
final stage of events, the secret letter of Kazakhstan's
Central Electoral Commission was revealed, which
prescribed that all names not crossed out on election
ballots would be considered votes cast "for" (instead
of such ballots being declared invalid). As a result, in
Abylaykhanovskiy District, where 58,567 voters went to
the polls, the number of votes cast for various candidates
was...84,384. Naturally, such a methodology of tallying
the vote could not help but influence the overall election
results.

The critical moment in the "Kvyatkovskaya case" came
last February, when the Central Electoral Commission
cast doubt (and perhaps justly so) on the right of the
Constitutional Court to assess specific violations com-
mitted during the course of the election. In response,
the Constitutional Court broke the Kvyatkovskaya ac-
tion down into two cases: on the one hand—the "law-
applicable" case, and on the other—that related to the
appeal of normative documents of the Central Electoral
Commission. The "law-applicable aspect," threatening
certain people with criminal liability for forgery, was
put on the back burner in expectation of clarification by
the Supreme Council (which can hardly be expected to
act now). But the finale regarding the second part be-
came entirely apparent. In Kvyatkovskaya's words, back
in the fall of 1994 she predicted that when Nazarbayev
had his fill of this Supreme Council, her proceedings
would turn out to be most opportune. I recall that viola-
tions in the March elections in Kazakhstan were noted
as well by CSCE observers, but at that time the pres-

ident angrily rejected their claims. One year later that bomb exploded, and the explosion came at precisely the time when such would be advantageous to the president.

During the course of the "Kvyatkovskaya case," the Central Electoral Commission had sufficient time to itself repeal the letter on methodology for tallying the vote. According to the strange rules operating in the Constitutional Court of Kazakhstan, this might possibly have suppressed further examination of the case. In addition, it might have been possible to simply declare the results of the voting invalid in several districts, so as not to apply this conclusion to all of them. For some reason, however, the Central Electoral Commission failed to take advantage of these opportunities. The subsequent decision of the Constitutional Court of Kazakhstan looks somewhat suspicious—that in the absence of the parliament, the president could adopt edicts which have the force of law. It is this that permitted Nazarbayev to announce the referendum on extending his own authority, when it would have been possible to announce a referendum on the new constitution with simultaneous elections to the new parliament and thereby attempt to emerge from the crisis in a more democratic way. But the Kazakhstan president preferred to proceed not along the "Yeltsin" path, but rather down the "Karimov" path.

Nonetheless, the situation in Kazakhstan does not lend itself to definitive evaluation. No one will risk asserting that democracy has won out here, at least not at this stage of history. On the other hand, no matter what the Constitutional Court has been using to guide its actions, its influence has increased sharply. And from the point of view of law-and-order consciousness, this is without a doubt a positive aspect. Thus, the "Kvyatkovskaya case" has precedent-making significance not just for Kazakhstan, but for the practice of constitutional law in general.

Physicist on Nuclear-Powered Engine for Spacecraft
954F2286A *Almaty PANORAMA in Russian*
13 May 95 No 19, p 3

[Interview with physicist Ivan Fidik, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, by N.M.; place and date not given: "Research To Create a Nuclear-Powered Engine for the Spacecraft of the Future Is Being Conducted in Kurchatov"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The well-known physicist Ivan Fidik, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who answered PANORAMA's questions, took part in a ceremony devoted to the 20th anniversary of the startup of the IVG-1 reactor which was held recently in Kurchatov (see PANORAMA Nos 17 and 18).

[N.M.] Ivan Ivanovich, PANORAMA is aware of the development at the research centers of the Semipalatinsk Test Range of nuclear-powered rocket engines.

[Fidik] The far-reaching nature of the problem of nuclear-powered rocket engines (NRE) and its dimensions require very great expenditure. Neither Kazakhstan nor Russia have such resources at the present time. And even the world community cannot permit itself to embark immediately on realization of the immense task that was set 30-40 years ago—the conquest of near and outer space. But what was obtained as a result of the creation of the first nuclear-powered rocket engine, namely, the development of high-temperature technology, undoubtedly made and is now making a big contribution to the development of other directions of science and technology. For instance, it was thanks to NRE that the techniques of high-temperature gas-cooled VGTR reactors, which in terms of their design and technology are practically safe, were born; new high-temperature materials based on carbides, nitrides, and such, which made it possible to further advance various branches of mechanical engineering, were created; and many metallo-optical elements based on ceramic materials and such were created. The mere fact that at the Kurchatov reactor we were able to surmount the 3,000 degrees Kelvin barrier may be noted as a very high scientific achievement. In the creation of similar engines the Americans, for example, were unable to exceed 2,500 degrees Kelvin, which reduces appreciably the quality of their NRE development. Now, when we have already reached the 3,500 degrees Kelvin threshold, this cannot fail to evoke heightened interest on the part of foreign specialists, and we have concluded many contracts for demonstrating the behavior of certain materials at extreme temperatures.

[N.M.] It is known that foreigners, particularly of the United States, are displaying an interest in our NRE efforts, and it would seem that even the latter were intent on buying this technology from us. Why, then, have our atomic scientists now also ceased active work on NRE?

[Fidik] I would say that this is an economic problem. We have obtained such an immense amount of material that it has to be reinterpreted. We are somewhat ahead of time: Even having built such NRE at this time, it is impossible to avail ourselves of them since—the simplest example—we do not yet know how to create complete life support for man in space for a prolonged period. In addition, the entire warning system has not been created, the corresponding space-launch vehicles have not been created.... There is still a mass of problems here!

Repeated meetings were held with the Americans, and individual contracts were concluded. In terms of the materials we are, generally, ahead, but they have embarked on the next mission—the creation of bimodal devices, that is, engines which would perform additionally the role of power units for the cosmonauts.

[N.M.] Has there not been a moment here when we have simply blabbed out or sold for a pittance some know-how of ours?

[Fidik] During all contacts and in trade—let's call these contracts this—such a problem has been taken into account particularly and examined by a special commission. I can therefore state that we have not thus far handed over to them a single piece of valuable material. It is impossible to steal our technology even as a result simply of a visual examination, and for this reason we consider the information losses minimal. As a result of their visits, foreign scientists have obtained merely visual confirmation of our achievements, and this also is of considerable importance for the researcher. As for all the rest, we adhere strictly to secrecy.

[N.M.] As far as I understand it, certain results achieved in the work on NRE are being used also in the creation of the International Thermonuclear Energy Reactor (ITER), in the international project concerning which Kazakhstan is taking part as an associate member of the Russian Federation. How realistic can the contribution of our republic to the realization of this project be and what might this do for us?

[Fidik] Yes, individual aspects of research in NRE are undoubtedly very important in the creation of the ITER, but I would not care to talk about this in detail at this time since this international project itself (being conducted as principal participants by the United States, the Russian Federation, the European Community, and Japan, and also Canada, as an associate member of the European Union, and Kazakhstan, of the Russian Federation) has undergone and possibly has still to undergo a multitude of changes. The unification of efforts was required on account of the very great cost of the project (a sum total of \$6 billion was cited at the conference, in particular—N.M.), but the participants are afforded access to all the information and all the latest technology in this sphere and allowed to have lead roles in science—you understand what immense dividends may be derived from this. Kazakhstan's contribution to the project could be very considerable: You already have processes for obtaining superconductors and nuclear fuel, and the production of ultra-pure beryllium and such is practically ready.

[N.M.] Contact with our scientists has left me with a sense of some separation of them from real life and the

impression that they do not know how to apply their research efforts in practice, if only to obtain financial resources for further research.... Could you allay such doubts or is this typical of scientists?

[Fidik] I would like not to allay these doubts but to explain why this is the case. We are still far from the Western technological society, which frequently approaches high scientific research also with an aspiration even at the intermediate stage to obtain some specific benefit. If we reach a level of the technological society at which, merely embarking on research, we are forced to determine in advance where we stand as regards various sources of financing, plan the project's cost recovery, and such, we will see how science, production, and even commerce merge. We lacked this in the past, and there were many gaps in this chain. Research at random in and of itself and separate production without economic expediency and without a study of people's need for science and technology are becoming unproductive and inefficient. The technological society anticipates in advance what and how much it will invest at the entrance and what kind of information and knowledge it will obtain at the exit. If such a system is lacking, it is better not to begin any research efforts—such should be official policy.

Kyrgyzstan

Government Presidium Approved; Premier Named

LD1805190295 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio Network
in Russian 1315 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The government has adopted a resolution on the presidium of the Government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, in which the structure of the presidium was approved.

It includes:

Apas Dzhumagulovich Dzhumagulov: prime minister of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan;

Abdyzhabar Tagayev: first deputy prime minister;

Dzhumgalbek Amanbayev, Osmon Ibraimov, and Aleksandr Moiseyev: deputy prime ministers;

Orozmat Abdukhalikov: head of the apparatus of the government, with the status of minister;

Anarbek Kuramayevich Bakayev: chairman of the State Committee for National Security;

Andrey Iordan: minister of trade, industry, and enterprise;

Talaybek Koychumanov: minister of economy;

Colonel Madalbek Moldashev: minister of internal affairs;

Amangeldy Muraliyev: chairman of the State Committee for the Management of State Property, minister;

Kemelbek Nanayev: acting finance minister;

Roza Isakovna Otunbayeva: minister of foreign affairs;

Yan Fisher: chairman of the State Committee for Emergencies, minister.

Article Criticizes Local Bias Against Muslims

LD1805201395 Bishkek RES PUBLICA in Russian
16 May 95 p 2

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] **I want to become a Christian**

A large group of young people turned to the Naryn regional justice department with just such an unusual, indeed sensational, application. They represent various sectors of the population and have until now professed Islam. Many of them are unemployed, others are dissatisfied with the policy of the current authorities, and yet others are discontented with the activities of the teeming numbers of Muslim clergymen. The families of the applicants are eking out a miserable existence and are in a desperate state.

All of these objective and subjective factors prompted members of the sect to turn to the authorities with this application. It characterizes Islam as a backward and inhuman religion without hope. The application also speaks about the severity of certain suras of the Koran.

Contrary to the expectations of the sect, consisting of 37 people, they were refused registration. They were given no reason, but were even mildly threatened and put to shame because of their Muslim origin. In this way the representatives of the current authorities demonstrated again their adherence to "democratic" principles. However, this time their actions were dictated by a stereotypical nature. [passage omitted]

It is precisely the economic hardship and desperate situation these people find themselves in, as well as the inactivity of Muslim priests, which made the young people decide to apply to the organizations of justice. In addition, humanitarian aid is constantly being granted to evangelical sects (regardless of whether they are registered or not) by Western countries, mainly by Germany. Developed Muslim countries are not yet able to control the situation. Moreover, Muslim clergymen are also displaying sluggishness and indecisiveness in solving religious problems among young people. In addition, they themselves often violate the teachings and suras of the holy Koran.

Until now, many large and small mosques have been built on the territory of the region, but they have not yet had a tangible affect on local Muslim societies and the mosques remain empty. It is difficult to meet anyone among local young people who knows or reads the Koran. What can young people do if not all the old people know the religious customs, funeral rites and prayers?

The population of Naryn region is made up mainly of Kyrgyz who profess Islam. There is not a single Christian church or prayer house on the territory of the region. The local Christian diaspora is forced to go to Bishkek for religious rites. Local authorities pay no attention to this burning problem. Despite this, as it has become known, the number of Christian followers is growing, and evangelical sects are being set up in various places, overcoming the resistance of the local authorities.

The problem deserves serious attention because unemployment, crime, and other social vices are growing. It is not religious conviction which guides many young people, but the temptation of receiving free aid and other means of existence, and this must be a matter of concern to the authorities and law enforcement bodies. The solution to this problem depends on the resolution of economic problems. That is why it is necessary to do battle with the economic problems and not with the young people who are currently hostage to all the problems. No matter what happened, the actions of the Naryn representatives of justice cannot be justified in any way, because they have scandalously violated elementary human rights and constitutional norms, and are continuing to be led by the nose by Muslim fundamentalists and fanatics.

How can they not understand that prohibitory measures can only aggravate the problem?

Tajikistan

Rakhmonov Hopes For Progress in Talks With Opposition

LD1805185195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1606 GMT 18 May 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No. 92 (836); compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov and Andrey Petrovskiy; edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Emomali Rakhmonov and leader of the opposition Islamic Revival Movement Sayed Abdullo Nuri will hold a second round of talks in Kabul today after failing to make a breakthrough in the first round on Wednesday [17 May].

Yesterday's meeting, the first of kind between Rakhmonov and Nuri since the outbreak of civil war in 1992, was aimed to produce a policy of actions to bring an early solution to the conflict.

Rakhmonov praised Afghan President Borhanoddin Rabbani for arranging the dialogue.

He spoke of pinning great hopes on the Rabbani-sponsored talks and for a major breakthrough expected by the two neighboring countries and the region as a whole.

One of the opposition leaders, Akbar Turajonzoda, described yesterday's round as marking progress in government-opposition relations. He said the fact that the two bitter enemies of the recent past should agree for talks "instills hopes for a peaceful future of the country."

However, Turajonzoda also admitted to a lack of progress in the Wednesday round.

He said the two leaders discussed how to defuse tension in Gorny Badakhshan, arrange the repatriation of refugees and ensure that the interim ceasefire agreement sticks.

In an interview with Interfax, Turajonzoda reaffirmed that there were underground groups of opposition members inside Tajikistan who "will be used as a leverage to bring pressure on Dushanbe if need be."

However, he denied a security ministry report about the detention of a clandestine opposition group planning a series of terrorist attacks against the government. IF Note: The security and interior ministries in a joint statement last week announced having cracked down on an opposition terrorist group which has been active since last October. A large amount of weapons and ammunition, camouflage uniform, and portable radio transmitters.

Police officials said bomb disposal experts defused a rocket mounted on the rooftop of a high-storey apartment building, hundreds of meters away from the presidential palace.

They said that a series of attacks were carried out on key facilities and members of the law enforcement bodies, the CIS peacekeeping force and Russia's 201st motorized division.

Turajonzoda described the statement as an attempt to portray the opposition movement as a terrorist organization. He denied that rebel units had ever chosen civilian facilities or any individual as a target.

He claimed that the opposition had been gaining more supporters in its struggle with the government within and without the country. "The opposition will never

allow to be a toy in the hands of other states or help destroy the country", Turajonzoda said.

He said Dushanbe must realize its position was untenable and make constructive steps on the road of a peaceful solution to the internal conflict.

At the same time, Turajonzoda denied any opposition plans for serious military operations against Dushanbe.

Opposition Leader: Field Commanders Under Control

*LD1805114195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1024 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KABUL, May 18 (Interfax) — There is no rift in opposition ranks and all field commanders are under control by the opposition leadership, deputy head of the opposition Islamic Revival Movement Akbar Turajonzoda told Interfax in Kabul on Thursday.

However, he admitted to incidents of insubordination by some commanders in the past but they had either been dismissed or left themselves. Turajonzoda said the rebel units were well-disciplined now.

On the fate of former commander-in-chief of opposition forces Rezvon Sodirov, he said Sodirov had been suspended on charges of office abuse but would be reinstated if these were found to be false.

Opposition Leader on Possible Pressuring of Dushanbe Regime

*LD1805114495 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1024 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KABUL, May 18 (Interfax) — There are clandestine, specially trained opposition groups operating in Tajikistan. "If needed, they can be used for pressuring the regime in Dushanbe," one of the Tajik opposition leaders Akbar Turajonzoda declared in an exclusive interview with Interfax on Thursday.

At the same time, he flatly refuted reports by the republic's Security Ministry that a clandestine opposition group belonging to Tajikistan's Islamic Revival Movement had been detained in Dushanbe in early May for carrying out terrorism against the leadership of that Central Asian republic.

"The opposition regards the spread of such information by Tajikistan's special services as an attempt to make the world community, in particular Russia, believe that it is a terrorist organization," he stressed. "Our armed groups have never carried out any terrorist acts against civilian targets nor against individuals, nor do they intend to perpetrate such acts," noted Turajonzoda.

He pointed out that "in its struggle against the Tajik government, the opposition has been winning over to its side more and more supporters both inside and outside the republic." However, Turajonzoda stressed, "the opposition will never be a pawn for other states, nor will it contribute to the destruction of their homeland."

"Dushanbe should realize that since it is in a hopeless situation, it should constructively act in earnest toward resolving the inter-Tajik conflict by peaceful political means," he remarked, adding that the opposition, for its part, does not plan and will not plan major military operations against Dushanbe.

Tajik Conflict Players Viewed

MM1805161395 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 May 95 p 3

[Report by Boris Vinogradov: "Who Is Fighting and For What in Tajikistan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dushanbe-Moscow — A meeting is taking place in Kabul between Tajikistan President Emomali Rakhmonov and opposition leader Said Abdullo Nuri, chairman of the Islamic Rebirth Movement. This is the Tajiks' first attempt to reach agreement at this level.

The main questions which are being discussed in Kabul are the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and measures to stabilize it. There is no point in hoping for a rapid, coordinated decision. Sometimes even specialists cannot understand the subtleties of the situation which has taken shape. And this when the Russian border guards and CIS collective peacekeeping forces are acting as the main guarantors of security in Tajikistan.

Stereotypes and Paradoxes

A major from the 201st motorized rifle division in Dushanbe frankly admitted: "I have been here for two years now but I still cannot understand who we are for and who is fighting whom." The mental confusion as a mirror of our presence in Tajikistan seems overwhelming when you are talking not only of the peacemakers but also of the diplomats. Here the absurdity of the current moment becomes increasingly obvious.

On the night when the mujahedin attacked the CIS border guards in Badakhshan and killed 17 men Darko Silovic, head of the UN mission in Dushanbe, telephoned the Russian Embassy and demanded "an end to the atrocity." Ambassador Mecheslav Senkavich commented, dumbfounded, that he was telephoning the wrong person. By the morning U.S. ambassador Escud-

ero had expressed solidarity with his Russian counterpart and had accused the opposition.

Helicopters of the collective peacekeeping forces ship flour from Ismaili Imam Aga Khan IV to the Pamir and at the same time bomb those to whom they are giving the flour.

The border guards have dug in at the posts and are maintaining all-round defense. The peacekeepers are looked on askance and with hatred and the attitude toward them is expressed in the words: "They would be better off near Kurgan camping in the field." The war does not affect the collective peacekeeping forces but the legalized neutrality seems to doom them to inaction. But the mujahedin are being hit with aviation and rocket artillery on both sides of the Pyandzh.

The opposition claims that Dushanbe has violated the Tehran agreement by opening four additional posts near Khorog. But over the past four months there has not been a single day when the gunmen of this opposition have not broken across the border weapon in hand. This year alone over 170 violations have been recorded.

One can talk endlessly of the paradoxes in which Tajik reality is so rich. And I understand that major who in two years of this reality had become confused about everything. I also understand those Tajiks who curse the analysts in their offices who have only a vague idea of what a "jihad" or a "dushman" is. Primitive arguments do not always mean clarity of thought.

The newspaper stereotype explaining the thrust of the Tajik drama as a "playground dispute" is alive to this day. At best something else has been remembered — the struggle between the party nomenklatura and the embryonic democracy.

Hello, Bochai [meaning unknown] Salamsho!

A surprise was expected in the spring from Gornyy Badakhshan, where the gunmen have gathered. The region, which occupies an area almost half the size of Tajikistan, is convenient to the opposition. The high mountains, the border with Afghanistan, full of holes, the weak central power or rather the total absence of power, create ideal conditions for the concentration of forces and the creation of a bridgehead. It is not for nothing that Said Abdullo Nuri, the head of the "government in exile," in his directive to the Badakhshan field commanders sets the task of the region's secession.

But the real ruler of Badakhshan is one Salam Mukhabatov, who sits as governor general in Vanch. All the others are either directly subordinate to him or depend on him. However strange it may seem, the humanitarian

aid delivered through the government and international organizations one way or another falls into the hands of the terrible Salam.

It is already an open secret that the food delivered under the guard of the collective peacekeeping forces to Badakhshan is used to feed the cutthroats of Field Commander Dzhunaydullo, who have attacked the Russian posts in January and April. At the time notes were found on the decapitated corpses of four border guards reading: "New Year gift for Yeltsin." Food arrives in Vanch and Izgulem in the same manner to this day.

Never mind food. Military materiel is coming in. It has been established that during the April attacks the gunmen launched rockets from batteries brought into Vanch for economic purposes. Dzhunaydullo is the brother of Rezvon Sadirov, who until recently held the post of commander of the opposition armed forces. Bases are situated in the Afghan city of Darvaz adjacent to the border.

Salam has dealt and continues to deal no less freely with the Russian generals. It is true that since the April events the border guards have ceased to call him to a frank talk. But willy-nilly the collective peacekeeping forces must reckon with him. They are flying to Badakhshan and landing at sites surrounded by mujahedin. Salamsho must be approached with a smile with your right hand on your heart.

The last meeting between Collective Peacekeeping Forces commander Valeriy Patrikeyev and Salam, chairman of the "Gornyy Badakhshan jihad council," took place not long before his detachments attacked the border guards. The details of this unforced talk were told to be in Dushanbe by eyewitnesses. Patrikeyev called it "a meeting between two commanders: and urged peace on his counterpart.

Specter of "Tajikization"

At the recent council of CIS countries' defense ministers in Moscow Pavel Grachev was not delighted by Patrikeyev's diplomatic activity. Even greater anger on the subject was expressed to Boris Yeltsin by Andrey Nikolayev, director of the Federal Border Service.

Grachev was far angrier at the request from the new Tajik defense minister, General Khaydullayev, to give more weapons to the young army. "But where has it all gone," the head of the Russian military department said, quivering. Where it has gone is utterly unknown. But the last inventory at the Tajikistan combat materiel depots showed that several thousand assault rifles, light machineguns, and other weapons were missing. A special commission has been created in Dushanbe which is studying the "shortage" and also ascertaining the

sources of revenue of former defense minister Aleksandr Shishlyannikov.

There was talk that the weapons had been sold "on the side," in particular to Uzbekistan, and the money had disappeared. The national army as the guarantor of security, having recruited 11,500 soldiers to its ranks in two years, is on starvation rations.

Actually, I was told in Dushanbe, right now it is far more important to have stronger forces in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Security. Which is what they are doing. In the department of Yakub Salimov, the republic's chief militiaman, about 25,000 men are under arms. In the security ministry the figure is slightly smaller but the selection of recruits to serve on the border is under way at a brisk pace.

Already the Tajiks are independently guarding many sectors of the border and their numbers reach 80 percent among the Russian border troops. As a rule they are the ones who take on the brunt of the fighting against the opposition detachments. And it must be said that the figures for losses confirm this. Of 42 border guards who died during the recent events the majority were Tajiks.

At the same time Boris Yeltsin, noting that the Tajik-Afghan border is "the border of Russia and the entire CIS," promised Andrey Nikolayev every support on "the moral and material plane." As for the Collective Peacekeeping Forces, to all appearances they are to expand the zone of control and advance into the Pamir, to Communism peak itself, dividing the warring sides.

In principle Piris Ramiro-Ballon [name as transliterated], the UN secretary general's special envoy, agrees to "peacekeeping expansion" but only under the CIS flag. If this happens and the 201st division enters Badakhshan the Russian Army and its allies in Tajikistan will be face to face with Salam and his brother Rezvon and others.

All Power to the Jihad Soviet?

According to intelligence reports Rezvon, who is, incidentally, the former bodyguard of Akbar Turendzhon-zoda, the head of the opposition delegation at the inter-Tajik consultations in Moscow, was dismissed a few days ago. Said Abdullo Buri described his actions as "discrediting the opposition" and running counter to a "unified strategy." And in the face of this Afghan Defense Minister Almad Shah Masud kept Rezvon for a couple of weeks in the Taloqan prison for "disobedience."

On 15 April Rezvon withdrew his detachments from Taloqan to the North and made an appeal to the field commanders. The appeal says that the Tajik opposition's

struggle has reached the point where he, Rezvon, cannot remain any longer with Nuri because he sees no point in political dialogue. "Brother Mujahedin," he writes, "all those who hold dear the ideas of the nation's liberation, come over to my side."

Nuri has recognized the split in the Tajikistan Islamic Rebirth Movement but in his address in reply said he holds no grudge against Rezvon since the latter has chosen his own path. The April setbacks on the border when the gunmen lost over 200 men and the quarrels in the opposition have had an oppressive effect on the Badakhshan field commanders. Salam has told Nuri that desertion is acquiring a massive nature. Gunmen are throwing down their weapons and fleeing to Russia.

The Tajikistan Government claims that the strengthening of the border is not a violation and in this it is

supported by the Russian border guards. Akbar Turandzhonzoda is against this approach and apart from anything else is apparently rightly indicating that involving the Dushanbe national army in the March exercises of the Collective Peacekeeping Forces is not part of the accords reached either. Russia, he believes, has flouted the Tehran agreement of 17 September last year.

The best informed man with regard to Tajik affairs — Anatoliy Chechulin, commander of the Russian border guards groups, assesses the situation without optimism. He believes that the jihad leaders do not intend to conduct dialogue seriously and are preparing for aggression across Badakhshan. According to him the processes of the restoration of the groups' combat capability are under way and reserves are being brought up from Afghan territory.

Armenia

President Speaks on Death of ARFD's Manukyan

NC1805190095 Yerevan SNARK in English
1504 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan, MAY 18 (SNARK) — "We will not allow Armenia to turn into Lebanon," stated today President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan in the Parliament after a regular session.

One of Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun (ARFD) members, Artavazd Manukyan, who was under investigation, recently died in jail. He was detained last year and was accused of the case related to the "Dro" secret structure supposedly established within the ARFD. The reason of Manukyan's death was suggested to be included in the agenda of today's session. Meanwhile, the Supreme Council of Armenia voted against including this issue. The President said that he was ready to provide the technical experts of the Supreme Council with the medical results and all types of evidence, in addition to authentic documents on Manukyan's condition before his death.

The President also said that his administration asked the American Embassy to take part in the work of a medical commission, while the Embassy refused.

Ter-Petrosyan blamed the Dashnaks for their attempt to politically terrorize the Republic and create a state of chaos while shifting the blame on the government. According to the President, only part of the "Dro" secret archive has been published. The most important documents will be published in due course. Besides the archive, there are other papers, such as ARFD Bureau Protocols, according to which all its members are responsible for assassinations. Half of the ARFD Central Committee Staff is also blamed for this kind of crime.

Thus, having blamed the ARFD for organizing a number of assassinations, as well as the former Yerevan Mayor Hambardzum Galustyan, Levon Ter-Petrosyan stated that in spite of this he still feels responsible for Manukyan's death. He added that if he had forbidden the Dashnaktsutyun's activity on December 15 and not on the 28th, Hambardzum Galustyan would be alive now. And if he remained silent on December 28, there would have been another 5-6 assassinations during the following months.

ARFD Faction Seeks Review of Prisoner's Death

NC1805140795 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC
NEWS BULLETIN in English 0900 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("Lragir" daily), 05/18/95 — Armenian media reported yesterday about

Artavazd Manukyan's death in the special clinic of the Ministry of Interior. Mr. Manukyan was arrested and charged with collaboration with secret structure "Dro".

ARFD [Armenian Revolutionary Federation—Dashnaktsutyun] faction in RA [Republic of Armenia] parliament proposed to include this issue in the agenda of yesterday's extraordinary session. A claim was made, quoting the relatives of those arrested and charged in relation with Hambardzum Galustyan's murder and "Dro" structure, that illegal methods were applied to force them give evidence. Deputy Hovik Aghazaryan declared that "representatives of Manukyan's relatives, doctors, are not allowed to participate in autopsy or in verification of the details of death". He proposed a draft decision, according to which the Supreme Council Board should create a commission, with equal representation of all political factions, to investigate the health conditions of prisoners charged with being involved in Hambardzum Galustyan's assassination or in operation of the "Dro" structure, and to find out the details of Artavazd Manukyan's death.

The President Levon Ter-Petrosyan declared that he is ready to make a report to clarify the case. Responding to declaration of deputy Rubik Hakobyan (who said that Mr. Manukyan was assassinated) the President noted "I believe this was a responsible declaration, and you should provide serious explanations about it".

Nevertheless, the problem has not been included in the agenda so far, as no voting was carried out yesterday.

National Security Acting Chief Resigns

NC1805140095 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC
NEWS BULLETIN in English 0900 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("Lragir", "Azg", "Hayastani Hanrapetutyun" dailies), 05/18/95 — Acting head of RA [Republic of Armenia] State Department on National Security [SDNS] Davit Shahnazaryan resigned yesterday.

Presidential press service reported that Levon Ter-Petrosyan accepted resignation. According to "Lragir", the president also removed Shahnazaryan's first deputy Gurgen Yeghiazaryan. The daily speculates that resignation is probably related with the death of Artavazd Manukyan, who was imprisoned by SDNS and charged with relations of ARFD [Armenian Revolutionary Federation—Dashnaktsutyun] secret faction "Dro".

"Azg" reports that head of SDNS press service yesterday rejected the information of "Past" agency, telling that the death of Artavazd Manukyan is in no way related with State Department on National Security. Mr. Manukyan has only been in SDNS from February 28 till March 2,

and was then moved to the investigation isolator of the Ministry of Interior. At the same time there are rumors that resignation was caused by more thorough reasons, and it simply coincided with Mr. Manukyan's death. "Lragir" continues that the reason could have been Davit Shahnazaryan-Vazgen Sargsisyan struggle for power and influence.

The President Ter-Petrosyan assigned Defense Minister Serzh Sargsisyan as the head of RA State Department on National Security. Davit Shahnazaryan remains President's Envoy on Special Assignments. At the same time, President assigned Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Mikayel Harutyunyan as RA Acting Minister of Defense.

Azerbaijan

Nuclear Parts Said Shipped to Iran via Armenia

NC1805192695 Baku TURAN in English
1457 GMT 18 May 95

["Nuclear Alliance Russia-Armenia-Iran"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow (May 18) TURAN—The credible sources from Moscow told TURAN that currently the Russian Government works out the technical issues concerning delivery of nuclear components to Iran for construction of reactor in Bushehr. The same source said that the route of the delivery will be laid through Armenia.

During the visit of President Bill Clinton to Moscow from May 8 to 9 President Boris Yeltsin said that Russia will insert corrections in the deal with Tehran. He said that Russia will not deliver technology and equipment, which can be used for production of nuclear weapons, to Iran. However, the sources from Moscow say that Russia refused from the plan for preparation of the specialists in the field of nuclear energy for Iran. [sentence as received] The Chief of Russian State Nuclear Supervision Department, Yuriy Vishnevskiy, said that the Ministry of Atomic Energy intends to deliver gas centrifuges for concentration of uranium to Iran. It will allow Iran to produce splitting materials for production of nuclear weapons. The experts say that Russia does not even stop at the fact Iran is insolvent and it will hardly be able pay \$800 million for completion of reactors construction in Bushehr.

This way, Moscow does not refuse from deliveries of the components, which can be used for production of nuclear weapons, to Iran.

At the same time, Russia takes into account the necessity of deliveries of the equipment to Armenia for restoration of Metsamor Atomic Electric Station. Under cover of deliveries to Armenia, which are necessary for

"lifting of the energy blockade from this suffering country", Moscow plans to transport nuclear freights to Iran secretly. In this aspect, the Irani-Armenian rapprochement and the visits of Armenians officials to Armenia, which has become more frequent, are not accidental.

Recently INTERFAX agency reported that the Russian Atomic Department intends to sign the contract concerning deliveries of three additional atomic stations to Iran. The cost of the deal will total approximately \$2 billion.

Baku To 'Strictly Observe' Karabakh Truce

LD1805214195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1943 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, May 18 (Interfax) — Azerbaijan intends to strictly observe the ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh and refrain from any concentration of forces along the frontline, according to a statement of the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry published in Baku Thursday.

The statement described Yerevan's reports of concentration of Azerbaijani troops along the confrontation line as a "propaganda campaign on the eve of a large-scale Armenian offensive."

The ministry stated that the Armenian command intended to soon "carry out an operation to seize inhabited localities in the Khanlar and Geranboi districts of Azerbaijan."

"If Armenia breaches the ceasefire and disrupts the next stage of negotiations underway, it will bear responsibility for the future developments," according to the statement.

Georgia

Shevardnadze, IMF Mission Chief Hold Talks

LD1805204795 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network
in Georgian 1700 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The head of state's press secretariat has supplied us with a report by the KONTAKT news agency saying that the head of the IMF mission to Georgia, Shardiman Valavi, praised Georgia at a meeting with head of state Eduard Shevardnadze today, when assessing the current reforms in the country. Much has been done recently: Inflation is stable, the coupon's exchange rate has stabilized, the policy of repayment is being carried out in accordance with the existing agreement, and a strict financial policy is being carried out on the basis of the IMF reports.

Taking into consideration the current positive developments in Georgia, the IMF mission has put forward an initiative for a meeting in Washington to offer the donor states to restructure the foreign debts, after which the IMF, at a session of executive directors, will raise the issue of allocating to Georgia the second half of the debt for assisting the systematic transformation, as well as allocating the stand-by credit.

When assessing the reforms under way in Georgia, Valavi praised efforts by Georgian Health Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze, and noted that the IMF would try to assist fully the reforms in the health system. He added that funds would be allocated for special projects. The head of state thanked Mr. Valavi for his assistance.

Opposition Groups Form Consultative Board

AU1805124995 Tbilisi AKHALI TAOBA in Georgian
5 May 95 p 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "A National Consultative Board Has Been Created"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Agreement Between the Persecuted Authorities and the Parliamentary Opposition

Consultations between the persecuted authorities and the parliamentary opposition have been going on for some time now.

On 28 April, as a result of these consultations, consensus was reached on principal issues and a statement by the National Consultative Board [satatbiro] was adopted. It was signed by representatives of society Mukhran Machavariani, Elizbar Javelidze, Nodar Jalaghonia, Akaki Bakradze, Irakli Batishvili, and Vakhtang Bochorishvili, deputies Nodar Natadze, Temur Zhorzholiani, and Gia Khavtasi, persecuted Supreme Council members Guram Absandze, Bezhan Javakhia, Nugzar Molodinashvili, Avtandil Rtskhiladze, and the leaders of various parties and organizations. The collection of signatures is continuing.

The statement says:

— It is essential to put an end to the confrontation between us, which is causing harm to the nation and the country;

— We deem it necessary that we should conduct a political dialogue and elaborate a coordinated strategy to defend the principles of Georgian state independence, for which purpose we are creating a national consultative board.

The activities of the Consultative Board are based on the following fundamental principles:

1. Georgia should become a truly independent and democratic state. All those decisions (including membership of the CIS) that run counter to the will of 98 percent of the Georgian population, which was expressed in the referendum of 31 March 1991, are to be considered null and void.

2. Using all means permitted by diplomatic, political, and international norms, Georgia should ensure, in the shortest period of time, the withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory, as there is no justification whatsoever for their presence on Georgian territory. Proceeding from this, the legalization of Russian bases in Georgia is wholly impermissible, which threatens to involve Georgia in a global war and catastrophe.

3. In spite of our differing attitudes to the authorities that were elected on 28 October 1990, the overthrow of Georgia's legal government by force at the end of 1991 and the beginning of 1992 was a crime against the country's state independence organized by the imperialist forces in charge of the Russian state. We condemn the overthrow of any constitutional authorities by means of force.

4. The equality of all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic and religious affiliation, should be guaranteed in the Constitution. The persecution and imprisonment of citizens on account of their political beliefs is impermissible. There should be an immediate end to political terror. We are struggling to defend human rights, save and free political prisoners, and protect the mass media from the dictatorship of the governing regime.

5. Our primary task is to restore Georgia's territorial integrity that has been violated as a result of the political course taken by the governing regime and to return all refugees and forcibly displaced persons to their places of residence. With this aim, we are ready to share the recommendations of the world community that will be directed toward the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity as recognized by the UN.

6. We support the establishment of good-neighborly and equal relations with all countries, in particular neighboring states. The reason for Georgia's current most serious political and economic situation is that, in its relations with neighboring states, Georgia's governing regime is resolving questions that are of vital importance to our country to the detriment of the Georgian nation.

7. Our most important task is to change the current economic policy as, under the guise of economic reform, the nation's wealth is being plundered and destroyed and the population is becoming extremely impoverished. We will struggle for the implementation of such a free

economic policy that will promote Georgia's unique geographical situation with regard to all countries, particularly neighboring states.

On 3 May, the members of the Consultative Board informed the public that had gathered in the "Knowledge" assembly hall of the creation of the Consultative Board and read out the official statement signed by them. A significant part of those gathered in the hall responded positively to this fact while some failed to comprehend why one part of the "Roundtable" [radical opposition] was refraining from joining the National Consultative Board. However, Avtandil Rtskhiladze, a member of the persecuted Supreme Council, pointed out that talks were proceeding with "Roundtable" Deputy Speaker Tengiz Kikacheishvili and it was hoped that this question would be resolved positively.

The official statement of the National Consultative Board has already been signed by 22 parties and political organizations while seven parties will decide by Sunday whether they will also sign it or not.

Tbilisi Counts on Russian Help in Abkhazia

MK1805132095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 18 May 95 p 1

[Report by Liana Minasyan under the "Georgia" rubric: "Tbilisi Is Still in Need of Moscow's Help. Russian Peacekeepers on the Inguri River Have Had Little Success as Yet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Russian peacekeeping forces' mandate in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict area formally expired on 15 May. Most likely, however, it will be extended for another half a year at the next summit of the CIS leaders. And probably for the last time. Eduard Shevardnadze, at any rate, is against any "mechanical" actions. "It makes no sense to extend the mandate endlessly. The fact that there is no shooting in the conflict area gives no grounds for optimism — the shooting had already stopped even before the peacekeepers were brought there," he said.

The Russian troops have indeed divided the conflict area post factum — after Georgia lost the war and its troops had been ousted past the Inguri river. The Georgian population followed them or was forcefully expelled.

Today, of course, the prewar status quo would not suit anybody. In Tbilisi, they say that the draft of the future state structure envisions a higher status for Abkhazia than it had formerly as an autonomous republic, and it is suggested to create an "asymmetrical federation." Eduard Shevardnadze says: "If Abkhazia agrees to live in a federal state, it is in its interest to take part in preparing a new Constitution." Incidentally, at the

onset of the conflict, it was Abkhazia that demanded federal relations, but Georgia did not agree. Probably Tengiz Kitovani [former Georgian defense minister] brought troops into Abkhazia, being unable to resist the temptation of solving the problem by force. Now authorities in Tbilisi say that they are for a compromise. As for the people, they will probably be happy with any constitutional wording retaining "territorial integrity."

Abkhazians considered their prewar autonomous status a mere formality and regarded their national representation in the then power bodies as nomenklatura games. Tbilisi proposed no solutions to the problem and had to face a real threat of losing this territory. Therefore, the most important task for Tbilisi is to restore if not a political then a demographic prewar balance. The Georgian authorities are doing their best to bring the Georgian population back to Abkhazia. In so doing, they count on Russian peacekeepers. "Abkhazians must realize that Russia has turned its face to us. Politics is based on force, and the military are the main politicians for us," members of the Georgian administration for Abkhazia say, and Eduard Shevardnadze agrees with them: "It is too expensive for us to ignore Russia's interests. And Georgia cannot do without cooperating with Russia for the next 15 to 20 years." He demands, however, that Russia do more — pursue the policy of a strict blockade and complete isolation of Abkhazia, sticking to the principle of "no relations with separatists."

The blame for the fact that Russia — like a hut on hen's feet [a fairy tale analogy] — used to stand with its face toward Abkhazia and its back toward Georgia is laid here largely on the late President Gamsakhurdia and on the inertia of Moscow's approach to the Georgian problems still persisting after his rule. To overcome this, one is ready to admit that Russia can receive anything it wishes in Abkhazia — but from Georgia.

In the meantime, however, the Russian troops, having settled down in the Inguri area, remain there for the second straight term of their mandate. "There may be a time when I myself can demand that peacekeepers leave — if the situation does not change. But we want the Council of the CIS Leaders to take our arguments into consideration and make the mandate more specific by entrusting the troops with police functions and enlarging their numbers, so that by the end of this year the population could return to the entire Abkhazian territory. Abkhazia cannot argue against specifying the mandate — the essence of the document is to be determined by heads of states," Shevardnadze says.

Meanwhile, in the peacekeepers' area, there are already Georgian guerrilla fighters acting on the Abkhazian Inguri side. Although the territory of Gali Rayon has

long been separated from the battle sites, and its Megrelian [Georgian ethnic group] population showed a neutral stance toward the conflict, today the situation is changing. Members of the local administration, acting "in exile," claim that ever since the peacekeepers began acting roughly there, more peaceful people have died than during the war. Georgians from Gali Rayon are constantly crossing the river — to receive humanitarian aid and to till their land, which remained on the other side. About 200 people have been blown up by mines when crossing that area. Will the refugees try to come home with weapons — and the Georgian authorities warn about this possibility each time there is another wave of indignation over peacekeepers' passiveness? If so, not everybody. The most embittered and desperate ones will take up arms, but most of the people have been scared by war; they are unorganized and are interested only in their survival in the absence of any means of subsistence. Some of the younger generation demonstrates "passive pacifism" by leaving the country because of economic problems and an unwillingness to serve in the army. Even if Georgia — making

use of Russia's benevolence — attempts to speed up the process of equipping and training its army, this would take many years. In addition, there has been no precedent of any mass return of refugees yet, either.

For the time being, even Georgian military observers are not allowed to cross the Inguri. Russian soldiers, controlling the bridge across the river, say that it is mostly peaceful people who go past their posts — mainly Megrelians whose families live on both sides; as for weapons, "they are taken across fords."

The Abkhazians lay antipersonnel and antitank mines in the ford areas and lay barbed wire. They already do not know themselves where the mines are, therefore soldiers prefer not to walk in unknown areas. As for the Abkhazian Guards, they are constantly examining these fords looking for guerrillas. As one peacekeeper lieutenant noted, "We are here on nobody's side — only on ours; and we watch all armed people though gun sights."

Estonia

Further on President Meri's Visit to Finland

'Pleased' With Yeltsin's Remarks

LD1805163195 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1429 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, May 18 (Interfax) — Estonian President Lennart Meri expressed satisfaction on Wednesday with what his Russian counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, said earlier that day about relations between their two countries.

Yeltsin, accepting credentials from the Baltic state's newly appointed ambassador Mart Hellme, expressed the hope that Russian-Estonian relations, which today "are not developing very successfully," would improve through the efforts of both countries. Russia was the first to recognize Estonia's independence, "however unfortunately we have not had any reciprocity," the Russian leader complained.

Meri, speaking at a reception at the Bank of Finland headquarters in Helsinki, said he was "pleased by the words of Boris Yeltsin, which were said to the Estonian ambassador several hours ago." "The new government of Estonia, parliament and I are unified in our desire to overcome the remaining essential obstacles to the normalization of the relations," he said.

The main obstacle is a territorial dispute between the two nations, said the Estonian president, who is on an official three-day visit to Finland, coming to a close on Thursday evening.

Interviewed on Economic Issues

BR1805135395 Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET
in Swedish 17 May 95 p 5

[Report by Bjarne Nitovuori: "Lennart Meri in Finland — Stable Economy Is a Security Factor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonian President Lennart Meri emphasized economic stability as a factor of crucial importance also for the country's security when he began his official visit to Finland yesterday.

"Estonia tries to utilize all security systems and structures. Among them are economic relations and international investments which contribute to greater economic stability and security. We consider the economic structures to be part of security. If we succeed in stabilizing them, we believe that Western Europe will be more interested in us," Meri said at a press conference after his talks with [Finnish] President Martti Ahtisaari.

It is precisely with regard to cooperation in the Baltic region — which primarily is of an economic nature

— but also when it comes to maintaining stability in Northern Europe that the Estonian and Finnish positions are altogether concurrent.

For example, Meri responded to a question about the two countries' opinion as to whether Russia may be violating the treaty on the limitation of conventional weapons in Europe by saying that "our two states are utilizing all available foreign policy measures in this issue."

Nevertheless, Meri suggested that there are also differences between the countries' views on security policy because of the geopolitical situation, although this question was not the subject of a deeper discussion between the presidents.

"But the differences are not such that they necessarily distance us from each other."

However, he mentioned that Estonia "for reasons which are self-explanatory from Estonia's perspective" has let it be known that Partnership for Peace (PFP) with NATO is viewed as a first step toward NATO membership.

As we all know, the PFP arrangement does not have that purpose in Finland and the official view here is that NATO membership is not on the agenda at all.

EU Agreement Increases Contacts

Estonia's ambition to get closer to the EU also involves increased contacts with Finland. Estonia will sign its agreement with the EU on 29 May.

"Estonia is special in so far as we are signing an agreement without a transitional period. It is a result of the profound restructuring of the economy which Estonia has carried out," President Meri said.

The EU agreement means the start of a process which includes a political dialogue between Estonia and the EU and practical cooperation projects that create opportunities for future membership. For Finland this means something very specific and continuing talks, noted Jaakko Laajava, head of the Finnish Foreign Ministry's political section.

In his dinner speech that evening President Ahtisaari declared that he "is convinced that both Finland and Estonia will be members of the European Union in due time."

"We will do our best for that day to arrive as soon as possible," he said.

Visa Exemption Next Year?

Baltic Sea cooperation was a central theme during the presidents' talks, according to Finnish sources.

The Baltic Sea Council will meet at the ministerial level shortly and both presidents emphasized that this cooperation ought to become more visible and more important.

Economic cooperation is the big issue in the collaboration among Baltic Sea countries. There is greater interest in this cooperation than previously, also within the EU. It means that more and more resources, expectations, and international attention will be directed toward the region.

Energy cooperation — among other things, the conditions for running the Norwegian gas pipeline to Finland and the Baltic region — was also discussed. The presidents noted, however, that Sweden has a key position in this issue.

The presidents noted once more that the long-planned visa exemption between the countries is progressing. Nevertheless, Lennart Meri did not want to set a date when it will be introduced. In his dinner speech President Ahtisaari expressed hope that the visa exemption will be implemented next year.

Common National Anthem

President Lennart Meri and Mrs. Helle Meri began their three-day visit to Finland at 1100 AM (0800 GMT) yesterday when their airplane landed at Helsinki Vanda Airport. Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen, among others, greeted them at the airport.

The formal welcoming ceremony took place half an hour later at the presidential palace. There the guests were welcomed by President Martti Ahtisaari and Mrs. Eeva Ahtisaari. Also Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen was among those who welcomed the Estonian guests on the palace courtyard.

The national anthem was played twice to mark that the two countries' national anthems have the same melody, composed by Fredrik Pacius. At the press conference a few hours later Lennart Meri said that at the age of 66, he still gets moved when he hears the countries' common anthem and sees Estonia's and Finland's flags fly.

After a few hours' discussions in the presidential palace and the press conference, President Meri laid wreaths at the Heroes Cross and on Marshal Mannerheim's grave at Sandudd. Afterwards he got acquainted with the Riksdag [parliament]. At the same time Mrs. Meri and Mrs. Ahtisaari visited the Children's Hospital and the National Opera.

Today the Estonian presidential couple will continue the official visit with a visit to Turku and Salo. Tomorrow

the guests will be going to Rovaniemi from where they return directly to Tallinn.

First Official Visit

This is the first time President Martti Ahtisaari is hosting an official visit. It is also the first time that President Lennart Meri is making an official visit at all. And it is the first official Estonian visit to Finland since 1937 when Estonia's then president, Konstantin Pats, was the guest of President Kyosti Kallios.

"So much time has gone by that it seems like it happened in prehistoric times," Meri noted yesterday.

In his dinner speech President Ahtisaari referred to a letter from Konstantin Pats which has been found in Finnish archives. In his letter to the Finnish political leadership, dated 30 July 1940 — that is, shortly before Pats was taken away to Soviet imprisonment — the last president of the first independent Estonian republic put forward his political testament whose most important point was the emphasis on closeness between the states of Finland and Estonia after the end of World War II.

"Now we can begin to see a Europe like President Pats saw it," Ahtisaari stated.

Ends Three-Day Visit 18 May

LD1805172195 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1600 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonian President Lennart Meri ended his state visit to Finland this afternoon. During the his three-day visit, Meri said that Estonia wishes to improve relations with Russia, to become a member of the European Union, and to resolve the issue of illegal immigrants.

During their meeting Meri and Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari discussed cooperation between the two countries in power engineering, issues to do with the international Via Baltica motorway, the installation of a joint gas pipe, and trade relations. During the presidents' meeting Estonia's large trade deficit with Finland was also under discussion, as well as projects of visa-free travel being introduced.

The Estonian president visited Helsinki, Turku, and Rovaniemi during his 3-day state visit.

Trade, Sea Transport Agreements With Ukraine

LD1805172995 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network
in Estonian 1600 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Estonia and Ukraine today initialled a free-trade agreement and an agreement on sea transport. Government delegations initialled the

free-trade agreement and its appendixes, including rules for determining the origin of goods. According to Tiit Reiman, head of the Estonian Ministry of Economy foreign trade department, the Estonian-Ukrainian free-trade agreement covers all goods, including farming produce.

Attending the initialing ceremony was Ukrainian Ambassador to Estonia Yuriy Olenenko. The Estonian-Ukrainian free-trade agreement will be signed on 24 or 25 May, when Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma arrives in Estonia on a state visit.

Latvia

Finance Minister Resigns Over 'Mistakes'

WS1905103995 Tallinn BNS in English
1214 GMT 19 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, May 19, BNS — Latvian Finance Minister Andris Piebalgs announced his resignation thus admitting mistakes in implementation of the budget policy.

Piebalgs made the statement during the Saeima's (parliament) extraordinary meeting on Friday. He is going to submit resignation to the Prime Minister Maris Gailis later on Friday.

Piebalgs said the budget crisis has been caused by the crisis in Latvia's banking sector.

On Wednesday, the Latvian government decided to take partial control over country's biggest commercial bank, the Banka Baltija. Several other banks were suspended also earlier, causing rumours about Latvia's financial health and lat's potential devaluation.

Piebalgs said the state budget needs 70 million lats (134 million U.S. Dollars) to cover the deficit. The outgoing minister proposed to decrease state expenses or take a credit from the central bank.

Transport, Communications Agreement With Belarus

LD1805131695 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1200 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Latvian and Belarus transport ministers today signed an interstate agreement on cooperation in the rail transport and communications spheres. A statement that was issued says that the agreement on cooperation in the sphere of rail transport will promote the safety of carriage of passengers, coordinate timetables of passenger transport, reduce formalities related to the border crossing, and will regulate the transportation of dangerous cargoes.

The second agreement will tackle the problems of currency conversion and will improve transit communications. It will also promote the introduction of a network of direct communications and the joining of a newly-constructed Belarus system of optical communications.

Lithuania

Foreign Minister Departs for Gdansk Meeting

WS1805141895 Tallinn BNS in English
1412 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Vilnius, May 18, BNS — Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys left for Poland on Thursday to attend the fourth ministerial session of the Baltic Sea States Council.

The two-day meeting in the port city of Gdansk is aimed at reviewing the council's activities over the past year and planning further cooperation in the Baltic Sea region.

Representatives from 10 countries are to assess achievements in economic, nuclear and environmental cooperation, human rights protection, law enforcement and some other areas. [passage omitted]

Cabinet Forms Department for European Integration

WS1905075895 Tallinn BNS in English
1727 GMT 18 May 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, May 18, BNS — The Lithuanian Cabinet has decided to establish a new Foreign Ministry department for European integration, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius told reporters Thursday.

Slezevicius also said that the signing of an association agreement between Lithuania and the European Union had been moved from May 29 to June 12. The premier gave no reasons for the postponement.

As regards the new department, Slezevicius said it would be responsible for coordination of Lithuania's relations with the European Union.

On Wednesday, the government also set up a coordinative council for European integration, which is headed by the prime minister. The council includes several deputy ministers, President's Office representatives and some other officials. In addition, the Cabinet decided that every minister must have a deputy responsible for European integration processes.

Opening of Chechen Center Elicits Inquiry

*WS1905080295 Tallinn BNS in English
1727 GMT 18 May 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, May 18, BNS — The Lithuanian Foreign Ministry has asked Kaunas municipal authorities for explanations regarding the opening of a Chechen information center in that city, officials said Thursday.

In a letter sent to the Kaunas City Council on Wednesday, the ministry's Press and Information Department indicated that the center was opened in violation of the established order.

Under the existing government regulations, foreign information bureaus and centers can be opened in Lithuania only with the mediation of the Foreign Ministry.

Arvydas Naujokaitis, the department's first secretary, told BNS that no permission to open a Chechen information center in Kaunas had been given. This actually means that the center was opened unlawfully, he noted.

Naujokaitis said the Foreign Ministry intends to make an official statement after an answer from Kaunas authorities is received.

Kaunas Mayor Rimantas Tumosa said an answer would be given only after the municipality's lawyers present their conclusions.

Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin told BNS on Thursday that Moscow was still looking into the circumstances of the center's opening and preparing to react officially if its activities become anti-Russian.

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